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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Use of the Term, "Psychological IE.ta 11 • 
1 
This dissertation is an investigation of several 
philosophical questions, answers to which are basic to any 
attempt to formulate rules of moral conduct from psycho-
logical data .. 
'lhe term "psychological data" as here used may be 
understood in either or both of two senses, one a broad, 
and the other a somewhat specialized usage: 1. Any 
"conscious" or "unconscious nl mental content which can be 
Shown to be relevant to problems of moral choice; 2. the 
carefully classified results of scientific psychological 
experimentation and observation. Now while problems 
faced in this dissertation are equally pertinent to both 
interpretations of 11psychological datatt, it is the second 
one which is of most pressing current interest. 
II. Evidence of Interest in the Relation between ~hies 
and Psychological Data. 
From many quarters one is able to observe an in-
creasing interest in utilizing scientific psychological 
findings for the formulation and/or revision of moral 
codes. Even though sametimes there is a tendency to over-
look the fact that an adequate morality may need to im-
I. The term "unconscious mind" is an unfortunate and 
misleading coinage, but is used here because it is 
widely employed, and because the introduction of a 
substitute term would require a quantity of explana-
tion which at this point would hardly be justifiable. 
prove the psychological data, the recognition of the in-
t~r-relatedness of the two fields is a development worth 
cultivating. Illustrative of such tendencies is, for 
instance, the following statement by Thomas EngliSh Hill 
at the conclusion of a wide and ably-conducted survey of 
the contemporary ethical scene: 
All too often moralists have relied solely upon 
their own introspective insights and their all 
too limited and often biased observations. Like 
·every other significant discipline that claims 
to have a bearing on facts, moral philosophy 
must be grounded in exact empirical data ••• there 
is no inherent reason why united effort cannot 
yield achievement here as well as in science. In 
order to clarify the issues and avoid the pitfalls 
and blind alleys ••• moral philosophers must now 
make the fullest use of the findings of the 
moralists of the past and present; but this must 
be only preliminary to renewed, patient, careful 
examination of the data themselves, the formula-
tion of new hy:potheses, the repeated checking and 
rechecking of these against the data and the sug-
gestions of other thinkerst and the consequent 
revision of hypotheses.2 
Radhamal Mukerjee, advocating what he calls "A 
Biosocial Approach to Morals", wri tea: 
It is ••• by no means true that the subject matter 
of ethics has disappeared or has even been attenu-
ated. Psychoanalysis and psychopathology throw a 
flood of light on the dynamics of moral behavior. 
These now yield a new dynamic view of the human 
personality with its tensions, behaviors, and ex-
pectancies oriented in an integral manner at con-
scious and unconscious levels and lay bare many 
strivings, conflicts, and imperatives governing 
behavior that gould not be clarified by introspec-
tive analysis. 
The same interest is expressed by psychologists as 
well as by philosophers. Thus Harold D. Lasswell writes: 
2. Hill, CET, 2o6-257. 
3. Mukerjee, (.Art. )1950. 
2 
:tn.· co:mmon with-·a.ny- branCli-·or-·sociai and··-· 
poiit'icaJ:. scfien·ce;. ·psyChology oears a.n- in:.. -
s·trumen tar-x-elati an ship- to··· morals and· :P o:ti~ 
·tici!f.-~--. -~e rela..tionShip of paycholcfgical· · 
kiiawiedge· to;· •• ··aas·es of moral frustrati·on: 
is· benign.-,- for by the- _timely e:pplicatiori ·or 
·this kn6wledg€f"the ·:moral intention may be 
properly im_pl e:n.ented. 4 
- - -
:Elricfu. Fromm, a. neopsychoanalyat who ha.s produced 
. ~ . -
one of the few works in 1'lb.ich an actual attempt is mde 
- - - - - ~ - . 
to develop ethical principles through applic~tio~ of 
- -· " 
psychological data, regards the quest for moral norms 
as an indispensable factor in any productive attempt to 
understand personality. 
-- ' .. 
Psychoanalysis, in a.n attempt to establieh. 
psychology ·as a natural science inade the mis-
ta.ke·of divorcing psychology from problems of 
philosophy and ethics~ · It ignored the fact 
that human· pars cna.lity ean not be understood 
unless·we look at him in his totality, which 
includes his need to ·find an answer· to the 
question_ of the meaning of his existence and 
to disco5er norms according to which he ought 
to live. 
One of the most original attenpts at studying 
ethics p sych~logi c~ 11! is th~ _thoroughly expe:t:"imen tal 
work of :aa.rry L• Hollingsworth reported in his book, 
~aychology and Ethics. He states his purpose, in part, 
a.s follows : 
This book attempts to take the subject of 
etbies out of the clouds and to give it 
solid anchorage in the psychology of every-
day life. Only wren this objective is 
achieved can rules of conduct and moral 
principles be expressed that will guid us 
safely in the world of tomorrow. Ethical 
... 
i~ Lasswell, (Art. )1941. 
5. Ji'l:.'omm., MFH, 6-?. 
3 
t·op1cra -a.a 1lere ·-aonsia·er"Erd ·become· subject- to 
6l'"diftary ··a·cien:tific·· inspe·cftioif -;.. to obse·r:..··· · 
va. tlon, · cla·asi:f'Tcation, ··analysis,- ·and reason-;.; 
·a.bie · argum:eht, ve·r"iflable by other·s.· ·"Ethical 
phen·am.ent=f 1·erid tliemselv"fHf."in· ·some .. respects· ••• 
to meaeuremen t and to experimental study. 6 
4 
While_ one mign.t w~th good cause _qu,e~~-~on_ H_ol:lings-
worth'a_ ra;~er narrow_assUini>tion that science is reason-
able and philosophy is not, his work does illustrate grow-
~, • • ~· ·- • ·- • •> ·• I '"' • •' • • '• • •• .. -' ,, - • • - • • • • .._ • •- .. , • 
ing interest ~n thi~. problem. lliRnY mo:re articles and books 
. ·- ~ .. 
could be cited as evidence of a growing interest in utiliz-
ing not only psychological d~_ta,.. but data from ·all social 
•, .. ·- • -- , ' . • .. . • •·· • . • .... ' . ,:}- • .r • - - ·- .. . - ·• .• 
sciences, and even, in some ·9'sls, from the physical 
... -. ---· -·- .. ·- ~ - . ;;::-: :/' 
sciences, :for elucidating p;r::o'b).ems of morality in hum.a.il re .. 
lationab.ipa. Such procedures would by no means be taking 
problems of ethics out of the realm of philosophy. Any 
. . 
attempt at scientific investigation, whether in physical 
science or in social sci~nce, is launched fran a platform 
of certain fundamental philosophical a.aaumpti on a about 
. . . ' 
the subject investigated, about the relevance and inter-
, ... 
preta tion of data, about productive methods, about the 
. . ~ .. 
criteria of judgment and the requirements of evidence, etc. 
. . - . 
In a very r·eal way, therefore, any effort to derive moral 
laws :from psychological data will presuppose· some philoso-
phy about man, about his values, about the nature of mo:ral 
. . . .. . . . . . .. . .. . . ' . ~ 
obligation, and about other basic considerations. Un-
fortunate_ly psychologists, in their anxiety to make theirs 
a thoroughly 11scientific 11 atudy, have sometimes taken their 
6. · Holllngswortht P.AE, Prevaoe, v. 
• 
5 
philosophies by default, deluding themselves into believ-
ing that their ignorance of the assumptions underlying 
their studies rendered such as sump ti ons non-existent or 
irrelevant. Commenting upon this tendency among psycho-
logi sts, philosopher- sci en ti st .Alfred North Whitehead 
observed that 
the progress of biology and psychology has prob-
ably been checked by the uncritical assumption 
of half-truths. If science is not to degenerate 
into a medley of ad-hoc hypotheses, it must be-
come philosophical and-must enter upon a thorough 
criticism of its own foundatians.7 
It was inevitable that sooner or later the fields 
o:f ethics and psychology should be, to some extent and in 
some fashion, conjoined. Both are concerned with human 
behavior, and both attempt to prescribe certain mental 
and physical conduct that is, sanehow, "better". Even 
the :formal dichotomy by 'Which ethics is designated a 
normative science and philosophy a descriptive science 
is valid only to a limited extent. Efforts toward mental 
therapy through counseling and psychiatric practises are 
of necessity founded upon normative judgments of descrip-
tive data. And since rationally defensible moral norms 
must be possible ideals, the ethicist can ill afford to 
ignore whatever light descriptive data can throw upon 
questions of necessity and possibility. 
It should be recognized that psychology is not 
alone in providing data of interest to the ethicist. 
S.lch studies as. anthropology, sociology·, economics, and 
7.. Whitehead, SMW, 18,r 
........ , ~· -· -- . ·- ... - . ·~.- - ·-- ....... - .. - ~- · .... ·-· .... ~ --·· ..... . ... · ... ·~ ........... ~..,. ..... 
~~.S.~O,:r,~ are ~~~-e~-~i.!_e_ .?~--other iDJ.P.?~t~t s.?~~-e~~ The 
pres~n~. ~at?-~ concentra..tes on ~h~ .. ~se_ ~_f_ p_~!?h.o~.o~ cal 
data, without suggesting that these are exclusively 
relevant. 
:point in the appropriation of data to problems of ethics. 
~ateve;r else morality ~Y i~volve, it i~! fix."~~ (Jf_ ~~1, 
an eXperience of persons. studies in psychology throw 
more direct light on moral expe~~ence as such than does . 
any other field of investigation. It will be observable, 
of course, that ~ertai~ p~o~lems faced ~n ~til~zing 
psyChological data will be identical with those enc~­
tered in deriving norms from any other data. 
III. ~e Complete Problem. 
This dissertation will be a first step in approach-
ing an extremely far-reaching problem. fhat problem has 
to do with actual derivation ·of moral laws from psycho-
logical data, and the verification of such laws. There 
are many philosophical and methodological sub-problems to 
be dealt with along ·the way to Slch a goal. 
To begin with, the concept moral laws has a long 
philosophical history. Since every contemporary effort 
- . 
to formulate moral laws, by whatever procedure, will be 
colored to same extent by one or several factors in the 
. .. ~ 
historical background, this study gives early attention 
to history. 
ltllfo:y:al ~" must be defined for purposes of this 
:;.::" 
7 
_d!~_ser~at~?n, and an effort made to show !h!__~n. empi~~ca~ 
a.pproa?h is nece~sa:ry. The more se_:z:-i~us object~~ns_ ~-o. -~~ 
empirical approach will then be faced. ~ere must follow 
a discussion of several matters involved in the relations 
-'-··············. ·-- . ~ .~ ... ~ .. -- -··· ··~··-., ···-·-··---··-··· 
between custom and a rational morality, and between the 
- . - . 
descriptive scien~e of psychology and the normative 
science of ethics. 
Any study of moral c ond.uct is a study of the experi-
ence of persons. Only persons of all the entities we know 
anything about exhibit any evidence of making moral choices. 
What we understand moral experience to be reflects direct-
ly mat we understand persons to be. Herewith arises a 
co:nwlication. . :rhe term ~erson, appears to. mean different 
things to different people. Yet nothing verifiable can 
be said about the moral experience of persona except as 
' . - . 
one accepts one or another of the many proposed ways of 
thinking about parsons as well as ways of thin~ing about 
'
1mora.l 11 • In the field of psychology where for m.a.ny years 
attempts bave been nade to study personality "objective-
lyt' or 11 acientifically 11 , one seems to find the confusion 
a.nd disagreement intensified. Clearly, some basis of 
choice must be established, and some selection :n:ade be-
fore any further discussion of the moral experience of 
persons will be intelligible. 
Once we ha.ve selected, at least tentatively, a. 
workable concept of persanali ty, it then will be pos-
aible to examine the moral experience of persons. Here 
~ ··-- .. ,_ -· ~-- - -· ...... .._,_... . .. ,_- ·~ __ ,._ . .._ ..... 
both the possibilities and the limitations of psychologi-
... - " ..... 
cal d.a.~a _will b~_come specially apparent. Here, also, in 
. ········' . -·· .. - - .. , ., . -
the na.ture of moral experience itself, if at all, some 
basis for ~~v_ersali t;v m.ust be £.'~~?-~. 
-· - ... . .... ~ 
Whatever else mo :ra.l e:x:peri enee may or may not be, 
it is an acknowledgment of obligation concerning the ef-
fects of aetiona upo~ values and parsons~ With this no 
moralist can disagree, :for to do so is to deny the very 
existence of a moral problem l;>y asserting that so-called 
moral choices matter to no one. Just as it would be 
meaningless to <Uscuss the moral experience of persons 
. . . 
without a clear understanding of our concept of personali-
. . 
ty, so would it be meaningless to discuss obligation 
. . 
toward values wi tbout a clear-cut theory of value. Here, 
again, the problem of uni ver sali ty in moral la.ws come s to 
the fore. Recent psycho~philosophioal s~dies o~ value 
afford encouragement to believe that there is some univer-
sality in value experience; that is to s~, that some ex-
periences may be valuable to all persona, thus affording 
foundations :for a moral obligation a.t least as universal 
a.s the recognition of common values. A theory of value 
is thus a basic issue. 
Equipped with an understanding of the nature of 
the experiencing person, an insight concerning the nature 
of the moral experience i tselt, and understanding to 
. .. . 
some extent the values about which "feelings" of obliga~ 
tion center, it would then be possible to discuss the 
l?J~i9_ cr! ~e:ri!_i~~ moral laws from p sychologica 1 data.. 
~-- ...... ~ ~ ·-···· ~ .... ----·~--; ~- ..... , -·-
The central q_uestien at this point, of course, is, "to 
,O•# 'P•-••·-•-•; •• •o• o• ·~ --~·--·-'-••• ·-·- -·•' 
what extent, and in what way, can the scientific method 
- . ..-... -- ··-·· -- -- ·-·- ~ ..... __ ,,, .... - ---· .. .. -. ~--- ......... . 
of discovering physical laws be utilized f" Following 
··- ' .... -· -- -·· ._ ......... . 
very closely in importance is the proO.lem of making_~i­
versality of moral obligation coherent with the indivi-
- ·- . _... .. . " 
duality of personalit,r. 
--. - -. --
Aetual formulation and verification of moral laws 
could then follow. Finally, there would be almost limit-
less_ opp?rtuni ~ies for application to personal and social 
moral problems. 
IV. ~e Scope of This Dissertation. 
The present work is distinctly a. prolegame~~ to the 
far-reaChing problem delineated above. It is an attempt 
to face several of the basic philosophical problems en-
countered in such an investigation. The importance of 
care and thoroughness calls for a strict delimitation of 
- . . . . 
this introductory work to the general question of whether 
or not such_ an investigation is philosophically sound. 
T.b.us the outline set forth above will be pursued at the 
:pr~sent only through the examine. tion of the psychology of 
moral experi enae. 
T.b.e next logical step would be the development of 
a comprehensive theory of value. While it is hoped that 
eventually the investigation ean be carried into axiologi-
- . 
cal considerations, this is a problem sufficiently broad 
and com.pl ex: to preclude treatment within the present 
10 
foundation work. 
-v.; Previous Work in· the Field. ~e Literature. 
No problem, ~ealing as this one does with a living 
issue in philosophy, will suffer from meagerness of inter-
est or of relevant material. Within the past ten years 
no less than thirty books have contained specific refer-
ences of more than incidental signi:f'ic~ce to this sub-
ject. The technical journals; too, have been well-stocked 
with discussions of the relation between psychology and 
morality. If' one expands the term "relevant material tt so 
as to include all the works which throw some light on the 
v~rious topice to be discussed successively as our in-
vestigation proceeds, the task of even listing them be-
e omes an impossible one. Not only are there now literal-
ly hundreds of' books and articles dealing with one or more 
of such topics as philosophical contributions ·to ethics, 
the nature of' personality, the experience of' moral obliga-
tion, the definition and classification of' values, and the 
applicabilit.y of scientific method to a study of moral 
judgments; if the past few years may be regarded as a basis 
for prediction, more will be in print before this investi-
gation is completed. Thus all we can hope to do by way of 
calling attention to important contributory material is to 
cite such works in direct relation to specific topics as 
the study un:f' ol ds. 
When one turns from a consideration of ~enerall~ 
relevant material to that of previous work and literature 
on the problem of actually utilizing psychological data 
for the formulation of specifically stated moral laws, 
one is amazed to find that even though relevant data 
accumulate rapidly, little appropriation is being made. 
This condition can hardly be regarded as a universal 
oversight, especially since, as indicated above, there 
11 
is increasing interest in the. rela.tion of the two fields. 
Bather, the peculiar dearth of prod.ucti ve labor at this 
point would appear to be concrete evidence for the impor-
tance of facing same of the inescapable philosophical 
problems involved. Arather extensive examination of the 
general literature produced during the past years indicates 
that the work is inhibited by a philosophical dilemma: 
For the most part, those who are convinced of the import-
ance of psychological data for moral problems doubt the 
likelihood of moral !awe; and moat of those who take the 
reality of moral laws seriously doubt that psychological 
data can be helpful. 
German philosopher-psychologist Wilhelm WUndt was 
one of the first to con~uor this dilemma. His compre-
hensive ~ik~ (1886) considers not only psychological 
data, but anthropological and sociological data as well, 
and exhibits remarkable grasp of philosophical issues in 
the formulation of moral norms vrhich are asserted to be 
valid for cont~porary civilized man. 'VUndt•s labors, 
8. An Jlli'ig1i5h t:Fansla tian in three volumes by E. :a. 
Titchener, julia Henrietta Gulliver, and Margaret 
F1oy Washburn was produced between 1908 and 1914. 
12 
unfortun~tely, were not soon to be supplemented by com-
parable investigations, as for a quarter century or more 
0 M • 0 ~ "• o ' • ' 
most psychologists became preoccupied with physiological 
. ,. .. . . . .. . .. -
measurements, or with reducing volitional acts to one or 
- • • - - - '.. •• • * ~ 
another form of biological determinism. 
The present. wr~ ter_t s 1.nterest_ in the problem was 
first aroused by E. S. Brightman t s !oral Laws (1933). 
By it also same of. the essential problems of the present 
study were suggested. Brightman sets forth more adequate-
ly than has any p.rev ious writer some of the philosophical 
principles of deriving moral laws from psyChological data, 
though he does not, in formulating specific laws, take 
much experimental or case study naterial into account. 
There are other materials which have been helpful 
in gaining perspective on the subject and in sugge_s~ing 
the general direction this investigation might take. 
Louise Saxe Eby' s The Q,ues-;t for Moral I.a.w (1944) is excel-
' lent on historical background and in assisting in orienta~ 
tion on the present status of the problem. Thomas English 
Bill's ~ontemporary ~thical Theories (1950) is a s~cnoaarly 
and incisive survey of the principal important current 
schools of ethical thought. 
Where progress toward workable answers to real 
issues is impeded by concern over the fate of metaphysical 
preconceptions, John Dewey's ~e Quest for Certainty9 (1929) 
9. The order of mentioning various works is not historical, 
but parallels, in so far as possible, the development 
of the thought in this investigation. 
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will be especially helpful. Herein also will be found 
suggestions for application of scientific method to pro-
blems of personal and social morality. 
. - -
George R. Geiger, a Dewey disciple, presents, in 
!awards an Objective Ethics (1938), an ar~~n~ for the 
necessity of a "functianal 11 approach to ethics. Geiger 
institutes a se~rch for ethical prin~iples in the socio-
economic_ life of man and develops what are,. fo:t' the Dew~y 
approach, significant criteria for tlobjective scientific'* 
. . . 
ethics: 1) Presence of operational meanings; 2) Possibili· 
ty of control; 3) Opportunity for application. Geiger ts 
views may be regarded as representative of a number o:f 
writers who deal with the application of science to 
ethics, some of whomwill be cited at appropriate points 
in this study. 
Stephen Toulmin, in Reason in Ethics, (1951) pre-
sents a stimulating discussion of the possibilities and 
limitations of reason in the moral realm, restating some 
views generally accepted among those who regard moral 
decisions as amenable to rational judgment, and, if his 
position be accepted, rendering an empirical approach 
necessary. 
Concept of M:>~, (1937) by w.. T. Stace is par ... 
ticularly significant to any approach to morality through 
ps,ychology. Stace takes happiness (not pleasure} of per-
sons as the criterion of moral action but specifically 
denies that his approach is hedonistic. This happiness 
...... ~.... ' ... --······· j - ~-
is seen to be a condition of aelf~fulfilment which is 
achi eve_d ~J:l~ol;lgh un_~e?-f~ sh a:f'fi_~;a. ti ve _ re~a ti ons with 
other persona. This work is :f:urther suggestive in 
. . - ~- ~ 
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J?.~~~~~ng; __ a._ W~Y .. _to ;r>Er~-~~---~o!.~.~. ~:ttd~~!:lt~ '--~~- -~~ ~ :J?~ s~ ~--· 
tistic denial of the relevance of such judgments is cir-
cumvented. 
!lhe me st comprehensive study of personality in re-
cent years is Gordon w. Allport 'a Personality: A Psycho-
-. . . - ·-. .. . --
1og;i. cal A;P:proach (1931). We are indebted to tr!is ~oro\lgh 
. - -- . ~ -
discussion, both for the clues it provides to the status 
. ·- . -. 
of the term gene:r~lly, _ and, in an important measure, for 
the concept of personality proposed for the present in-
vestigation. 
Kurt Lewin's work as a social scientist has been 
unusual~~ productive for a broadened understanding of per-
sonality. His Field ~eorr in_ Social ~ience, a. :P?st-
humously published collection o.f his works, has been es-
:pe_cia.lly_ valuable in affording insight and grasp of _the 
extent to vhich a person 'a society participates in the 
total :personality pattern • 
. Paul Johnson's arti ole, 11:Ma.rgins of Conscious-
nesslt,lO now awaiting publication, affords .interesting 
. . . ' - . . 
and strengthening collaborationJ both in discussions of 
. . -
the so-called unconscious mind, and in dealing with the 
mind-body problem. 
L. Harold DeWolf's article, "A personalistic Re-
!O. J"ohhson, .Art.(l952). 
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examination of' the Mind-Body Problem 11 , 11 also awaiting 
p~blica.tion_, is highly valuable in establishing the philo-
sophical ade9-ua~y of' views. i:~:tcorporating the. assumption 
of' psycho~physical continuity in personalit,y. 
.. ,.. . .. ~ . . . -· 
Two_ articles by Peter A. Bertocci _ar~ v~luab~e f'o:r 
this study. One is his treatment on 11Personalityu in 
Harriman (ed.) ~cyclopedia of' Philosophy (1946). 
Bertocci 's "A Reinterpretation of' Moral Obligation~' 
(1945)12 is of' special importance as a f'ull•scale counter 
attack upon the Freudian reduction of conscience to the 
. . 
"internalization" of' society's d.ompulsions. Without some 
such searching re-examination of this matter, ttmora.l laws:" 
formulated from psychological data could be nothing more 
than statements o:f various current mores. 
Contemporary discussions of axiology certainly 
could not be what they are without the pioneering work 
in the "interest u approach presented in Ralph ~rton 
Perry's General Theory of Value (1926). While this in 
itself can hardly be regarded as an adequate concept of 
value, it does point the way which numerous subsequent 
thinkers have pursued, and, in general, anticipates the 
kind o:f method proposed in our own study. Perry's work 
deserves mention because of the thorough manner in which 
he clear the way :for all views which find value in human 
experience itself. 
11. DeWolf, Art. (1952). 
12. Bertocci (Art.) 1945. 
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The V~_rifiEJ.b.i~_i-~;r,_ o~ _Value 1 (1944) by Ray Lepley, 
is ~qually worthy of men ~ion ~or the fortific_a_tion it 
pro vi des against claims that value judgments are Wholly 
. , .. -.' - - ... . ... . ..... 
~u?jecti_v~, ~ence devoid of ~he possibili_ty _of ol:)~ect~v:e 
verification. Lel?ley t s precision ·in ~fferentia ting be-
tween various meanings of valu~ while somewhat cumber-
some, does call attention to a wide-spread ambiguity 
which often has made axiological discussions more con-
fused than would be necessary. The omission of reli-
gious values robs the work of breadth of comprehension. 
Ex'ich Fromm is one of the few psychologists who 
. . 
has made a definite effort to derive moral laws from 
psychological data. In his clearly written book; Ma.p. 
tor H.im.sel:f, (1947) Fromm sets out to find in the 
. ... . --
psychological nature of man answers to problems of 
morality. After describing the human person according 
to various typical ttorientationsn which develop around 
several poles of requirement~interest, Fromm takes up 
mat he calls problems of 11H.umanistic Ethics u. The pro-
blem.s he lists are self-love, conscience, pleasure and 
happiness, means and ends, man's need for faith, the 
moral powers of man, freedom of the will, and attitude 
toward force or power. At last he equates ~~li ty and 
men tal health t 
The problem of psychic health and neurosis is 
inseparably linked with that of ethics. It may 
be said that every neurosis represents a moral 
problem. The failure to achieve maturity and 
integration of the whole personality is a moral 
'fail.ure ·--1-:n ~the- sense or· ·humani atic · e"tbic ff;- In-
a. ·m.o:rz.e- spe"cifrc ·aen:se many' neuroifes ·are-·t:ne· :ex-
preesioi:i" of moral -pr oblenur; and ·neuro tie- s.f · :: 
toms result from unresolved moral conflicts~3 
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Fromm•s wo~k (except for some metaphysical inferences he 
.•. •d••·- •• ~ • - •• • - • - -- • • - '- ...... -~ • • • - • • • 
feels required to draw) shows more graSJ? of philosophical 
... . - . . .. ~ - ' . . .. -· .. 
P:X:?,b~~ms th_an is usu~lly found in the work of P~Y<?l:to~o­
gists. Des~ite the fact that he sometimes seems to confuse 
ethics and :psychology, Fromm makes What the present writer 
. . . -. -·· . . ... . 
would regard as one o:f the two or three most significant 
contribution to insight on moralproblems co~ng trom that 
field. 
H. H. Hollingsworth's ~sychology and Ethics, (1949) 
is an interesting and very different attempt to deal with 
ethics :psychologically. If one understands that 
Hollingsworth's boo~ is a study of the feeling of moral 
obligatiQn as a psychological fact, and that it provides 
no insight concerning what a. defensible morality ought to 
. .. -· 
be, it has some value for the purpose for which it is in-
tended. :But that purpose is de~eated to some extent by 
an unfortunate confusion of moral obligation, logical 
predictability, social expectation, and other forms of 
experience simply because in the English language the 
term ••ought u is often employed in a way devoid of moral 
implication. If one should attempt to use investiga-
tiGns such as Hilling~orth's as bases for formulating or 
revising moral codes, it would be a clear illustration of 
the need for facing the kind of ps,ychological questions 
- . 
which ax-e undertaken in our present study. In sllort l 
!3. homm, :MFH. 224. 
18 
moral ought vs. nonmoral ought. 
Other valuable psychological and psychiatric works 
.. . - -
throwing some light from various angles upon our problem 
. - -
include a Franz .Alexander and Thomas ][!. French, 
Psychoanalytic Therapy, (1946); ~orman C~eron, !J:le 
Psychology of Behavior Idsorders, (1947); J. Dollard and 
- . 
N. E. Miller, ~ersonality and Psychotherapy, (1950); 
. .. ... .. . . - . . . . -· --' ... -. . .. ; .. 
Sigmund _Freud,. New Lectures in_ Psy?hoanalysis, (1923); 
-. . " 
Erich Fro:n:nn, Escape fro~ ~eedom, (1941); Karen Horney, 
New Ways in Psy-choanalysis, (193~), QE!. Inne:: Conflicts, 
(1945) and Neurosis and Human Growth, (1950); Alfred C. 
- --· . ----:- - - . ·-. . ... 
Kinsey, eta~., ~exual Behavior in the ~uman Male, (1948); 
Fritz Kunkel, In Search of Maturity, (1943); Jules Masser-
man, Prin~iples of ][n~c P~ychiatry, (1946); Karl 
Menninger, Love Against Hate, (1942) and ~n Against~ 
.§.elf, (1938); J. G. Miller (e~.), ~eriments in Social 
~recess, (1950); o. H. MOwrer, ~arning Theory and Per-
.§.Onality D[namics, (1951); Otto Rank, !ill T.hera;pl and 
Truth and Reality, (1945);Carl R. Rogers, Client-
Centered Therapy, (1951); Silvan s. Tompkins (ed. ), 
Q~nte~orary Pslchopat~~' (1946). 
When one turns to a consideration of periodical 
material, one finds essentially the same situation as that 
prevailing among the books: fhere is a super-abundance of 
generally relevant literature, but comparatively little 
treating the specific problem of this dissertation. 
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.. -- - ..... , 
__ ... _ Patrick llfu;t;ta).,lY'~ article,. ~.'P~cJ:li~tr~~ ~n~ ??~~ho­
l()~i.~a.l_Co!l.~~ibu~~ons to Ethicsu, 14 is perhaps the most 
. . .. . . . . -
directly pertient. .Milllahy follows, and, for the most 
.. - ... . ... 
part, reiterates Fromm's discussion in Escape from Free-
• , . • . ·- •.• ·--~ p • . b •• 
~~ holding that studies in mental therapy point to the 
significance of self-d~velopment and self-respect as 
sound bases for ethics. 
A. I• Malden moves toward a reconciliation of a 
long-standing s.truggle, arguing in "On the :Method o:f' 
.. - . 
Ethics tt that there is 11nothing in principle incompatible 
between an emotive ty:pe o:f' analysis and an ethics in 
which due attention is :paid to the role o:f' princi:ples 
and moral imperatives. nl5 
Two articles presenting views somewhat o:p:posed to 
that which will be developed in the prese~t study were 
written by w. D. Falk and George Gurvitch, Falk's arti-
.. 
ole, 11Morali ty and Nature nl6 denies any universality o:f' 
moral judgment on the ground fuat morality arises in the 
nature o:f' man, and that the nature of each person is high-
ly individual. Gu.rvi tch asks the question, "Is MPra.l Phil-
. . ' . 
osophy a Normative ~eoryf11 , 17 and answer in the negative, 
.. 
contending that moral situations make their own n()rms, 
with .:formal ethics constituting only an after-knowledge. 
14. MUllahy, (.A:rt. )1947. 
15~ Melden, (Ai"t. )1948. 
16. Fa.lk, (.Art. }1950. . 
17. GUrvi tch, (.A.t't. )1943 .. 
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Many articles in recent years have, in numerous 
ways, pointed to the need and possibility of an objective, 
~ . . .. . . 
empirica~ ethi<?s• Repre~entatiye of su<?h ~terial __ one 
might list: E. G. C~nk~~n, . ••noes_ .Sc:ien.ce .Affor_d Base~ 
for Ethics?n~8; J. B. Gi ttler, "Science ~nd ~r~ls ul~;_ 
Gerald Heard, "Need for Moral Re.sea.rch n20; R. A. l\11b Connell, 
. . .. .. -. . . . .. ~ . -
11A Physicist Looks at Moralityu2l; L. H. Mcianiels, 11Some 
Social Implica.tio!ls of the. ~cien tific Methodtt22; W. L. 
Sperry, "OUr Moral Chaos u23. 
Finally, it should be noted that such journals as 
Journal of Persona.li~~~:, Men tal !fYgien~.; The Ps;zchoa;talyti£_ 
Review, The Journal of Abnormal a,nd Social Psycho];~, and 
The .American Journal of Sociologl, Journal of Counse~in5, 
?,sychology, Psychiat~z, Psychological ~view, and the 
J'ourna~ Clinical Psl£_holosY regularly contain case study 
material Which is constantly adding to the vast number of 
data that throw light on causes and effects of moral 
choices. 
The foregoing discussion, it should be repeated,is 
only suggestive of material Which is generally relevant 
to the present study. Yet limited as these listings are, 
they are sufficiently representative to give a fair 
sampling of available literature. FUrther compounding of 
ra. 
19~ 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
Conklin, ~Art.)l939. 
Gi ttler, (Art. )194,1. 
Heard, (Art.)l945. 
McConnel~ (Art.)l947. 
McDaniels, (.Art. )1941. 
~erry, (Art.)l942. 
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similar writings would serve no good purpose at this 
point, though numerous additional books and articles will 
be cited at points in the study where they are especially 
relevant. 
It should be borne in mind, of course, that philo-
sophical backgrounds provide.a wealth of preparatory work 
on the concept of moral laws. In a. very real way, there-
fore, the historical survey in Chapter Two will be an ex" 
pansion of the survey of previous contributions. 
CHAPTER TWO 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CONCEPT OF MORAL LAWS 
IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
The search for moral laws is at least as old as 
22 
human history. The Babylonian code of Hammurabi (2104-2061 
B.C.) was believed to have been received from the sun god, 
and pres~ribed specific rules of behavior, together with 
penalties for their violations. The Egyptian Negative 
- . 
Confes_sion, which every soul entering heaven was req~red 
to make before Osiris, mentioned such sins as murder, 
lying, di~rega.rd for truth, blasphemy, and many other~ •. 
The Confession had been developed well before 1, 000 B. c. 
Babylonian-Assyrian religion had assumed a definite ethi· 
cal content by the seventh century before Christ, at the 
latest. 
The first Vedas of India, variously dated from 2500 
- ·~ -. 
to 1500 B.C., represented the chief gods, Varuna and Indra, 
as be :ing molly righteous, and as supporting both physical. 
and moral stability of the entire universe. It is re-
quired of man to lead a. righteous life in order to please 
the gods. The latter Vedas, known as the U;panisads, are 
more concerned with metaphysics than with ethics, but the 
promise of cessation of transmigration for the righteous 
man indicates that the moral element is still a. real factor •. 
Bra.hma.nio morality, a.s set forth in The I.aws of 
~'lb while pre- supposing a caste system, established very 
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definite social obligations, the compexity and extent of 
Which depended upon the supposed capacities of the four 
castes. FOr the Brahman, as a member of the highest caste, 
the chief duty was maintenance of personal piety. FOr the 
lower castes were prescribed duties of sacrifice and 
similar duties, with rebirth in a high caste the promised 
reward. 
Buddhism, founded 536 B.C., prescribed "~e Eight-
fold Path u to truth -- right belief, right resolve, right 
speech, right behavior, right occupation, right effort, 
right thought, right concentration. 
Confucianism in China, dating from about 500 B.C., 
centered about an ideal of filial piety. Gentleness, 
grace, and decorum were regarded as virtues as well as 
the marks of the true aristocrat. Confucius himself was 
primarily concerned with an ethics that could be put into 
practical effect in human affairs, so that his teachings 
contain little discussion of principles as such. 
Probably the oldest direct influence upon Western 
minds regarding moral laws was religious, rather than 
philosophical. This was the Judaeo-Christian tradition. 
The ndoing justlynl of which the Hebrew prophets spoke 
was not vague generalization to their hearers. Jehovah 
was believed to have spoken on occasion quite directly 
to his people, exhorting ihem to specific forms of be-
havior. These directives, growing through several 
1. Michah 6 :8. 
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centuries, became known collectively as The I,a,w. Xb.e .. :r,aw 
.. ---· ~----- .... ~ 
if obeyed was manta guarantee of health and happiness2 , 
and was to be disregarded at the risk of almost certain 
disaster. 
While Jesus brough~_. ~van more empbasis_upo~ tl.:e 
positive aspects of the raw, his assumption of divine ori-
. ····-- -·. . ..... .. ... .. .. . ...... . . - .. 
- . - , 
~n of __ mo;-al _la~s_ matche~ th~~ o~ hij3 _ pr~_dec~s.s_or!=l.~ True, 
he ma~~- ~t clear that righte~usness for the s¥.e of 
~i_gh~Eaousness was P:r:Earequisi~e to th~ goo~_act3 J. it was 
the will of God, hence permanent, having its ground in 
.. .... -
God himself. 4 
~e history of Western ethics as a philosophical 
concern began with the Greeks. ~e apparent incompa. t-
-- . . 
i.bility of moraJ. relativity and moral universality be-
--. . . - '·.- - .. 
~ama _a maj?r problem when Soc~a.tes (470-399 ~C.) spoke 
o1:1t against the_ moral teachings of the Sophists. Prota-
gora.s (fifth cen ttiry, :s. c. ) declared man to be the 
measure of all things, 5 and included moral beliefs in 
the universal flux of which Heraclitus had spoken. 
A direct reaction to sophistic relativism was 
the Sacra tic-Platonic system of. Idea.s~\..wi:Ver:Sa:t. .,~·: : ... 
arehetyp as of raali ty which did not participate in the 
flux of the temporal world, and of which particular 
2. Psa~ 19:7-10. 
3~ :Mark 8 :35.-
4~ Matt. 5:16-18. 
5. Bakewell, SAP. 
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things were only pale copies. 6 The Idea of the Good was 
. - -· - . • .• " •••• c~ " 
for Plato (427•347 B.C.) the form of forms, the organiz-
.. - -· ... . ..... -. -- . ~ . ···-
in~. force ~n.a.~. ~rde_:r:ed ?:iera.~chy. 7 ~~a?-: ~!s ___ (~_eugh 
Plato did not use the term) were among the archetype-
·¥ ~ ~ • • •• ~- ••••• ·- -- -· ............ - --·- ····---···' -·· ~ - •• -· --, 
Ideaa, thus participating in the permanence of reality! 
co~letely beyond the relativity of the physical world. 
Ar.istotle (384-321 B.C.), in turn, denied the 
independently subsistent status Plato had given to 
. . 
moral laws, insisting .that all universals are principles 
of being found consistently from particular to p~rtiou­
lar, but always and only in particula~s. 8 A mean9 rela-
ti ve 11 to ourselves" pro vi des the only rational cri ter-
. . 
ion of conduct. This was not a resurgence of sophistic 
relativism, for Aristotle recognized a universality in 
the reason by whicb. the mean is deter.mined and in the 
nature of man. Probably Aristotle's chief concern was 
to guard against a dogmatic assertion of moral laws 
-whiah would disregard the essential individuality of' 
moral problems. 
~omas Aquinas (1227-1224) gave a peculiarly 
. ' 
theological interpretation to Aristotle's ethics, and, 
while agreeing that man's highest good is contemplative 
6:--Bince most o? our :knowledge of Socrates comes 
from ~lato 's dialogues, no a.ttemp t is made here 
to distinguish between the thought of the two. 
7. Plato, !!~.·, VI and VII. 
8~ Aristotle, Met., V1 VI. 
9. Aristotle, NEr 1106 at b. 
s~~-..;real~zation, a9-~~d __ that this means kn_o!;~-~g-~-~f 
God. 10 Ac~s for Aquinas were g_o_~d or ba~ a,co?.J:ding 
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to the ~oo~e~~ of the will, servant of the intellect.ll 
Row does one know when one_ is willi_ng rig1ltly"l At its 
highest level, the good will in man is a reproduction 
- --- -
o:f the will of God for man. __ ~d's will LJiioral raw:W is 
mad.e known through revelation, 12 and while, for the moat 
part, that revelation can be seen to be reasonable, its 
. .. 
validity in no way dep~ds upon human reason. 13 Nor 
Qan it be followed except as God's grace is given to 
14 man. 
Beginning from a pan theism in which all good and: 
evil have meaning only in terms of fulfilment of life,l5 
~inoza (lo32-l6?7)employs a rigidly math~tical 
technique for the construction of a meaningful ethi~s. 
The 111ntellectual love of God" is at once man's salva-
tion and the nature of the morally good life.l6 It is 
thus that reason is able to afford control over the 
passions. The passions, arising out of ill-formed ideas, 
are the direct source of all evil. Reason leads to the 
I 
amor intellectualis Dei, displaces the excesses of 
lo. 
ll. 
12. 
13~ 
14~ 
15. 
16. 
Thoma's Aijuinas, 8T, II, ~' art. I, and ~~' ii-iv; 
and SCG, III, lxi. l 
Thomas Aquina..s, ST, II , Q,. lvi, and Q,Q,, xlviii, 
lxx:x:ix, lx.xii; and SCGi IIIl, .x. 
Thomas ~uinas, ST, .II , ~, .xciv. 
Loe. cit. . 
Ibid., II~ Q, eix, cxiii, xoiv• 
Spinoza, Eth., Preface; Part 4. 
Ibid., part, props. xiv-xv. 
--~-· ... ---- ~- ... ···-· ____ ,. __ -·-\_. ________ ------- -· 
',_ ·- --· --- ...... ·. 
passion with the mode:ratio,n of control, 17 and_provides 
-·· ...... ··' ,. ~ ----- -·- ~ -·---· .. 
~re incisive appreciation o:f lasting values.18 Mbral 
laws :for B,pinoza were, thus, uniquely to be discovered 
in a pr~ctio~ empiricism_ (~:~elf' ... realization). and a 
theoretical rationalism (-the intellectual love o:f God). 
. . . - - - - . . . 
Modern skepticism concerning moral law found its 
. - . . . 
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first imposing champion in ~vid B.Ume (1711-1776). Said 
. . . .. - - . . . . .. 
he, certain character traits arouse in a+l men 11moral 
. . . -- - . 
sent:illlents" of awroval or disapproval. 19 These moral 
sentiments are expressions of the nature of the i~divi­
dual a_s he develops in his peculiar ex.p eriences. 20 
. 21 11:Reason is and ought to be the slave o:f the passions u, 
because sheer reason possesses no motivational power. 
. . . - . 
By this dichotomy of the personality into "man reason-
--- .. 
ingu ;m_d 11man em.o~ingu, Rume denies the pos_sibili ty o:f a 
ratioil.~l: morality. __ Moral sentiments are. forms of "man 
eniotingtt, having nothing to do with reason. Each man's 
moral experience is as individual as his emotional re-
actions, and while it is necessary that the individual 
react as he does, this is_ the necessity of pass~on,. and 
not of any moral obligatoriness, ~ational or divine. 
. . . 
The apparent generality of some moral sentiments exists 
only because of a !~athetio (not itself emotional) 
17~ ~inoza., E~;, prop. I; scholium, prop. lx.i. 
18. ~id•, prOp"';", lxii. · 
19~ Rum:e; m:N, ·III, iii, I. 
20 ~ Htt:nle; ECl?M, II. 
21. Rttme, THN, II, iii, 3. 
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particij;ia ti9~ :J:_n -~1.1~. app~o!"~:L-:-_a.pp~oba_t~o~_ -~~~r~el].~_e __ of 
·-· -···-·22 
()the:;-_s! . .. ~o-~ .. t:t;rough any uni vera ali zed rational grasp 
of "principle au. 
Edward Weatermarck (1862•1939) combined Hume's 
kind of skepticism with the new sociological relativism 
- . - . "- . - ... ·- - . -. . . ' ' - .. . 
of' :the twentieth c.en tury. "Society i a the school in 
- - .. . . . - - ·-
~ich we learn to distinguiSh between right and wrong. 
The headm.a.~ter is CUstom, aJl.d the le~sons are the a~ 
for all. tt23 Custom, in turn, is "a generalization of 
. -- .. ·-
emotional _tendencies app~ied to ~e~tain mod_es of con~ 
duct and transmitted from generation to generation:24 
Perhaps the moat widely current form of et:bical 
skepticism is that fomented by those who call them-
selveslogice:l positivists. They include such writers 
as Dldwig Wi ttgenstein• Moritz Schlick, Rudolf. ca.rnap. 
.. . 
. . 25 Bertrand Bussell, .Alfred J • .Ayer, and others. By 
. . - . 
arbitrarily limiting experience to senaati~n, the 
. - . . . . 
posi ti vista deny that any ethical judgment can be a 
statement of fact. 26 SUe~ judgments are only emotional• 
ly charged exclamationa, 27 carrying no obligation, even 
to the individual making the judgment. By Ayer, in par• 
ticular, ethics as a legitimate study is confined to 
clarification of the meaning of moral predicates. The 
22~ !ume, f[N, r, ii. 
23. Wester.marck, ER, 48. 
24. Ibid., III. 
25~ See bibliography for works by these writers. 
26 ~ See Oarna:P, · PLS, 36f. 
27. Ibid.;, 24•25·. · See also; Russell, RS, 230:f', 2361'; 
Ayer, LTL, 150, 158. 
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... ~·· ---. .. . . -~-- ....................... -- .... . . _. --. - ... ~ ~ ...... -·-· ... _ ~-.. -- .... - .-.. .... ---- - '-· - ·-· -·· 
entire discussion of the possibility of moral law possess-
... • - ' ' . o ..-- "• -· •. -. -- !I • •• ,... • r • •• - ·~ ~ •· --. •· • • ·-. • ,. •• •• - --- • 
ing universal validi.t.y is, for radical positivism, 
- ..... -. .__ ·- . . -__ - . ~-- .. : ·- -- .. -- ... ·- . .. - . - . . -- - - -. - . . --··· .. - . - --
hon ... sense (and nonsense, too). A somewhat modi.fied posi-
~---- ···--- .. ··-- ----~---·······" ··-·- ·--····-···- . ................ ~- -----··----------
tivi am is pres en ted by Charles L. Stevenson. He recognizes 
-- ... -· -- ---- --... .. .. . -- - ·-·- --. ... ... --~·- ------· -- ·- ... -~ - . ... ·- .. -.-- -
_:that_ ~e_re ~s_alway~ the rational element inyolvec:t_ even in 
emotional reactions. FUrther, he sees that emotive state-
- -- -· . --· 
menta have a legimate place in human affairs, even if they 
- .. ~ - - - .· . ~ . . . 
~a.n~~t be -~mployed in :pr9blems of scientific verifica-
tion. 28 He thinks further that it i a quite possible that 
di. sagreemen ts in 'J?elie~ are r_ea~ly. basic to d_i~agre~Jl1en_t 
in attitudes in ethical matters. 29 If so, same legimate 
pl~ce is left for ethics as a normative science, and 
there is the possibility of reasoning about ethical mat-
ters. Yet even Stevenson 'a modificatio.ns would leave a 
search for moral laws a barren, unproduct~ve pursuit. 
The views of two utilitarians contain significant 
implications for a. kind of moral law. Jeremy Bentham 
(1748 .... 1832) held that· "It is the greatest good for the 
. -. 
greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong. n30 
Pleasure and pain are the two chief motivators of human 
behavior. One man•s pleasure is as good as another•s, 
. . . 
and pleasures themselves differ only quantitatively. 
' ~e ;quantity of pleasure ca):l be measured in seven dimen-
sions: intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, 
2a. Stevenson, EL, vii. 
29. Ibid., 136ft~ 
30.. Bentham, FOG, 93. 
fecundity, purity, extent. 31 Using this calculus, the 
individual will be prudent in choosing acts, the conse-
quences of ~ich will afford the greatest good for the 
greatest number. Such utilitarian morality is to be 
enforced by physical, retributive, political, popular, 
sympathetic, antipathetic, and religious sanctions. 32 
30 
The real enforcing agent is the desire of the individual 
to gain approval with its benefits, and to avoid dis-
approval with its disadvantages, rather than a concern 
for either an absolutistic or a rational oughtness • 
. - - ' ~------
~ohn Stuart Mill (1806-1873) adopted and altered 
.Bentham's utilitarian principle, but denied. that quani±-
- -
tive measurements are adequate for choosing between 
pleasures. There is in men "a sense o:f dignity ••• which 
is so strong that nothing which conflicts with it could 
be ••• an object o:f desire to them 11. 33 It is, therefore, 
11better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a 
fool satisfied". 34 
Persons fitted by natural capacity and breadth o:f 
experience must be the judges concerning which pleasures 
are qualitatively highest.35 Both external and internal 
sanctions support as moral laws the highest quality of 
31. Bentham, .IPJlllL, Chap t. IV. The a e 11d.imensi ons 11 are 
known as the tlfelicific calculus.n 
32. Bentham, FOG, Chapt. v. 
33. Mill, Util., 9. 
34. Loc. cit. 
35. Dll,, Util., 11. 
happiness for the greatest number. External sanctions 
includ~. hope of favor, f~a:J: of di ~pleasure, l::l.uman .. and 
divine.3 6 The ultimate internal sanction (and the on~ 
superior to ?.-11 other~) Js. 11the. c~ns~i. e~:ti ()1lS ~eelings 
of mankind. u37 Such conscientiousness consists of a 
"feeling of moral obligation 11 , combined with sympathy, 
love, fear, religious beliefs, self-esteem, esteem for 
others, and some self abasement. 
31 
The ethics of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) marks the 
clearest possible contrast to both skepticism and 
utilitarianism. Kant holds that 11 The autonomy of the 
-- . . 
will is the sole principle of all moral laws. u38 
Experience. activates a moral a priori, a Categorical 
Imperative39 , which requires the rational person to "Act 
so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or that of another, always as an end and never as a means 
only. n40 The rational will alone -- compliance with duty 
for duty's sake -- can make an aut morall~ right. Al tru-
ism. has no part therein. 41 11~o the most perfect thing 
~~n be done. by you is the primary formal principle 
of all obligation of commission. n42 Thus there is but 
one formal moral law, devoid of all empirical con tent, 
and, as such, universal, and therefore applicable to all 
36.. Mill, Uti!':-;" 25-26. 
37~ Ibid. 27ff. See Chapt. iii as a whole. 
38. Kant, CPrR, V, 33. 
39. Kant, FOM, IV, 413. 
40. Ibid., IV, 429. 
41. Kant, CPrR, v, 34-35. 
42. Kant, NTM, II, 298. 
•.· 
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empirical con tent. 
Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1929) early saw the potential 
value of various data about men and society for moral 
norms. Basing his views upon a broad survey of such data, 
WUndt finds two fundamental philosophical motives common 
to all cultures and all individuals; reverence and affec-
tion. 
And the development of human nature itself not 
only leads back to an universal sameness of 
philosophical elements, but has throughout been 
subject to definite philosophical laws Whose 
validity is not less universal, however varied 
a guise the individual forms of life may be.43 
He traces the development of moral concepts through three 
successive st~ges; primitive beginni~gs of social im-
pulses; an interaction between social impulses and reli-
gious feelings, resulting in "differentiation of moral 
ideas"; the introduction of philosophical evaluation of 
saaio-religious moral nor.ma. 44 A further important law 
found ap era ti ve i a that of 11heterogeny of ends, 11 accord-
ing to which ~motives are originated for future ac-
tions, and again, in their turn, produce new effects. n45 
Raving thus taken account of both universality and in-
dividuality in moral laws, WUndt proceeds to develop 
norms for man at the third stage of morality. Each 
moral nor.m is matched by a specific 11d.u ty concept"; 
"Everyone ought to fallow them, but no one can be con-
43. \~dt, Eth~ Vol. I., 328. 
44. Ibid. , 3'29. 
45. Ibid., 330. 
strained to do sost.46 It is because of the non-compulsory 
nature of moral norms that they must be translated into 
legal norms. 
For T. H. Green (1836-1882), true good is that 
which satisfies the desire of a moral agent. 47 The will 
of a trulY;,_- moral agent is the production in man of an 
eternal conscience which is ttobject to itselfn, 48 content 
of which is mediated by a society of moral persons. ~e 
eternal conscience in man presents him with an nuncondi-
tional law of conduct. n49 Intimately, 11 the goodtt is 
human perfection. The essence of Kant's Categorical Im-
perative is reiterated, as, for Green, the conscience be-
comes a directive 11which dictates to ~im an equal regard 
to the well-being, estimated on the same principle as his 
own, of all whom his actions may affect. n50 The principal 
function of conscientiousness is to maintain moral a~ira-
tion as we seek in actual experience to discover and 
achieve that which is coherent with the ideal of human 
f t . 51 per ec ~on. 
-Borden Parker Bo~e (1847-1910) was an early repre-
sentative of a trend toward a combination of formalism 
and utilitarianism, of rationalism and empiricism, in 
ethics. Mbral insight begins, not with a consideration 
46. wu:n~ val. III, 151. 
4?. Green, PEr, 178. 
48. Ibid., 184. 
49. Ibid., 203. 
50. Ibid., 231. 
51. Ibid. , 333. 
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...., - - .• ~--·., • .l ... - ••.• ·- ... ·~· .. 
of _ c~.l?.-~e9:~~n(}~ ~' _'}Jut_ :w-i.~-- ~ind.ing the law which the moral 
aubj ect imposes on himself. 11 52 
. ' -·- . . -
____ .... __ .There are two ~und.amental:. moral law~, :Bowne be-
lieves; "benevolence or good will, and requital, or the 
' . . - .. . ...~ 
~ood deaer.t .. of the good will al_ld the _ill des_er~ ()f __ th~ ·-
ill will. n53 Any more s:pec ific rules must be determined 
- ··-
by peculiar circumstances. Yet ttlo w simply as well-
... . 
. ~ . ~ 
wi ahing or an unwillingness to _give pain, i a quite as 
- -
likely to be i:rmn.oral as moral. u 54 Thus nA complete law 
of duty ••• must include bo~. a human ideal and also a 
law of a ocial interaction. u55 
Walter G~ Everett. (1860-1931) also sought to give 
content to the concept of duty, and found that 11the e;n<i 
of conduct is the richest possib~e system of values. n56 
There al'e for Everett 11instinc ti ve and im.pulsi ve ,!Jilora1J 
elements of human nature u57, which are conditioned and 
given direction through interaction with the social order. 
Thus conscience is the result of the moral capacity of the 
individual being c ond.i tioned by s ooiety, and serves as the 
guide to which the individual owes ultimate loyalty.58 
Conscience is not merely individual, but social a.s well; 
it develops and becomes enlightened through social in~ 
52. :Bowne, PE, 98. 
53~ Ibid~; 106. 
:5·4 ~ Ibid., 111. 
55~ LOc. cit. 
·66. Everett, m, 250. 
57. Ibid. i 268. 
58. Ibid., 274-277. 
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teraction. 59 Finally, obligation is "transformed into 
spontaneous, uncompelled choice of the good 11 through 
sympathetic and aesthetic impulses. 60 
With Edgar S. Brightman 's (1884- ) Moral~ 
the philosophical search for empirically verifiable 
ethical postulates emerges at last from abstract specu-
lation into concrete formulation. Beginning with 11 the 
conviction that ethics is truly ••• a normative science 
of ideal principlesn61, Brightman sets out ttto construct, 
out of the data of experience, a coherent system of 
. 62 laws. n Scientific method is to be employed so far as 
it is applicable; i. e., observation, generalization, 
criticism, interpretation (divisible into two phases; 
hypothesis and systematization). 63 IUversity of moral 
experience with the consequent inadequacy of any moral 
law as it stands alone means that, ultimately, 11Ra ti anal 
system is the only trustworthy foundation of ethics and 
criterion of morality.n 64 
Brightman proceeds to formulate eleven moral laws 
which he believes can be verified by a rational examdna-
tion of experience: Laws of; Logic, Autonomy, .Axiology, 
Consequences, the Best Possible, apecification, the Mbst 
InclusiveEnd, Ideal Control, Individualism, Altruism, 
59. Everett, MV, 277-280. 
60. Ibid., 282. 
61. Brightman, :ML, 9. 
62. Ibid., 82. 
63. Ibid., 85. 
64. Ibid., 96. 
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the Ideal of _Peraonality. 05 
._ ... ~~ _ w~:rk_ '!~ I!la~Y min_ds _bza.s_ peen. 1:1~-~_es~a.!;r. to bring 
~~~- -~~n~~I>~ ?t.. mo~~ _laws to the :point from wJ::ti_~:b:--~~s in-
vestigation is launChed. For a significant number of 
... ''" -·--· ·- - ''; .... ~.~ ... -.. -,,.~-······· --
~inkerst both subsistent objecti~ ty of mor~l :prece:p~~ 
and unquestionable authoritarianism are dead. The battles 
. - .. - . . - . ' ... -...... ·- - , ·.... . . .... 
of rationalism versus empiricism, of reason versus em.o-
. " -. . -. ·--- . .. . . ..... ···-- .. . . . -- . 
ti~?' of rigid f?rmaliam versus disintegrative relativism, 
have been fought. After all these struggles ~ere may 
well be gwounds for peace acceptable to all save ~ecial 
. - -
:pleaders who refuse compromise, and who love their own 
preconceptions more than truth. 'lhe net product would 
seem to l:e two fold : 
1. 'lhe belief in the possibility of moral laws has 
evolved from early c_ustom-magie practises, through pre-
occupation with divine origins and attempts _to find such 
laws in the structure of reason, t0 a searCh for empiri-
.. . . 
cal evidence of predictable relationships between choices 
and effects on values. Yet the belief in some basis of -~
univeraali ty in ethics -- hence in mora.l laws ...... has 
persisted under the most diversified and penetrating of 
criticism. 
2. 'lhese critic isms have shown that l CUstom may as 
easily be mor.al as immoral, hence is no dependable cri-
terion (Plato); while moral laws may be coherent with 
the will of God, alleged revelation unsupported by 
66. Bri dhtma.n, n, Chaps. v-xv. 
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:r_~~-~~~ c~~-~~ b~ ___ d_~J2~de~ ?.!l.~_o_,formula~e-."t!'-~~--(~t~~ 
-~~e~, ~_wne, Ev"ere_~t, _J3rigl:lt~)-~ 1 ~ ~S. ~~~()_Sa~?~~ to 
formulate applicable moral laws in abstraction. from the 
flow of experience, sinee moral choices are at least 
- -·. p- ·- --· .... , • -. -·y· ... ·--·-···--
partially emotional and arise amidst unforeseeable cir-
- -. - .. -- ·-··· . -·· .. 
cumstances (Hume, Westermarck, Brightman); there may be 
' • ' • • ' • --• r • 
in some sense a. umoral nature n in man, fulfilment of 
Which would necessitate observance of moral laws a.s 
·-· - . -.. .. 
universal as personalit.y (Plato, Aristotle, ~omas 
.. --. .. . 
Aquinas, ~inoza, Kant, Green, WUndt, Bowne, Everett, 
Brightman). SUch results strongly imply tbat -~erifiable 
moral laws must. be supported by empirical data.. 
-ihis brief sketch of ihe history of moral laws is 
necessarily incomplete, both as to the various views 
cited, and as to detail of treatment. A thorough pre-
sentation of the history would b.e an extensive study in 
. . 
its ovm right, and one 'Which the central interest of' this 
investigation must preclude. ~e bibliogra~hy lists a 
number of excellent references for a complete historical 
survey. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
T".dE NECESSITY OF EMPIRICAL METHOD 
I. The Term Moral Laws Defined for This Dissertation. 
The term law will be used in this investigation to 
refer to principles of constantt verifiable 1 genetic 
relevance among experiential phenomena. Genetic relevance 
occurs only when phenomena stand in a cause-and-effec.t 
relationship to one another. There is.t of course, much 
spatio4temporal conjunction from genetic relevanae is ab~ 
sent. Even constant and verifiable conjunction may lack 
relevano.e. To illustrate.: Mr. A and Mr. Ct- residents of 
the same hotel, eat dinner together each evening at 7:15. 
About mid-way through the meal each evening,. Mr. A devel-
ops severe nausea and abdomenal pains. Now :Mr. A and Mr. C 
as they meet daily and eat together· and Mr. A 1 s illnesst 
are conjoined in a regularly repetitive~ verifiable spatio-
temporal relation. Yet Mr. C1 s presence cannot be said to 
be. genetically relevant to Mr. A's illness, unless it can 
be shown that something specific about Mr. C.........:.something 
he says or does, his appearance.,. his emotional state, 
etc.--stands in a one;-one functional relation1 to Mr. A•s 
illness; that ist· unless it can be shown that something 
about .Mr. C is at least a part of the cause of Mr. A1 s 
illness 1. and that in Mr. C1 s absencet the illness would 
not occur. 
1 .. For a concise. discussion of one-one functional lawsJ 
see Burtt, RT, 325f.· 
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While co~st~~yj~r_ ;re~ll:l:t:?: t;y) __ a~<?-- v~:r--~fi~?~~~ ty 
in the absence of genetic relevance are not sufficient 
~or :th.f3 formula~ion of _a _l~~' a law c?u~d _ har.dl;y b(3 _es-
tablished without these tNo. Any assert;i on of ca. use-and-
, . - . 
effect relationship must be in sane sense verifiable if 
- - . . . 
any rea.s aning mind is to take it seriously. And unless 
such relation is seen to .be constant, -- that is, unless 
the phenomena are inva.riably2 conjoined -- the correct 
inference is that either genetic relevance is lacking or 
that there are additional unknown factors which partici-
. - . 
pate in genetic relevance. A law cannot be formulated 
so long as. thi a condition remains. 
It is entirely possible, of course, that some 
event might occur once and never be repeated because 
factors a, b, c, whose genetic relevance was responsible 
for the event, have c.eased to exist. While it may be 
pointed out that in such a circumstance there would be 
little practical reason for establishing a law concern-
ing this nonrepea table relationship, nevertheless o on ... 
stancy would be present, because every time a., b, and c 
had been conjoined -- once -- the event occurred. 
It is to be noted that this usage of the term 
~ carries no legislative or jural connotations. ~is 
distinction is especially important because of precon-
ceptions which will otherwi ae color the thinking of ma.ny 
2. Problema of ve;-ifiability relative to considera-
tions in this investigation will be dealt with at 
points where they arise. 
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persons as soon as law is conjoined with moral. 
-- - 4• •••• • - ..... ___. • ~--·-·- - •••• -~---~-~--~--~ ·-
There may 
o:r: may not be a -~ral Le~isJ.-ator besto\V?:~ ~e~rds f'or ob-
servance and exacting p mal ties f'or disregard of' moral 
w •• • • •• .. • • - • -· • - - -. • - ~ • - • -· • -. • " • 
laws •.. -~ intere_st __ ?e~~ _i~ in constant, verifiable,_ -~~ne ... 
tic relevance of' experiential phenomena, and not in meta-
·- . 
physical or theological theories which may be i~lied. 
Experiential phenomena are states of' awaren~ss, 
which may or may not include sensory e:x:perienc e. A 
nun t s prayer in the dark for inward peace is no less an 
experiential phenomenon than is the visual perception of 
the first star of' evening. 
~e term moral designates, at least, an ought-to-
be f'or beings who are able to understand and to exercise 
some degree of choice in their activity. If there be any 
action wbich can be called moral -- indeed, if there be 
any moral problem at all -- then there is also some stand-
ard 'Which is accepted and acknowledged as binding, whether 
on reasonable grounds or not. ][oral right a.nd moral wrong 
have to do with the extent to Wl.ich choices of persons 
ttmea.su:re up 11 to some acknowledged cri terian. Accidental 
or mechanical approximation of behavior to a standard, by 
'Whomever approved, would be morally neutral, as moral is 
understood for purposes of' this study. It would be non-
moral. Coercion of such intensity and degree that irra-
tional fear renders real choice impossible (if indeed 
such a point ever is reached.) also precludes moral evalua-
tiun of resulting behavior, however useful socially this 
41. 
behavior might be. 
--- .. . ~- ... 
For reasons t~a:t_ will be nade more fully ~:pparent 
in Chapter ~~Nt'tle, Section v, the te::~ moral a.ppli ed to any 
choice must also connote choice of certain foreseeable 
- . - " . ~ ... - .. - . - . .... - -· ..... __ 
consequences, with implied rejection of foreseeable conse-
. ~ . -. ~- . 
quences of different Choices. In a sense this addi tiona.l 
~- .. . . . -
qualification is tautologous, for any choice must be 
choice of samethi~. If that something is not a conse-
quence of the choosing, no effective choice has taken place. 
Even such formalistic ethics as Kant's, in which the signi-
ficance of consequences is denied, is caught in this same 
necessity. Choosing duty for fue .sake of duty always en-
tails choosing the consequence of being a duty-Choosing 
person rather than that of being a duty-rejecting person.3 
There is no necessity of a time interval between Choice 
and conse~ence. Similarly, unless a consequence is fore-
seeable it has not been chosen, and therefore is morally 
neutral, however fortunate or unfortunate it will 'turn 
out to be. Though euCh considerations as these seem ob-
vious, the very vigor with which consideration of conse-
quences is sanetimes denied a share in morality is suffi-
cient to establish the necessity for explicit statement. 
Of course, consequences must not be regarded as external 
'3. Ai3 will be anown in later discussion, Kant t s formula-
tion of the Categorical Imperative actually implies 
much more consideration of consequences than is in-
volved in this formal necessity. Drake, pursuing a 
similar line of thought, argues that Kant 'a Imp era.:. 
tive is really conditional rather than categorical. 
Cf. Drake , PO. 
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to oha.racjt;er~ .. 
one further qualification is necessary if the term 
moral is to have any distinctive meaning. Not every 
chosen foreseeable consequence is moral. The matter o~ 
value must be added. Amoral choice is one, the foresee-
able consequences of which have some effect upon values, 
or on supposed values. Since examination of value also 
must be reserved for a later point in.our discussion, all 
that can 1:e said now is that a value is an experience in 
which someone has an interest, an experience that matters 
to saneone. This requirement is equally present, however 
value be defined (unless it be so defined as to eliminate 
other factors of moral choice), or whether one regards 
the concerned ttsomeone u as human or divine. lOgical 
choices are choices between formal c ansistency and formal 
inconsistency. Pragmatic choices are ·choices between 
what works and what doe a not work for the achievement of 
a given end. And mor~l choices are choices between values 
or effects on values. 4 Thus no theory of ethics can be 
formulated apart from a theory of values. !!his disserta-
tion is strictly a state:Ip.ent of prolega.mena;., since it 
leads to but does not develop a value theory. 
Let us now draw together the various threads of 
the discussion. Fbr purposes of this investigation we 
4. These are only representative kinds of choice. There 
are others, of course. Further, a given choice may be· 
classified from several different points of view; e.g., 
a moral choice :may be also a logical choice and a 
pragmatic choice. 
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shall understand the term moral laws to refer to principles 
of constant, verifiable genetic relevance between choices 
and foreseeable consequences for values. If it can be 
shown that. some values are "more valuable 11 than others 1 and 
that one may by taking thought choose greater values in 
preference to lesser onesj a firmer foundation will have 
been established for the ough~to-be mentioned as a factor 
in the meaning of moral. Value in preference to no value or 
to value destructiont and greater ·values in preference to 
lesser onest will be normative for rational persons. 
Even though Chapter One contained a general discus-
sion of the problem of this dissertation1 a statement of 
that problem at once concise and comprehensive could not 
be made before the definition of moral laws was before us. 
The problem fully stated is: What basic philosophical 
questions must be faced in utilizing psychological data 
for the formulation of explicit statements concerning oo~ 
stant, verifiable genetic relevance between choices and 
foreseeable consequences in values? 
Sueh moral laws would be self-obligatory for all 
persons who reapect reason enough to be governed by it. 
Moral lawa differ from physical laws at least in that one 
must observe physical lawsi but may refuse to be governed 
by moral laws. Yet refusal to be so-governed would not ab-
solve any person from the consequences of such disregard~ 
any more than refusal to observe rationally ..... esta.blished 
physical laws would permit one to escape physical conse~ 
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quences. 
II. Vlb.y an Empirical Approach to Moral Iaws? 
The first and moat obvious answer to this question 
is to the effect that, as moral laws have just been de-
fined, there is no other possibility. Genetic relevance 
oan be ~ _s~ov~red only b;r direct_ exaiD.ination of_ the ~heno­
mena involved. Yet the very limiting of procedure by ~is 
definition of the problem was no merely arbitrary fiat. 
Mbdern philosophy.has been characterized from the first by 
a revel t against unquestioned authority. One of the more 
authoritative historians of philo-sophy wrote: 
T.b.e history of the new era may be viewed as an 
awakening· of the· reflective spirit, as a quicken-
ing of criticism, as a revolt against authority 
and tradition, as a protest against absolutism 
and collectivism, as a demand for freedom in 
thought·. 
We are confronted with the same phenomenon in 
the empire of the intellect, with the same an-
tagonism of tutelage, the same demand for a free 
field. Reason becomes the authority in science 
and philosophy ••• The notion begins to prevail 
that truth is sometning to be acquired, something 
to be achieved by free and impartial inquiry.5 
T.b.e revolt against unquestioned authority was des-
tined to issue in a new struggle of empiricism versus 
rationalism. litany who asserted the validity of human 
reason still considered human experience too insignificant 
or too profane to be worthy of consideration in man's new 
and freer search for truth. It has been only slowly and 
sometimes painfully that empirical considerations have 
gained recognition in various philosophical questions. 
!); '!hilly, HOP, 250. 
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~~~_t_i~~s the e:m;piricists have be~n_n.t~~e1~ __ rad1.c~_:L sensa-
tionalists, and this has tended to cloud the issue and to 
delay_ th~ ti~ whe~ ~he ent~re sea~ch for knowl~dge wou~d 
be put on firmer ground through a rational examination of 
human experience. But the movement toward recogniti~n of 
the legitimacy of empirical method has been indestructible, 
until in the twentieth century we find an over'Whe1ming 
majority of philosophers, who, on one ground or another,. 
are careful to call themselves e:m;pirieists. 0 
Before the present question can be discussed with 
.. . .. 
much further profit, e;m,piricism and rationalism need to 
be clearly differentiated. The term empiricism, and the 
derivative adjective, empirical, will be used in this dis• 
cussion to refer to the belief fua t all evidence on which 
to found a theory must be derived from experience. Ex:--
perience.has.been def~ned above as inclusive of any ele-
ment of consciousness, sensory or otherwise. This usage 
does not oppose experience to reason as an approach to 
knowledge, but rests on the fact that e.x;p erience must be 
interpreted by the active reason in order to have any 
. . . 
meaning. It does not deny a. priori 7 categories of reason, 
so long as those categories are understood to be ~a.paci­
ties for ~ypes of ~ought, but empty of con~ent until ap-
plied to experience. An empirical approach, then, is one 
6. For an eiuci dating discussion of the historic conflict 
between empirical and non-empirical approaches ·to: pro-
blems of philosophy, especially those with moral im-
plications, cf. Dewey, QFC; Chapts. I-IV. 
7. See Chap. Four, Sec. II, 1, for definition of a priori. 
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in which reason considers the facts of experience and de .. 
rives from. ex:perience information which may be classified 
- . . .. '- - .. . . . . .. - .. '... .. ·. . .. . . . .... - --· - . ~. 
and evaluated for numerous purposes. 
-- ·.• . -· -··- -- .. - . •... --
.An empirical ap ... 
:pr~a,_ch ~~ __ moral laws is ~n .. a~~~?~ ~_o find ~l_l ___ e~ ~i~l_l_c_e 
data_ which will_ throw_ light on pro.b~ems of moral obli.~­
tion. This approach is es:pecia;I.ly opposed to doctrines of 
innate ideas, intui tioniam., and certain forms of rational-
a ism. 
There are few philosophical terms more ambiguously 
. . .. 
used than rationalism. :Baldwin-'s ~ictiona.ry of Phil!i-sophy:, 
~d Psychology defines the term as follows: 
(l) The theory tllat everything in religion is to 
be rationally explained or else rejected. Tb.e a:p-· 
pliQatian of ordinary logical standards ·a.nd methods 
to dogma. Opposed pa.rti cularly to supernaturalism 
•• ~. (2) ~e theory that reason is an independent 
source of knowledge, distinct from sense :percep-
tion, and having a higher authority -- opposed to · 
sensationism ••• (3) The theory that, in philoso:phy, 
certain elementary concepts are to be sought, and 
tha.t'the remaining content of·philosqphy is to be 
derived, in a. dialectical way, from. ~hese fundamen-
tal notions. Qpposed to empiricism. 
While such a definition has some value, it falls far short 
of clarifying the term. For instance, e~iricism as de-
fined for this dissertation is "opposed to sensationiamtt, 
a. ~is usage of empirical is not original in th.i s d.i s-
sertation, but is opposed to earlier meanings of the 
term., Which usually limited the data of knowledge to 
sensation. Of. E.ttme, EOHU. It is opposed also to 
the "radical empiricism" of logical positivism, in 
which the Rumian interpretation is largely reinstated. 
For a broader picture of the meaning of empiricism in 
philosophy, see, Baldwin, (ed.) DPP; and Runes (ed.), 
DP. For yiews close to the usage here, see works by 
:Bowne, Brightman, DeWolf, :Sertooci. 
9. Baldwin (ed. ), DPP, vol. II, 415. 
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but is opposed also to 11 the theory that reason is an inde-
~~l:l~-~l:l t_ ~o~-~e .. o~_ kno~ledge._ ~t Am"!Jigl1~ :tY __ ~s _ ~~~~~Y inten-
~i:f.~ec:i ~Y -~_he thir~ of __ :J3a:ldwin_t_ s classi~i~~ tiona. This 
view was refuted by Kant as far as concerns knowledge of 
. , .. , - - . . . --- . . - - -- " .. . .. ·~ . -·- --- ~- - -· -~ ·- •' --- . '-- -- --· - ... --- ... -
_the_ p~~nomenal world, but is employed by Kant in his own 
ethics. 
One of the moat thorough studies of rationalism 
. ~. - ' . ·•· . 
was ma.de by \Villiam .A. OVerholt. He lists the following 
characteristics of the term: 
·c1), Ba:tionalism is the dedu-ctive reasoning, judg-
ing;- or comprehending activity of the· mind-which 
aims at valid proposi tiona or methodology~~- •• De;.. 
duction i·s the mental analysi-s of given postulates 
by- :Pr e'ci sely defined: pro o'edU:res which reveal' the 
necessarily· c onsti tU.ent rela tiona among those 
postulates •• -~ (2) The criterion of· rationalism- is 
the system of principles inherent .in· the mental·--·· 
work of va.rifying its own efforts: consistency •••• 
Hegel enlarged the concept of consi steri.cy to an · 
organic, evolving concept of coherence. (3) ~e 
affinity of rationalistic and mathematical reason-
ing is indicative of the scope of their applica-
tion,. viz.' where regti.lar qualitative relations in-
here whi.ch . .are to be'extracted analytically and for-
mulated explici tly.lO . . 
An even more penetrating and clarifying stat~ent, 
is Frank Tb.illy•s: 
(l) B,y rationalism we ma.y_mean ~he attitude ~hiCh 
makes reason instead of revelat~on or author~ty 
the standard of knowledge. (2) The view that 
genuine knowledge consists of universal az;d neces-
sary· judgments, that the goal of thought 1s a 
syst~ of truths ••• (3) The question is also 
asked concerning the origin of knowledge, and 
10. 
this receives different· answers in modern :philo-
OVerholt, RAN, 53•54~ FOr a comprehens~ve discus-
sion of the p :resupp o ai ti ons of ra ti onal1 am. and of 
its applicia tiona to -various problems of ph~losophy 
and science, ibid., 31-64. 
--~~ .~----····· --·- ......... ,, . ._ ......... ,_,_,.,_ -· '-" -----
sophy: · - ·(a.) genuine llliowie dge cailno t·· comef from 
aeiise-perceJ;itian· ·or· experience.-~~ ·· there-·are ···· · 
truths natural· or na:tive·-·to• reason: . ·inna-te or 
inborn or ··a; ;Priori· truths~ •• ·• (b) There· are ··no ·· 
inborn truths: ... all knowledge s"prihgs from: sense 
pei'ceptirin ·or .. exp eri.eiice·, ·and -b.Enic·e . so·..;ealle"d · 
necea·sa.:ry·propositions· are not· necessary·· or ·a.b-
·soJ.ut·ely cfertain a.t· all,- bu~ yie~d only· prob;.;-
·able kilowledge.· This View bas been called em-
piricism or sensationalism.ll 
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The real conflict in ~preaches to ethics is point-
ed up in Tb.illy's third characterization of rationalism. 
. .... -· -· . 
The debate is over the rationali~atic attem.pt to deduce 
. . . ... . 
specific moral prescriptions from metaphysical presuppoai-
. . . 
tiona, or from alleged! prior~_truth~ inherent in the na-
ture of reason itself. As pointed out earlier, it is not 
necessary that em.pirioism be equated with sensat~ona~ism, 
as Thilly's discussion tends to suggest. Bather, the em-
. - . 
pirical approach of this disaert_ation opposes itself to 
ethical rationalism by denying ihat there are ~ priori 
moral truths, and by denying the productivity of any at ... 
tempt to deduce specific moral rules from principles al-
legedly valid, independent of considerations of experience. 
The sterility· of purely ra tionalistio and intuitive 
methods in the production of applicable ethical insight is 
prima facie evidence that some other approach was too long 
delayed. Any counselor attempting to render assistance in 
real-life problema of ethics bas felt the hollowness of the 
platitudes ::.:: which have rended non~empirioal approaches 
abstract and inadequate. 
ll. Tfi!iiy, HOP, 252·253. 
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1. A Real Problem. 
• . - • - tl 
Take for exaln)?le. the case of a youn~ cou];>le ~o_, _. 
for the sake of anonymity, we will call David and Eleanor. 
David is in his first year of medical school, and Eleanor 
is employed as a s·tenogra:Pher. ~ey are :physically and 
- - . 
mentally healthy, mature, and very muCh in love. Intel~ 
lectually and idealistically, the;r are ~om:patible. They 
met a few years ago through :parti ci:paticm in a youth 
group at their church, and each continues as active in 
the church as work and study wi 11 :permit. Any of the 
better objective tests of marital compatibility would 
. -· 
clearly indicate that they should marry, the sooner the 
better. But there are complicating cirmxmstances. David's 
education is being financed through the combined resources 
of a scholarship and a student loan. He anticipates two 
more years of medical school and a year's internship at 
subsistence pay. The int.ernational situation is such that 
~n all probability David will be called for mil~tary ser• 
vice when work for the M. D. degree is completed. 
Eleanor's father died a few years ago, leaving 
little insurance. There are three younger children in 
the family, all girls and all in school. Eleanor's mother 
works :part time in a neighborhood store, and the total 
money the two of them earn affords the family only moder-
ate support. There are no fa..ctors suggesting a. change in 
the family's financial condition for several years. 
The problem David and Eleanor face is already ap-:-
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:parent. Menta~ly, spiri tua1.~y, _and :physically they are 
11right 11 for one another. »notionally, they are at the 
:p~in~ ~_ere to con~n:ue ee.eing. on~ a,noth~?:: ~hile_,_su:pr~~s­
ing their natural se:x: desires will soon be intolerable. 
··- ~ " 
Ordinarily. marriage would afford a context in which 
. . . - " 
their love could find its rightful consummation. Yet 
both are wise enough to know that marriag~ for them at 
this time would be likely to create more problems than 
·-. . -
it would solve. To possess one another outside of' mar-
riage would be a violation of the social mores and of 
their personal ideals. To break off their relationship 
would be contrary both to desire and to the validity of 
their love. To :post:pone further relationShip into the 
indefinite future probably would be impossible because 
of the numerous times they would unavoidably be together 
day by day. Even if :postponement were :possible, David's 
probable induction into the armed services might separ-
ate them forever. Which of the rationalists or intui-
tionists can help David and Eleanor to find what is mor-
ally right for them? 
2. Several Rationalistic Systems Ex:amined for Insights. 
(i) Plato prescribes inquiry and coherence, but 
provides little specific insight. SUp:pose there is a 
hierarchy of Ideas, of which the Idea of the Good is :pre ... 
eminent. The question is, What ~ the good in this case? 
Nor would the recounting of the Platonic virtues be of 
assistance. What specifically, here, is the part of wis-
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dom., and why? Is it more courageous to surrender to social 
·-·· -· .. ~ .. 
- ·- .... -~- , - ·- .... 
d~s,ap~roval t~a~ ~o _one ta own desires? What is just, and 
how is it possible to be just S;ci all who will be affected 
by whatever decision? Is it not true that wisdom, courage, 
.. ·~·- - . .... " ·-
and justice must be considered relative to the frumily 
wh~ch ~!id_ ~nd Eleanor ndght create'1 Would they be more 
just never to bring that :family into existence, or to 
. . . - - . -
bring it into existence at the expense of Eleanor's parent-
al family, or to delay its creation :for perhaps ten years? 
.And what of David and Eleanor themselves as centers of 
value1 Is temperance a virtue if it ~orbids self-fulfil~ 
ment? The hygienic and ennobling effects of controlled 
sexual relations as expressions of love are well known, 
as are the disorganizing effects of repression. 
(ii) Kant's admonition to duty for duty•s sake would be 
completely devoid of practical value here. Ideally, they 
. . . . . 
both want to do !heir duty, else they would feel no stress 
in the matter. But what is duty? liTreat all persons, 
yourself and others, as ends, never as means only. " But 
what does this mean to David and Eleanor? If Eleanor re-
mains single and continues to help support her family, 
she becomes a me~s in denial of her own legitimate ends. 
If they marry, under present circumstances, they will not 
be able to achieve the mutuality that must undergird any 
true marriage. David's necessary preoccupation with his 
studies, his approaching internship, the likelihood of his 
being drafted, and the necessity of continued :full-time 
52 
employment for Eleanor all will conspire to rob them of the 
?P~o_rtuni~;y to be toge~er suf'fici<?:tl~ly t?;. e!U:\.b~e their 
marriage to be a real blending of personalities. Thus to 
marr;y:_ a~ _present would d,o __ li_tt~e.l!lore than prov;_de _super:' _ 
ficial satisfaction of sex drives. ~e same would be true 
if they should enter such relationship outside of marriage. 
(iii) T. H. Green's ideal of human perfection, as a ra-
tional argument, is interesting, but platitudinous because 
. ' 
it is devoid of content. Here, as in the case of all ra~ 
tionalistic approaChes, the transition from the abstract 
- . 
to the ~ecific is not self-apparent. What possible course 
of action for these young people comes closest to suCh an 
ideal? What is per~ection for a young couple w.ho ought to 
marry, but who are prevented from doing so by exterior cir-
cumstancesf How does one, even after the choice is made, 
verify the assumption that it is more nearly perfect than 
others? 
(i v) 111\t' eta tion and its duties 11 , F. H. Br:adJ..ey 1 s recip:fi . 
for right living, is especially vacuous in the face of a 
real problem. .Again; what is duty? Does David have an¥ 
more duty to become a physician than he has to establiSh a 
normal ma.rital relationship? Even assuming 1hat one shouJ.d. 
be committed first to rendering the greatest service (though, 
actually; why should such an assumption be ~de?) how can 
one .know tha. t he would render a more significant servia e 
as a physician than as a father supporting his family as a 
businessman, or teacher, and participating in church and 
eommunity affairs? Does Eleanor have any more duty to her 
. .,., --··•> ...-r--··- ~··-·~-·• 
parental f~ily than to her own unborn childrenf Do the 
tv,ro of .them have more duty to ~ocie.ty ~a!l __ t() _one another? 
And how is their station especially distinguiShable from 
that of millions of other young people? 
It is unlikely that David and Eleanor would give 
much of a hearing to the intuitionists who might seek to 
provide bases for a decision, and it would be difficult 
to think of any good reason why ~hey should. Quite ob-
viously, the answer they are see~ing is not self-evident 
as an intuition would have to be. Further, the authority 
of an intuition, even if one should appear, would be most 
difficult to establiSh; the needs and inhibiting circum-
stances are much too concrete to be dealt with by an in-
tangible abstraction whose source and validity would be 
so open to question. 
When, ·With a little study, David and Eleanor would 
discover that rationalists and intuitionists often have 
been, within their re~ective groups, diametrically op-
posed to one another, the young people would be especially 
anxious for some more fruitful approach. A fair question 
then would become, 11Wha.t can the empiricist do that the 
rationalist has not done in dealing with this problem?tt 
3. SUperiority of An Empirical ~preaCh. 
To begin with, the empiricist can define values 
in terms of interests real to David and Eleanor, and Show 
'Why there are values. Secondly, he can then help them to 
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identify just wha. t values are involved in the circum-
- ... - •.. ., .. -· " 
stances in Which they find themselves. Thirdly, he can 
~ --·-·· . -·-.. 
-. . ... - . - -- -·· - --. 
~P~~Y ~J?i~ical data to assist them to rate the involved 
values according to impor}i~c~~- .... Next, he.~~ ~~amin~ .. with 
them their. gra.s]? of the situation with a -view to deter .. 
mining whether o~ not they have recognized all possibili-
-. - .. .. . . - . -- . 
ties. Finally, he can call once more on empirical data to 
- " .. -- . ~ . . 
indicate, on the basis of past experience, what the prob-
able effects of each possible choice will be on the values 
involved. He can stress the long run, and help them to 
understand. that sometimes many values which cannot be 
achieved simultaneously can be aChieved in rational se-
quence_. He can make clear the probability that some tragedy 
must result in these circtmstances, and he can provide data 
to aid in Choosing the least tragic course. of action. 
The Chief advantage the empiri~ist has over the ra-
tionalist lies in dealing with living problems, intimately 
aware of' their unpredictab!li ties and of their non-rational 
elements. Increasing familia.ri ty with what is can be help-
ful in understanding wha~ ~ay be. It is from the total 
p_ossibili ties of' human behavior that any truly moral ought-
to-be must emerge. .An empirical approach to morality thus 
. . 
may be employed to bridge the gap between the abstraction 
of' logical operations and the concreteness of' experience 
into which enter many unforeseeable factors. 
Rationalistic approaches take their chief value in 
rendering the fact of moral obligation meaningful to and 
coherent with the presupposi tians of given philosophical 
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are of little assistance when the problem is "how ought I, 
.- ....... -- -···. . . .. - .. , 
here and now, in these specific circumstances to behave?tt. 
-.. ... " - # ' . . ... - •• - - ··-· • , -- -- ·-·- -· - ...•. - .-... ~- •• ,_. ••.••.•.• -·- ·-~ . 
;t __ i ~ _ ~~~~, _ ~~ ?_?~ se • _that empiri_~al ~ndling _ o~ ~-~~t~ c1:l-: 
lar _li:V:in~ prob_leins_ mar e:xll;ibi t t~e philosollhical _ a.clequacy 
of some rationalistic interpretation and the philosophical 
inadequacy of others. ]Ut when this occurs it is evidence 
of the fact that the empirical validates the rationalistic, 
- - -
rather than vice versa. ~re specifically, the empirically 
coherent outranks the abstractly coherent. 
. . . . 
Stephen E. Toul.m.in, in a penetrating analysis of 
~eaaon in Ethics, has discussed the question of rationalism 
versus empirici am in ethics in a somewhat novel way. On 
the basis of an examination of traditional approaches, he 
concludes that the chief weakness has been in a failure to 
give "~ny adequate account of the nature of ethical reason-
ing. ul2 He proposes a. freSh a.ppr?ach through a better_un-
derstanding of the function of ethical judgments in human 
affairs. Approximately one-hundred and fifty pages are 
used effectively to argue that 11Ethics is concerned with 
the harmonious satisfactions of -desires and interests.ul3 
The context of the discussion in Part III of Toul.min's 
book is such as to make it clear that his meaning is far 
from the hedonistic interpretation whi ab. might be given 
this isolated quotation. 'Wb.a.t he is really saying is es-
sentially the same thing that has been said at this point 
12. Toulm.in, BE; 223. 
13 • Lo c • oi t. 
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in the present study; i. e., the real problem of ethics is 
to provide insight concerning what effects possible 
courses of action will have on values ir~licit in real-
life situations. He rightly recognizes that in an empiri-
cal approach the moralist welcomes the scientist without 
abandoning his own distinctive function~ 
There is ••• always a place in society for the 
moralist ••• And the ideal that he must keep be-
fore him is that of a society in which no miser.y 
or frustration is- tolerated within the existing 
resources and state of knowledge. It is for 
those who are expert in the natural sciences to 
discover the means of reducing the amount of 
misery in the world ••• but the evidence of sci-
ence remains evidence of what is practicable ••• -
what ~or could be, not what !?_~ to be. It 
is in the hands of the moralist that possibility 
becomes policy, what can be done becomes what 
ought to be done. All-his experience and wisdom 
are needed to bridge the gap between facts and 
values. But the gap can be bridged.l4 
There is, on the side of an empirical approach to 
moral laws, a further philosophical reason whiCh carries 
significant implications for the hope of applicable ethi-
cal insights. Preoccupation with purely formal ethical 
~eculations, devoid of living content, and often mutual-
ly contradictory, has been one of ihe contributing causes 
in the development of wide-spread ethical skepticism. If 
there is to be a body of moral laws sufficiently verifi-
able to command at least general agreement among rational-
ly responsible persons, such laws must be founded on evi-
dence. Evidence is discovered only through empirica 1 in-
vestigation. 
14. Toulmin, BE, 223 .. 
1he empirical approach to problems of living is 
and ou~ht. to be_ ~h~ temp_~~- of the modern mind. ~r~~dy 
ef~orts to em~loy such methods in ethics ba.ve .P::'_o.<l:uc~d 
mo~e._appli.ca,~le i~~ght, and more ba~es ~o.! ~~:re~e~~ 
among thinkers whose ideas are widely divergent on other 
. . ..... - . .. . . .. 
5? 
subjects, than did any five hundred years of rationalis-
tic speculation. While one ndght not wax quite so optim-
istic as did Hobhouse in his appraisal of the future 
. . 
po ssi bi li tie a of an empirical approach, many wi 11 be in 
general agreement with the following statement. If elo-
quence_ not be regarded as detrimental to obj activity, 
this might well be adopted as a preamble to further 
search for moral laws in human experiencet 
. . . -
••• the further development of society 'Will follow 
a very different Qourse from its past history; in 
that it is destined to fall within the scop·e of 
a.n · organizing intelligence and thereby to be re..; 
moved from the play of blind force to the sphere 
of rational order ••• The very ideas which are· to 
direct Lthis chang!V are yet in their infancy. 
Yet the social self-consciousness which gives 
them birth, arrived at as· it is by a blending of 
the moral, the scientific, and the religious 
spirit, is for·ua the culminating fact of ethical 
evolution ••• this slowly wrought-out dominance of 
mind in things is the central fact of evolution ••• 
it is the germ of a religion and an ethics Which 
are as far removed from materialism as from the 
optimistic teleology of the metaphysician ••• It 
gives meaning to human effort, as neither the pawn 
of an overruling Providence nor the sport of·blind 
force. It is a message of hope to the world, of 
suffering lessened and strife assuaged, not by 
fleeing from reason to the bosom of faith, but iy 
increasing rational control of things by that col-
- --· ... - . . ... . . .. ···' ~ - - " ~. . ·-·· 
lective ·vnsdo:m~-- -tlia:i\~ ~t1No-s ~~~-C)s -which. l.s 
all that we directly know of the Di vin~.l5 
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15. Hobhouse, MIE, 637. While the present writer sub~ 
scribes in general to the evaluation of the empiri-
cal ·approach to morality e:x:pr·essed in this quota..:. 
tio:i:l; that is ·not to be construed as necessary en-
dorsement of metaphysical implications of some 
parts of the statement. 
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CH.APTER FOUR 
OBJECTIONS TO AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
I. The Claim of the Primacy of 11/fetaphysics. 
Metaphysics is the study of the reality ttbeyond 
:physicstt -- hence of the nature of the ultimate reality 
'Which accounts for all existence, physical and otherwise. 
The growing disdain for metaphysics among some contempor-
ar_y philosophers raises significant questions .. conce:rning 
the philosophical adequacy of the views of such philoso-
. . . - - . 
phers. There is no science and_no relevant conceptual 
thought which does not make certain metaphysical assump-
tiona as a frame of reference. Even logical positivists, 
;who regard all metaphysics as 11nonsensen,l make certain 
metaphysical assumptions as a background for their view-
point; e. g., that reality is of a nature totally incom-
prehensible by the mind of man. This ia an asslllr!-pti?n 
vfu.ic~ ha.s no really convincing evidence· to support it; 
the very statement is self•contradi ctory. The only be-
ing who could with adequate grounds :n:ake such a statement 
would be a non-human entity capable of understanding 
simultaneously the nature of reality, the possibilities 
of human knowledge, and the points at which human know-
ledge fails to encompass reality. When any scientific or 
I. See Ayer, LTL. .After two thousand years of meta-
physical system building by some of the world's 
moat profound minds, J;yer "eliminates" metaphysics 
in the first chapterJ 
oo 
speculative thought is undertaken, there are but two al-
ternatives relative to metaphysical grounding; either 
reason through to the most adequate metaphysis of which 
one is capable, or take by default a body of unconsidered 
metaphysical assumptions. Professor Whitehead, respect-
.- . 
ed as both scientist and philosopher, observed: 
Induction presupposes metaphysics~ In other words, 
it res·ts upon an teQ· sdent ra tiona.~ism. You caruiot 
have a rational justification for your appeal to 
history till your metaphysics has assured you that 
there is a history to appeal to; and likewise_Ydur 
6o:rijectU'res as to the future :presupposes LaiC/ some 
basis of knowledge that there is·a future already 
subjected to some determinations. The difficulty· 
is to nake sense of either of these ideas. But un-
less you2have done so you have made nonsense of in-duction. 
In periods When the inescapability of metaphysics 
was more clearly recognized than at present, the :primacy 
of metaphysics was pres~poeed. First, clarification of 
metaphysical :principles, then deduction of axiological, 
philosophical, ethical principles, was the accepted 
method. 3 Indeed, this approach is by no means a museum 
piece. Scholasticism remains a vigorous and significant 
school of philosophy in the present scene. It might even 
be argued. above a chorus of agitated '1naystt that both the 
theistic and the atheistic branches of existentialism 
adopt such an approach. For them, the existential data 
are interpreted in the light of the metaphysical assump-
2. Whitehead, SMW, 45. 
3. For examples, see Spinoza, Eth.; and Thomas 
Aquinas, ST. 
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tion that man stands completely alone; for the theist, 
alone before a transcendent God; for the atheist, alone 
before ,!!O thing·. ·4 
Now while the inescapability of making metaphysi-
cal assumptions even to begin any major problem-solving 
thought must be recognized, it does not follow that solu-
tions for empirical problems can be deduced from metaphys-
i'Ca.l--. pre-supposi tiona. All one really needs to do to 
establish the unproductivity of reasoning from metaphys~ 
t:Cs;. to exp er:-ience is to cite the history of thought .. 
Progress in dealing with physical, social, philosophical, 
and moral problems of man was stagnated throughout the 
centuries of domination by scholastic metaphysical pre-
suppositions. Their dependence upon f1Aristotelian 11 
logic unfortunately overlooked the fact that while it 
was deduction that Aristotle systematized, he was, in 
his own wor~a master of empirical research and of in-
ductive reasoning. Aristotle's metaphysics was not 
divinely 11givenu as a framework into which all other de-
tails must be made to fit. Rather, his metaphysics was 
an attempt to account for the facts which he believed 
he had discovered in his wide-ranging empirical studies. 
It might be argued with considerable cogency that one 
reason why p regress in problems of ethics has lagged be-
hind that made by the physical sciences, psychology, and 
:4.. Of. Bretall, KA; Kierkegaard, FT; Kuhn, EW.N; Rug-
giero, Ex:,...1_.; Sartre, Ex:i. 
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sociology, is that ethicists have been slower to take up 
again an a:t>P.roa.ch~t l_east as e~ir_ic~ __ as A;-~s~o_t~e .. ~f3·_ .. 
There are good reasons why a search for understand-
- - . ... . - . -. 
-~~~ c_a_ru~·?t proceed lo~i.~~l~y from _metaph;r~:i(}S. ~o pa:r:ti~lar 
problems. For one thing, there is the point on which we 
. - --
dwelt at length in the previous chapter, i. e., life does 
. . . .. 
not of neoessi ty conform. t~ rationalistic -~chemes. developed 
without regard to the individuality and the flux of expel;'i-
- - - . ~ .. 
ence. Rationalistic coherence does not assure empirical 
coherence. 
Further, an adequate met~physical system is one 
which renders a comprehensive and coherent account of all 
experience. There is no way such a sy-stem can be built ex-
cept as universals are discovered in experience itself, and 
woven together into a comprehensive tapestr.y. While it is 
true that one must assume a metaphysics if critical thought 
is to begin, it is also true that suCh metaphysical assump-
tions mus~ be altered progressively with the accumulation 
of empirical data. Otherwise one 'a investigation will 
quickly have outgrown the metaphysics by Which meaning is 
given to the investigation itself. It is as true in the 
history of the thought of mankind as in the developing 
understanding of the individual that there is need for con-
tinual revision of metaphysics to keep pace with the organ-
ization of new information. The constant accumulation of 
data concerning choices of foreseeable consequences for 
values are ~ong the considerations which make such con-
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tinual metaphysical revision necessary. A:n empirically co-
--·--·· --.... . ...... . ---- -·· ... - -- ,_ ... - _ _; .. · ...... ~ ·--. . .-... ·- ·- - ·- . - ..... 
·-. -- - - ·- ··-~ ; 
h.e_~_e~t-~e~~Pil.Y~i~f! '_VO~~d l)e more r~~e:v:at?-t __ .~':-.~~ics, but 
there is no way in which an adequate metaphysics can be for-
... ~-·- -- . . .. - -- . - . . - -~ ~ .. . ' - ... - . .. . .. . 
mulated in advance of the discovery of the data for ~ich 
it must account. 
Again, if ~etaphysic~ must be logically prio~ to 
ethics, then chartless ethical relativism must carry the -de~ 
bate. This follows from the necessary fluidity of metaphy-
. . - . -. 
sics. The final word in metaphysics may nev~r be said. In 
the meantime, the necessity for an 11a.s if" decision in moral 
- ., - . 
choices is daily with us. Fo rtuna.tely, inductive use of 
- . 
empirical data, ~ile not affording the absolute certainty 
tba.t is hoped for through deduction from a non-existent 
final metaphysics, will provide a working hypothesis sup• 
ported by a considerable amount of evidence. Further, ex-
perience in the inductive use of empirical data promises 
that certain universals corresponding to the definition 
given in this dissertation to ~can, after a. time, be 
identified. Whether we approach ethics metaphysically or 
empirioally, we are fo reed to accept s anething less than 
absolute certainty. A.n approach in which that fact is re-
cogniz_ed frankly and which seeks constantly improved degrees 
of verifiability is superior to one in which the illusory 
infalli~ility is still pursued to the detriment of timely, 
applicable insight. 
Of course, there are some ethical questions which 
do not occur apart from metaphysics. JQr instance, if a 
physician, after careful and earnest thought, is convinced 
-
- -------------~----------- ------- -
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there is no God, he is hardly morally obliged to :pray for 
•• ~ ~ •• 0- • 0 ••-'• ••·• ·~ <tl ••••••• • • ~··•u ~ 
God's h~l:p_in delicate surgery. If, on the other.hand, 
-·· .. 
that :physician does believe in a; God who might be able to 
- . - -·-
help under conditions partially dependent upon both the 
:patien~ and the physician, there is a real question about 
the physician's failure to pray, in one way or another. 
But note that while a metaphysical conviction rray ~ose a 
moral problem, solution cannot be arrived at apart from 
empirical considerations. In the example above, how, 
-
except by consideration of experience, can the physician 
be enre that prayer is the best method for coming into 
such a relationship with God as would enable God to hel:p? 
Thus while the place of metaphysics as the ulti-
mate philosophical discipline cannot rightly be denied, 
it is logically fallacious and unproductive of practic-
able insight to attem_p t to deduce moral laws from meta-
h . l •t• 5 p ys1ca presuppos1 1ans. 
II. The Kantian Exclusion of :Hmpirical Data. 
J.. Significance of a priori Truths. 
The Kantian exclusi.on of empirical data from con-
siderations of moral obligation can be understood only 
against the background of his extensive investigation of 
human reason. .Any attempt at compile.te exposition of that 
investigation would constitute too great a digression 
from the central problems before us. Yet his unwilling-
5. For a cogent discussion of this topic, see Brightman, 
JlllL, 272-276. 
i 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
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-ness to utilize empirical data in relation to moral laws 
cannot be discussed without some reference to his broader 
work. 
As &>crates bad defended a reasoned mo:r~~i:tY_ 
against sophistry, ~o Kant,. prodded by the searching_ .... 
ekepticiam of Hume6, set out to measure the _poss~'l?ili ties_ 
and limitations of reason in all areas of inquiry. Though 
he did not express directly grave concern over Hume's 
ethics, Kant's own vi tal interest in problems of ethics is 
evidence that his recognition of the explicit and implicit 
skepticism of_Hume's moral _theory was a part of the philo-
sophical motivation for Kant's examination of the possi-
bilities of reason. In three famous critiques he set forth 
the case for a modified rationalism, or a limited empir-
icism -- depending upon how one chooses to make the class-
ification, for either is possible. The first of these, 
The Critique of Pure Reaso~, is the foundation upon which 
the other two a.re constructed. Significantly, in the 
first two paragraphs of the Introduction to this work, he 
states his basic view on the relation between experience 
and reason c 
e. 
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge 
beg;na with experience. For how ahould· our facul-
ty of knowledge be awakened into action, did not 
objects affecting our senses partly of themselves 
produce representations, partly arouse the activi-
ty of' our understanding to compare these repre- · 
sentations, and, by combining or separating them, 
work up the raw material of the sensible impres-
See ·Hume, THN, EHU; and Chapter 1\l'lo of this disserta-
tion. 
·siena lnto ·tn.a.t knowledge of ·objects VD:licli -ifi-
enti"tled e:x;Pe:rience.' '!n order -o:r time;- there-
fore; we· ha.ve no. kn'owledge an.'tecedeil.t to ex• 
:t>erien:o·e, and with experience, all our know-
ledge-begins~ · -
But, though all otir knowledge begins with 
e.x:perience, it-doei~ not follow that it all 
arises· out of' e·xp eri ence. For it may well-be 
that even our empirical knowledge is made up 
of what we receive through-impressions and of 
what our own faculty of knowledge (sensible 
impressions serving ·lferely as the occasion) 
supplies for itself. 
The second paragraph of the above quotation calls 
attention to ~ntts effort to lift knowledge out of de-
pendence on sensation, and to indicate that the mind it-
self, as a peculiar kind of instrument, brings to every 
knowing situation certain categories not given in experi-
ence. These categories have'a double reference; to 
phenomena of experience, so constituted as to be capable 
of specific classification; and to fu.e eapaci ties of 
reason itself, whereby the mind is able to organize 
phenomena into such classifications. This process of 
organizing raw sensation into experience and utilizing 
experience for the development of knowledge requires that 
there be ~ truths not given in experience, but 
presupposed by it. The Kantian usage of a priori is of 
special significance: 
What we here require is a criterion by ~ich to 
distinguish with certainty between pure and em-
pirical knowledge. ~erience teaches us that 
a thing is so and· so, but not that it cannot be 
otherwise. First, then, if we have a proposi-
\l . tion which in being thought is thought as neces-,.; ~·· 
7. Kan 'E, CPR, Bi , ( N. K. &ni th, tr. ) • 
sa-~ ··1 t is a.n··a. -;priori judgment;·-ana· if;·· l:Ye;..· · 
sides; it is nc)t derived from arty;pro:i;)oEiiti·on 
except one which ·a.rsa·has the vali'dity··of' a 
neceseary judglD.erit, it is an· absolutely · 
a pri"ori ·judgment. Secondly, eX_perience never 
confers on its judgments true or. strict, "but 
on1y assU:iried and "6ompa1'ative·uni versali ty·, . 
through induction.· It', ·then, -a ju[gment"""is 
thought with strict universali tyt that is, in 
such mariner· that no extSe;ption is allowed as· 
possible, it is not derived from experience, 
but is valid absolutely .! ;priori •••• · J.ifeces·si ty 
and strict universality·a.re thus sure criteria 
of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable one 
fro iii another. 8 
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Thus, in every knowing-situation the mind receives sense 
data, classifies them according to the categories, and 
binds them together so as to give them m ea.ning by a;p;pli-
cation of _! ;Eriori judgments. 9 
2. The World of Appearance and the World of Reality. 
Since all we really know of the physical world 
is experience -- sense ;phenomena organized into pat-
terns by the categories ~- the physical world is a con-
struct, an appearance. 10 This is a space-time world 
in which eaCh event is the effect of' some prior 
cause(s).ll One could hardly imagine a more complete 
determinism. But reason is not satisfied with unbroken 
determinism. Reason dema,nds that every event have a 
sufficient cause, and ihi s demand can never be met in 
mechanical determinism. For every supposed cause is it-
self an effect of previous causes, mich are effects of" 
--·---------------
a.. Kant, CPR, E3 ... 4. 
9. Cf'. Kant, CPR, B34 ... B91, "Transcendental Aesthetic, tt 
"Trans den tal ro gi c u. 
10. Ibid. --~-B66-B'7 3. 
11. Ibid. B232-B247. 
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previous causes, ad infinitUm. Hence there must be a 
noumenal world -- a realm of things·i~-themselves -- as 
-. . - . . ·-· 
contraste~ with thE? phen!'menal world .. 12 Reason demands 
the noumenal world. Here the deterministic chain does 
not apply, since the chain is merely a necessary inter-
pretation of sense phenomena. 1 3 In the absence of 
mechanical determinism, there is the possibility. of non ... 
rational ca.usali ty .. 14 'Jhe search for such sufficient 
cause must be entered into as an investigation in its 
own right, and in such an investigation we are led to 
practical understanding that could never be discovered 
so long as we limit ourselves to the categories of 
phenomena. 15 
Reason is thus forced to investigate this illu-
sion ~pplication of the rational idea of the 
total~ty of conditions to appearanceE7 to find 
out how it arises and how it can be removed. 
'Jhis can be done only through a complete criti-
cal examination of the entire faculty of reason; 
the antinomy of pure reason ••• is in fact, the 
most fortunate perplex:i ty in which human reason 
could ever have been involved, since it finally 
compels us to seek the key to escape from this 
labyrinth. 'Jhis key, when once found, discovers 
that which we did not seek and yet need, namely, 
a view into a higher immutable order of things 
in which we .alread;y are, .16 
In this 11hi@J.er immut;able ·order of things 11 we find the 
reality of moral obligation. 
12. This, in -essence, is the problem of the third 
antinomy of reason. Cf. Kant, CPR, B472-:B479. 
13. Ibid. Bl3. 
14. Ibid. B-477-479. 
15. Ibid. B856-B857. 
16. Kant, CP.rR, v. 107. (ileck, tr. ) • 
3. The Function of Reason in MOral Obligatien.17 
- ... ~ - ... - , 
11Reason is given to us as a practical faculty, 
i. e.,. one w_hich _is __ mea11t -~o have an inf'luen~e o;f the 
will. ula The ,proper function of reason is to J?roduce 
-. " • • • _.,. ••• - ..... -·. • • • ' • - •• - ~ - • • • - ¥ • - ~ ••• •• -
a good will.l9 There is no other manner in which rea• 
son aan serve morality. The only true satisfaction of 
reason is to achieve same purpose, without regard to 
other circumstances. Thus reason must produce a will 
that is good in and of i tsel:f. The. only good for the 
reasoning person is the good will. 20 
4. Du.ty for Duty's Sake. 
There are three important princi);lles characteris-
tic of the good will. The first is that one must will 
to do one's duty for duty's sake. Any other considera-
tion puts something in the place of the good Will. 'Ihe 
second is that purpose of moral action is not what makes 
it moral. It may even be that What one wills is utterly 
impossible. What is im);>ortan t is volition. ~e third 
principle t 
unu.ty ·is the necessity of an a.otion done :from 
· reSI>ect for the law ••• that which is. connected 
with my will merely as ground and not as conse-
quence, tha.t which does not serve my inclina ... 
tion but overpowers it ••• aan2ie an object of respect, and thus a. command. u · 
17. :lhis e:x:posi ~ion follows, at this point, the pattern 
set forth· in :Kant, FO:M. 
15. Ibid., IV, 396. 
l~. Loc~ cit~ 
20~ Lee. cit. 
21. I'bi d. , IV, 400. 
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These are, of course, three different ways of 
:pre sari bing duty for duty' s sake. What kind of la.w · 
. . . -- ~ .... .: _____ -·· - -· -·····. .-.----
fulfils this requirement? Only universal oonformity22 
~~--th~- ~a! ~f _cluty!__11 Tb.a~ ~s~_ I ~_auld_ ~ever ac~-~~­
such a way that I ooul.d not will that my maxim should 
be a universal la.w. u23 
. --
5. The categorical' Imperative. 
.. . -· -
It is clear ·iha t ·no ·e.x:periel'lce can gl. ve occa-
sion for inferring the possibilitY- of such 
apodioti'c -l-aws •• -~~-· all moral concepts have 
thei:r-·seat and ··origin entirely a: ·priori in· 
reason •••• IIi the purity of their origin lies 
their 'WOr-thine·ss ·to ·serve us as supreme pra.c~ 
tical :principles, arid to the extent that some-
thing empirical· is added to them, -Jtlst this 
much- is subtracted from their genuine influ..; 
ence .... - ~nee mo;J:al laws should hold' for every 
rational_ reing as- suCh, the principles must be 
derived from the universal concept of a ration-
al being generally. In this manner, all morals, 
which need anthropology for their application 
to- men; must be. oo:rhpJ.etely developed first as -
pure philoe~o:Phy~ 2!· e., metaphysics independent_ of anthropology. 
The will of man does not always voluntarily pur-
. - .. - . ~ 
sue that course which reason understands as go_ad. The 
will therefore, is, and must be, constrained. 26 This 
constraint is an !n/-pera ti ve. It is only when such re-
straint is necessar.y that there is any moral problem • 
.An inmera ti ve must be either hypothetical or cat~gori­
cal~ ~6 _ In the case of a. hypothetical iMRerati ve, _an 
tlif..... then '1 ccndi tian is defined;. e. g., It if you 
22• Kant; FOM, IV, 402. 
23~ Ibid., IV, 402. 
24~ Ibid.; IV, 408-411. 
26. Ibid. , IV, 412-413. 
26. Lac. cit. 
.. ·~ ·-· ... 
~nt_ to ~-t g?_Oti. gr~?-:ea~ ~11~11. you must sttl..~_._u~: A 
categorical imperative demands a given course of ac-
. -- - . - ~~ -· . -- - - . . .. . .. -·-- ·-- - -· -- ..... - .. 
tion without regard to any other conEJ.idera tion. Its 
commands are absolute and unconditional. The command 
of duty for duty's sake is of this nature a. cate-
. . . 
gorical imperative. 2_s "This imperative is an a ;priori 
synthetical practical proposition. u29 The imperative, 
stated, repeats the content given to duty. "Act only 
according to 1hat maxim by which you can a.t the same 
time will that it should become a universal law. n30 
Xhe fact that duty presents i taelf as a categorical 
imperative is a further reason why everything empiri-
cal i a beth unworthy ot and prejudicial to the mo :ral 
31 question. 
There must be a supreme practical prin~iple 
Whereby the categorical imperative i a made applicable 
to all problems of moral choice. 
The ground of this principle is: ·rational 
nature exists as an end in itself. Man neces-
sarily thinks of his own existence in this way; 
thus far it is a subjective principle of human 
actions. Also every other rational being thinks 
of his existence by means of the same rational 
ground which holds also for myself; thus it is 
at the same time an objective principle from 
which, a.s a supreme practical ground, it must 
be possible to derive all laws of the will. ~e 
practical imperative, therefore, is the follow-
ing: Aot so that you treat humanity, whether in 
2?. xan£, FOM,'IV, 413~415. 
28. Ibid~, IV, 416-419. 
29. Ibid~; IV; A20. 
30. Ibid.; IV, 421. 
31. Ibid., IV, 419. 
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your own person or that of anotheii always as 
an end and never as a means only. 
Kant believes that from this principle all specific 
rules of moral conduct can be deduced. 
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When a being obeys the categorical imperative, 
he has then won his admission into the realm of ends;33 
he becomes a free being, legislating for himself and 
for all mankind, for his will now participates in the 
universality of reason. nAutonomy is thus the basis 
of the dignity of both human nature and every rational 
nature ... ~4 
Seeking for moral laws outside the autonomy of 
the will itself always involves one with objects other 
than the good will, and heteronomy of the will is the 
result, with the good lost sight of. 55 
As a direct answer to the question, How is a 
categorical imperative possible?, Kant writes: 
••• categorical imperatives are possible because 
the idea of freedom makes me a member of an in-
telligible world. Consequently, if I were a 
member of only that world, all my actions would 
always be in accordance with the autonomy o~e 
will. But since I intuit myaelf at th~ same 
time as a member of the world of sense, my ac-
tions ou~ht to conform to it, and this categor-
ical aught presents a synthetic a priori proposi-
tion, since besides my will affected by my sen-
suous desires there is added the idea of the will 
as pure, practical of itself, and belonging to 
the intelligible world, Which according to reason . 
contains the supreme condition of the former will. 
It is similar to the manner in wl:d.ch o ancepts of 
'!.!~ Kant, FOM, IV, 429. 
~~. Ibid., IV, 433. 
~4. Ibid., IV, 436. 
~~. Ibid., IV, 440-449. 
"thef ·unaeratandini:f;- wh·:t-ch- of- themsel ve·s- mean --
:ti.ithing but. lS.Wfti.l- form in: gEn:ieral~- are· addea 
to the-- i:ri. tui 'ti ens-- of the- ·efensuous· world, -·tn.us 
renderin.· g pos.sib:te· a.Jiriori --synthetic :Propcisi-
tion·a, ·on which all owledge of a system of 
nature rests. 36 
. .. ~ - - .. 
6. The Summum :Bonum. 
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In ~e Critique of Practical Reason, Kant, in addi• 
tion to developing his mor~l philof!ophy __ after __ much the 
same faShion as the presentation in Foundations of MOrals, 
---
examines in detail the capac~ties of ~he practical 
reason. 37 .Argwnents for God, freedom, and immortality are 
built upon the fact of_ th~ ca. tegor_ical imp_ era ti ve. 38 One 
additional matter important for our purposes ~~ a much 
more detailed discussion of the summum bonum. 39 Here-
emphasizes that the categorical imperative constrains us 
. - . 
ever to pursue the highest. It is necessary to consult 
his Metaphysi9~ ~ MOrals to find his most succinct and 
significant definition of the highest good: "What are 
the ends which are also duties? They are my ovm perfec ... 
tion (foniJJ the happiness of others. «40 
7. Does Kant's Exclusion of Empirical Data Negate 
the Present Investigation? 
Kantts exclusion of empirical data does not negate 
this investigation for the following reasons: 
A. What Kant SUcceeded and Failed in Showing. 
In his treatment of moral laws Kant appears to a.t-
36~ Kant, FOM, IV, 454 •. 
37. Cf. Kant; CPrR, Books I & I I. 
38. Ibid~ ' v, 89-106, v, 121-131. 
39. Ibid~, :Book II. 
40. Kant; MOM, IV, 386. 
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tempt to prove two basiq ideast 
(l) That the capacity for experiencing moral obligation is 
·•· ' •• • - •• •• - ~ •. • - • • . • • • • ,/ • • • ---~ •··•·•• • a 
an a_ "Priori category of the mind, and thus underivable from 
-. . . - .. - . 
~~~~-~nee; _(~) _That mo_r~l laws by_ which ri~l?-~ condu~~- ~~-­
determined are also a priori, and equally devoid of empiri-
cal content. 
Rant seems to succeed in proving the first of these 
two ideas; that the capa.?i ty for _experiell:cing moral obl~ .. 
gation must be an a priori category. The capacity ~- or 
rather ~he imp~rative ~- to judge conduct in terms of 
oughtnesa can no more be taught or otherWise conditioned 
than ~~n th ~ category of quantity. Only a mind already 
capable of quantitative conceptualization can be taught to 
solve mathematical pxoblems,. for every term employed to 
suggest quantity is a. quanti ta.tive term. The capacity to 
interpret experience in quantitative terms is presupposed 
in any conditioning process. 'Eq>erience cannot cr_eate su?h 
-. . . . 
a capacity, but does provide occasions for the operation of 
the capacity. The same principle seems to hold relative to 
the capacity for ·moral obligation. At the proper point, 
below, the !. priori nature of moral obl~gation will be de-H 
fen9-ed against the currently predominant tendency t~ r~gard.. 
even the capacity for moral thought as wholly conditioned.. 41 
This investigation, therefore, rather than being 
negated by fuis first Kantian objective, will reassert _it. 
(2) Kant's second goal, proof that ~ecific moral 
41. f!f'. atli£pter JN:tn-e':, I, II, III, '.lhis Dissertation. 
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laws for the .~??~dan(}_~ ~f __ r~ght conduct ~~~- -~1.-~~ a -~r~?=:i, 
is not aChieved. ~e impossibility of establiShing such 
pr?o~_ -~S. _o~e factor which. renders_ such an _inv~st~_g~-~~on as 
the present one necessary. Kant's fear that chartless 
moral relativity or even casuistry will be the inevitable 
outcome of admitting ~mpirical considerations is, as will 
be Shown, groundless. 42 on the other hand, one of the 
principal weaknesses of Kant's ethics is its failure to ac-
count ade~uately for the hard fact of a considerable degre~ 
of moral relativity within an ultimately universal concept. 
~ecific choices in coherence with universal laws must vary 
with exterior circumstances. Verifiable moral laws must be 
so formulated as to take account of this fact. 
The remainder of the discussion in this section Will 
indicate why Kant's effort to prove the a priori nature of 
morality failed to give an adequate basis for ethics in 
spite of its partial truth. 
B. Is There Really A Priori Truth Where Kant Asserts Itf 
At certain points, Kant assumes an~ Friority which 
does not exist. Even the assumption that one can reason 
about morality is not a necessary truth. Unless one is 
willing to assume the claim, as Kant was, thus begging the 
question at the start, it can be proved only by a careful 
• ,_, I • • 
investigation of moral experience, of the emotions which 
enter into it, of the effectiveness with which the will 
can be persuaded by reason, and of the capacity of the willil 
42. Of. Chapter-Seven, This Dissertation. 
76 
to bring emotion under control of reason. 
---~~-let __ 1l~ .. s.uP.poa_~ that t?-~.C.~~acity to "1:>.~--~-e,~son• 
able in moral matters has been proved. Kant 1 a belief in 
th:e ~i ye~sali ty and .~e.cessi ty of _the p~i.l1ci.~le '!f . 11 du ty __ 
for duty's sake 11 iEI not an a. ;priori judgment. Even though 
Kant •s usage of !! pricE!_ has recently been dia~~sed, it 
rra.y be helpful to go a step further in clarifying ita sig-
nificance :for moral laws. In his _!ntroduction to Philoso-
phl, E. s. Brightman has a paragraph concerning categories 
'Which may help us to get close to the Kantian position. 
- . 
A category~~, ma,y· be identified by the fact that; 
if it be not true, a. whole system of eX:perience 
is impossible. Denial of a valid empirical law 
contradicts particular facts on the interpreta-
tion of them; denial o:f a category contradicts 
the ··possibility of there being any facts of the 
sort in question. If there be no space and time, 
there·is no physical world. Categories are.the 
structural principles of a coherent system.43 
This is exactly what Kant asserts concerning his a priori 
categories. They are universal and_neceaaarl to the very 
structure of thought about morality. To deny them,is to 
deny that there is a moral problem. But is this allegation 
actually true about the principle of 11 duty for duty's sake 11 ? 
Is it not possible to think about morality while denying 
both that a good will is the 2_n11 good, and that "duty for 
duty's sake" :follows from the primacy of the goodwill? 
43. Bri/ihtman, In>, 98. 
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But let it be asserted. for sake of discussion, 
that duty for duty:'s sake has been established a.s the 
criterion for the good will. It is not then, as Ka.n t 
assumes, an a priori truth that nthere are other ration-
al beings thinking of their existence by means of the 
same rational ground which holds for myself. 11 This can 
be only inferred from interpretation of complex sensory 
data. Even if one could be certain on ! ~riori grounds 
that such is the case, there is no ! priorit~ in the 
claim tmt I should treat them all as ends and never as 
means. This can be establisbed only by utilizing empiri-
cal data to prove the interdependence of personal values. 
Apart from empirical data, there is no logical contra-
diction in the thought tha.t I should treat a.ll otber per-
sons as means to my own ends which -to me might be con-
sidered as the only values. 
Neither are the examples of the application of 
44 
the principle of duty ~ priori. How can one show tmt 
an inexperienced buyer ought not to be overcharged, ex-
cept as one shows by empirical references that over-
charging an inexperienced buyer inwt(ji.li'f-'eS personal values1 
Or wba t is ~ :prioz:i about inferring from duty in general 
that one must preserve one's own life when it would be 
both easier and more desi mble to die? Apart from empiri-
cal da.ta evaluated according to criteria ·which must them-
4:4\. ci'. Kant, FOM, IV, 398-404, 429 ... 433. 
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selves involve empirical verification, one must agree 
w.i. th Hume tl:la t it is no more reas enable to prefer_ li_f"e 
than -death45 ; and one would have to add also that, ex-
cept for consideration of empirical data, it is no more 
obligatory. 
I<ant 1 s reasoning at this point lacks necessity. 
What is miss.ing? If the reas aning is arrang~d in syl-
logistic fpr.m, the weakness becomes apparent. To illu-
strate the difficulty, let us begin with an examination 
of a syllogism 'Which does possess necessity: 
Major Premi~s All three-sided figures made of straight 
lines are triangles. 
~Premise: This figure is a three-sided figure made 
~f strai~t lines • 
• 
Conclusion: • • This figure is a triangle. 
In this syllogism, the major wremiae is established by 
definition; the minor premise, in part, by an empirical 
investigation showing that "thisn object embodies the 
concept of tttrianglenes~"· When the truth of major and 
minor premise is thus established, the conclusion fol-
lows of necessity. 
Let us take a Kan tian idea arranged in syllogi a-
tic form: 
Ma.J or Premise: Duty for Duty 1 s flake ought to be observed 
by all persons. 
45. Hume, . mN:--
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Minor Premise: Preserving one's life is a duty<'for duty's ak s e. 
-~---~·--------------~~--------------~--------·=---------..... ~--• Conclusion: •• Preserving one's life ought to be ob-
served by all p era ans. 
If we assume for the moment that the major premise is 
an a Rriori truth, and go on to the minor premise, we 
discover a difficulty. Kant will not allow it to be 
established by empirical reference. Instead, he supports 
. -· 
it by ma.i ntaining that it follows from the 11 supreme prac-
. .• 
tical principle 11 ; treat all men· as ends, never as means, 
But as we have shown, this principle is not_~riori, 
rather resting on interpretations of empirical data. 
W.1!ts within the limi ta ti ons Kant sets up, the minor pre-
mise of his thought cannot be verified.. While the syl-
logism is valid, it lacks necessity because of the vul-
nerability of the minor premise. Again, necessity can-
not be saved by asserting that the 11 supreme practical 
principlett is an ~priori category necessary to the ex-
istence of the data. All the data are thinkable in moral 
terms apart from the principle. 
Criticisms involving the same principle may be 
46 
made of each of his examples. 
c) All Kant's Examples Are Over-Simplifications. 
Kant's examples of the ·application of the 
11 supreme practical principle" are all over-simplifica-
46. It would be-possible to argue that Kant's deduction 
of the categories in CPR rests on an empirical dis-
tinction -- the necessity of distinguishing the sub-jective from the objective. To go into this in de-
tail would be to deviate too far_ from the central 
purpose of the present discussion, however. 
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t~ons of morality. Very seldom does one face a clear~eut 
~--· ...... --.. -- - ·~ •······· .... _. __ ;, 
~o-~~-~ be~!e_~~- ~ruth:f'uln~ss and un~rutJ:tf~:IJ:.e~~' for __ ~~:- _ 
~t-~;e! is~I.a:t~d fr~m ~:1:~. o~he:r_moral eho;c~s. In actual 
fact, choices usually involve such conflicts as: truth-
fulness about literal fact versus truthfulness about a 
principle or spirit; truthfulness versus self-preserva-
. . . 
t;on; tr~thfulness versus the preservation of others, etc. 
Some system of Choosing between possibilities, all of 
.. -. - -· ... 
which. taken in_ a~~tra~tion appear good, is necessary to a~ 
adequate morality ••. , No system in which consequences are not 
allowed consideration can provide a basis for cboice. 
There is specially acute difficulty when the ends of sever-
.. ~ . 
al persons are involved, and when any choice involves using 
some pe~sons as means for the preservation of ends of other 
persons. 
D. Further Difficulties Centering Around A ~iori Claims. 
There are further difficulties concerning the 
alleged a priori nature of moral law~. According to Kant, 
the relation between actions and a priori moral laws is 
similar to that he finds existing between raw sensation 
and the phenomenal categories; both result in a priori 
synthetic judgmenta. 47 That is to sayr ~raw sensations 
are received, they are classified by the categories of the 
mind and worked into a· body of' experience, with resulting 
interpretations which did not appear in sensation; and as 
one acts and makes Choices, the categorical imperative op-
erates with resulting moral judgments of those actions. 
47. Ka.n=t, FOM, IV, 454. 
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.But why, it must now be asked, is it true that !!':Priori 
synthetic judgments about phenomena possess a degree of 
universality not achieved by~ priori synthetic judg-
ments about morality? Two men of equal honesty and in-
tellectual capacity observe a third man killed by a hit-
run driver. Doubtless they can ~ome to general agree-
ment about the observed phenomena, so far as the actual 
events are concerned (though of course, the more de-
tailed their a.oc ounts become, the more they will tend to 
. ) -t$ diverge • · :But what has been observed may mean two 
quite different things to the observers. Mr. A., con-
ditioned in our motorized society in which leaving the 
scene of an accident is held to be both illegal and im-
moral, would condemn the failure o:f the driver to a to:p, 
regardless of the circumstances of the accident. Mr. :B., 
coming from a background totally different, may feel 
sympathy for the dead pedestrian, but see nothing im-
~ral about the driver's failure to atop, And the cen-
tury-long debates among ethicists concerning the morali-
ty of given acts or practises afford no encouragement 
te believe that Mr. A and Mr. B would ever come te agree-
ment in searching for a priori truths whose logic would 
be coercive. They would agree that the driver should 
have done the best he knew. But that the best wo~d 
have a priori equivalence to stopping the car cannot be 
sbown. The principle of treating a.J.l pers ana as ends 
48. Of. Ruch, :PL, Chapt. 8. 
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would imply intention to stop. But, let it be repeated, 
that principle is not a priori to all reasoning minds as 
~- .... £ .•... 
are __ tn,.e :prin~~:ple.~ o~ classifying _sense dat~. To repeat; 
~~-p~io_r~ _synthetic :rno_rai. jl:ldgments~, -~a-~1{ the_universali-
ty achieved by ! prior~ synthetic judgments involving the 
. . .. - . - . . 
phenomenal categories. Why? Obviously, because the moral 
conc~usions a.t which Kant a.rriyes are not truly !_p_;:~. 
E. Duty versus Personality. 
Kant's principle of duty for duty's sake cannot al-
ways be made coherent with· treating persons as ends in 
themselves. Duty to any principle ·of behavior may on occa-
. ... - ···- ... 
sion involve disregarding the dignity of human personality. 
11 Tell the truth and let the heavens fall tt e:x:presse s a con-
siderable disregard of aJ.l the persons on 'Whom the heavens 
are to fall. Further, it is impossible to understand how 
Kant's exclusion of all altruistic impulses from determin-
ation of morality is consistent with regarding persons as 
ends. If I feed and shelter a helpless human being because 
I love him, am I not applying the "supreme practical prin-
ciple tt more clearly t lan if' I ha.ve no regard for him as a 
person, and extend a.id only out of' loyalty to some empty 
principle of' duty? Kant presupposes, of course, that al-
truism necessarily involves self-interest. While this is 
highly debatable, one may point out that even if this were 
true, one could hardly conceive a more morally praisewor-
thy man than one who counts among his own interests the 
conservation of the values of' his friend. 
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F. The Return of Co~sequenc~~· 
Actually, Kant does not su9~e~d- _il_l_ e~~~~nating con-
si_de_ra~~on o! ___ co!lsequences from hi~- ow~ e'tb.ic~. _~ere are 
at ~~a-~t _ t~r~~ ~?int~ at which consideration of consequenc-
es is necessitated by Kant•s own thought •. 
-. ' - " 
First, it is impossible to treat other persons as 
ends in any specific situation without considering the con-
sequences to that person of the al ternat~v~s open. Slp!)ose 
a merchant decides to treat the first customer of the day 
. . . 
as an end, and not merely as a means to profit. Haw will 
the merchant act? Re cannot possibly know What is good 
without considering consequences of the alternatives. The 
point is that choosing to treat the customer as an end is 
' . . 
simultaneously and indistinguiShably a choice of certain 
S:Pecific consequences. Until one has chosen foreseeable 
consequences, one has not chosen at all. A good will that 
wills nothing in particular is a meaningless ~bstraction. 
Secondly, Kant finally comes to the revelation that 
duty for duty's sake is not really the supreme concern,_but 
rather individual devotion to duty in order that one .may 
recognize oneself• as a member of the realm of ends.49 
This, as was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, is 
a matter of choosing the consequence of being a duty-serv-
ing person as contrasted with choosing the consequence of 
being a duty-rejecting person. And such a choice is not 
of merely logical consequences, but of a condition of life 
in which one is able to pursue with one's fellows legiti-
49. Kant, FOM, IV, 432ff. 
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mate ends in moral autonomy. Such a consequence would be 
.. 
- ... ·- ·--- . .. . . . . 
quite empirical. 
Thirdly, as Kant defines the SWmn.um bonum 
a;::=;:::::::::- -·--. 
the 
~P-~_~nes~ -~f- _my_ :nei~~or and my own perfection -- he be ... 
comes quite empirical. Certainly the good will is one that 
wills the highest good. Not only am I obliged to will the 
. . - .. 
highest good, but to pursue it. Thus, if my will is truly 
go()d! I will seek not only my own formal complian()e wi~ 
duty, but will do i,i to ~end (consequence) that my neigh-
bor will be happy •. Also, God sees that the good will be 
. . 
happy, as well as perfect. So even the consequence, per-
sonal happiness, is not disregarded. 
G. Kant • s Cri ti ci sms Inapplicable. 
If there were no other reason why Kant1s exclusion 
of empirical data would not negate this investigation, 
there would still be the fact iha t Kant uses both the term 
11 em;piricalll and the term lfmoral laws" in a manner quite 
different from the definition given to them by this study. 
He uses the term 11 em;piricaltt, apparently, to refer only to 
behavior in the physical world. For the investigation, on 
the other hand, the categorical imperative itself would be 
a.n empirical datum, since we are using 11 empirical11 to refer 
to any content of consciousness. In the approaCh made here, 
the categorical imperative would not be ignored, but stud-
ied along with other conscious content. 
Moral la.ws f:or Kant were not "verifiable, genetic 
relevance between chosen consequences upon values 11 • Kant's 
moral laws were rational imperatives arising from the sub-
~ eo~i ve :t.e~~ing of moral obligation. Thus even if one 
~hould a~~ow :Ka.ll:~*s ~ti::e case against empirical con-
sideration for establiShing what he regarded as moral 
- . '... . - . . ·- .. . . .. - - --
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laws, that would in no sense negate an empirical approach 
to moral laws as defined tor this stuey. Conceivably, 
Kant t s thoroughly ·formal pr ~scriptioi?- a!'l~ this empirical 
approach might be :pursued slln.ultaneously, without contra-
diction, for the goals sought are, by definition, somewhat 
different. It is even conceivable that agreement might be 
reaChed independently upon formulation of certain moral 
. . 
laws. Of course Kant would contend that laws formulated 
through consideration of empirical content would lack both 
universalitw and obligation. That question can best be 
settled by proceeding with the investigation. 
III. Relativistic and Positivistic Objections. 
This third major class of objections to an ampiri-
cal approach to mo ra.l laws is based partially upon a fail-
ure to recognize that no descriptive data have aignif:j-
oance until they are interpreted according to some nor.m. 
The norm need not -- indeed, Should not -- be ar~itr~ily 
determined. The data themselves ought to be of such im-
portance as to provide bases for periodic revision of the 
norms. But the necessities of classifying data, of de• 
terming their significance, and of estimating wnat use 
oa.n be :ma.de of them in fulfilment of the purposes for 
wniah they were collected, are all generally recognized 
in most fields of stud.Ye All such operations upon em-
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:pirieal data involve eva.lua tion of those da. ta, not mere 
.. .. 
cataloguing. 
Strangely, 'When one turns to the matter of uti liz-
ing empiri~a.l method for accumulating information which 
might throw some light on moral obligation, one discovers 
tba~ suoh operations as th.ose ~ust described giv~ rise to 
aonsterna tion in many quarters. It is assumed to be le-
gitimate to make evaluative selections among data turned 
up by empirical method if the purpose, for instance, is 
to determine how to make a. more flexible plastic, or how 
to utilize some of the wasted power in combustion engines, 
or how to achieve alleged a priori ends .better. In none 
of these cases is it claimed that bare description must 
suffice for what ought to be.50 But when the interest 
ie utilizing empirically derived data for the purpose of 
helping to determine the nature of moral.obligat1on, the 
objection is immediately raised that empirical da.~a can-
not be evaluated. It must be taken as discovered. What ... 
ever a. given thought or behavior pattern ·is must be ac-
. - ....... - . 
cepted as suCh. One must not pass any evaluative judg-
ment, by suggesting that what is ought to be different, 
·-
or by noting that what is, could, by certain adjustments, 
-
be improved so as to better serve the values involved. 
The reason for this supposed incompatibility between em-
pirical method a.nd normative moral laws is not immediate-
.,_ 
~. ·::_; ;, ..... 
5o. The first two examples are, of course, of logical · 
and functional oughts, rather than of moral oughts. 
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ly apparent. There are various claims that empirical in-
v~~sti~13: tion __ re_s?-lts in _complete __ r~lat~ vi ty; that eltl+ical 
~~~~~~~~s are emotional in _nature_, devoid of rational 
content; that ethical judgments are never verifiable be-
- . ~ ·-· .•... ·- -·-· - - . ,, ...... ... 
cause they say nothing about any existent thing, and so 
on. It now becomes necessary to investigate some of 
these objections at firf$t band, and to determine vfu.ether 
there is real incompatibility between empirical method 
... 
and normative moral judgment. 
1. Edward Westermarck's Relativism. 
A. Ex:posi tion. 
Westermarck's basic views and methods were early 
set forth in a. lengthy two volume work entitled, ,Qti gin 
~nd Development of .Mor_al Ideas. ~ A few years later his 
much shorter and more concise Ethical Relativitl restat-
ed essentially the same ideas and brought them up to date. 
Westermarck goes to gr.eat length to trace the be-
ginning and development of moral standards through vary-
ing stages from society to society. He lays grea. t stress 
on socio~economic circumstances which .give rise to vari-
ous ethiC?al '?oncepts, attempting to show an unbroken de-
velopment from most primitive moral standards to the 
ethical practises recognized in his own day. 'While his 
presentation of a history of moral ideas is saholarly 
and attempts to be e.:x:bausti ve, his· chief interest is not 
the history tor its own sake, but is rather to show that 
morality is purely a socia.l product, with practical ex-
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ped.iency as the guiding principle. "Society is the school 
in which we learn to distinguish right from wrong. The 
- -, . 
headmaster is custom, and the lessons are the same for all 
~ ~ - . . . . - . . . . •.. : '• . . ..... ~ . 
members of' the cozrnn..U!li ty-._ u5~-
If ethics is to be normative, Westermarck contends, 
morality must possess some kind of objectivity. Here he 
is clearly thinking of something resembling ~ Platonic 
Idea, having 11~ real existence apart_ from any reference to 
a human mind. u52 He sees no possibility that empirical 
investigation could afford any grounds for adequate ob-
jectivity. I:f' claims to normative moral laws are to hold., 
there must be some self-evident principle, s :ince, he be-
lieves, empirical investigations such as his own reveal 
only relativism. Westermarck does not define relativism 
explicitly, but implies that any proposition which is not 
self-evident is relative. 
The question to be answered, then, is whether any 
of the moral principles that have been regarded 
as self-evident really are so. If ethics be ta.k~ 
en as the term for a normative science, I agree 
with Professor Moore's statement that 'the funda-
mental principle of Ethics must be self-evident.' 
I also agree with him when he says: -- 11 'fhe ex-
pression 'self-evident' means properly that the 
proposition so-ealled is evident or true, ~1-
self alone, that it is not an inference from some 
proposition other than itself ••• t tt 53 
Numerous attempts to support a normative ethic·s are 
examined, and all are rejected, whether Aristotelian, 
51. Westermarcli,d EB., 48. 
62. Ibid.~; 3. 
53. Ibid., 41-42. 
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Kantian, utilitarian, or Whatever. He makes much o:f dis-
-·--- -~-----. ·- ----------- --·· J 
S.f5~~~~~~-- .a:rno~ ..... ~:;P~:t' ~s_•~,,. a!):d _ ~i !lds _in ~he_ :t'a~ ~ of.' -~uc_h: 
disagreement sufficient evidence that all are seeking the 
impossib?-.~~-. 
Since in the absence of objectivity supported by 
self-evident :propositions ethics cannot be normative, 
there must be a new a:ppr?ach c~ncerning the _legitimate 
task of ethics. As a f'ounda ti on f'o r this new conception, 
. . 
W~stermarck proposes his own def'ini t_ion of ethi os -- a 
definition which is representative of numerous contempor-
ary ethical relativistsc 
-- . ~ . - . 
It may, of course,· be a S.l bject :for sci enti:fi c 
in(tuiry to· investigate the means which are condu-
ai ve ·to human happiness· or welfare, the results 
of' such a· stu~ may also be usefully applied by· 
moralists, but it f'orms no more a part of ethics 
than physics is a part of psychology. If the 
word 1 ethics' is to be used as the name :for a·: 
science, the ·object of tb.a. t science can only· ge 
a stu~ of the moral consciousness as a :fact. 4 
In consistency with his own limitation of the 
f'ield, Westermarck turns to an examination of 11 the rise 
of the moral conscience as a :fact. n He :finds the genesis 
of morality in the emotions. In an account very similar 
to that :found in Hume 's A Treatise of Human Nature (though 
he gives Hume no credit), ~e traces the rise of the moral 
emotions o:f the individual. There are two basic emotion-
a.l responses; approval and disapproval. One approves of 
experiences or things Which give one pleasure or assist 
in the achievement of one's satisfactions. Similarly, 
64. Westermarck, ER, 61. 
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one disapproves that Which brings pain or frustration. When 
one believes that a responsible agent can be charged for 
either the approved or disapproved experience, the emotions 
become "retributive" -- that is, one has a desire to return 
like fo; like~&~ Moral emotions are a ~ecie of retributive 
emotions. All emotion may be called moral when, as a "disin-
terested spectator" one approves or disapproves an act, re-
gardless of one's own involvement or lack of same. 
A moral emotion is tested by an imaginary change of 
~elationsnip between him who approves or disapproves 
of the conduct by whiah the emotion was evoked and 
the parties immediately concerned, while the rela-
tionshi%J>etween the parties themselves is left un-
altered.·~ 
How do disinterestedness and apparent impartiality 
become a part of moral emotions? 
The solution of this problem is not difficult to 
find. It lies in the fact that society is the 
birthplace of the moral con$ciousness; that the 
first moral judgments expressed, not the private 
emotions of isolated individuals, but emotions 
felt by the society at large; ~~t tribal austom 
was the earliest rule of duty. 
Westermarck immediately denies that in deriving the 
content of moral disapproval from custom he is eontr3di~t­
ing his thesis that emotion is the basis of all moral judg-
.ment. Ethically, custom is only a ••generalization of emo-
tional tendencies, applied to certain modes of conduct and 
transmitted from generation to generation.u ~e moral 
custom itself arises from the fact that persons have similar 
Wo. Westermarck, ER., Qer~5$~90. 
fi(!., Ibid., 93. 
~~. Ibid., ER, 111. 
~-..... 
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emotional reactions to stimuli. In ~is connection, custom 
tends to give direction to the emotional reactions of the 
growing individual. As individuals mature in the tradition 
into which they are born, they sometimes begin to find fault 
with their culture on the basis of individual feelings. On 
such bases, certain individuals render criticism of their 
society, and af.ter a time this idea takes hold with others, 
and slowly custom is changed by the individual. 
The analysis of ~u~ht is a further interest to which 
Westermarck turns. He finds the first element in an 11ought-
ing" experience to be conation. Closely allied with the 
' 
conative aspect is an imperative one. fh.e ought derives its 
emotional quality from the knowledge that the direction of' 
the ought will not be followed, at least not usually in its 
entirety. This last he calla Hthe moat essential fact in-
volved in the notion o:e ought." Interestingly, he maintains 
that probable or aQ>.tual disregard f.or or transgression· of' 
the demands of an ought, bringing moral disapproval, is more 
fundamental to rightness than is right action itself. If 
all actions were right there would be no moral problem. 
Wrong is what brings a moral problem into being, and right 
is usually approved through the implication that the opposite 
of such behavior would have been wrong. 5S 
While one would suppose that, on the basis of what 
has gone bef.ore, Westermarck would deny al.l place in moral 
-
~a. Westermarck, ER, 220ff. 
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judgment to intellect, this does not prove to be the case. 
To wit: 
Though all moral ju~ents are ultimately based 
on emotions, the influence that intellectual fac-
tors exercise on such judgments is very great in-
deed. Emotions are determined by cognitions •••• 
Tnis has been a very important cause of the varia-· 
ttons of moral judgments; the same course of con- · 
duct is differently judged because different ideas 
are held as to its nature or implications.59 
With this beginning, Westermarck goes on to a statement 
whi~h would seem certainly to be in direct contradiction 
to much that he has said previously: 
Amoral judgment may be said to be more enlightened 
in proportion as it is influenced by reflection 
o:r knowledge, and the so-called moral evolution 
largely cons~sts in a gradual progress of en-
lightenment. 
He feels that even though cognition does play an important 
part in emotion, the same cognitions often give rise to 
different emotions in different people, or even to differ-
ent emotions in the same persan at different times under 
different circumstances. Thus, he contends, there is no 
ground for asserting a universality of moral judgments. 
A closing examination of various other theories, 
such as various forms of hedonism and Kantian ethics, 
leaves him with the firm conviction that his own views 
deal more adequately with the facts these former thinkers 
have endeavored to handie. This discussion does not alter 
his th~ory from the position as herein stated, however. 
59. Westermarck, ER, 147. 
60. Loa. cit. 
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B. Criticism. 
Westermarck's failure to see compatibility between 
em~i~~~~ method and normative mo:r::-~1 laws re~ts ~iJ:~~-' on 
h~~ _ in_S.i~t_ence_ t~~ t. or,t~Y.~ __ se~-~vident principl~ would 
provide the objectivity necessary to give moral laws auth~ 
ori ty. He did not deal with, nor did he seem aware of the 
possibility of, defining moral rightness in ter.ms of values 
- - -
real to persons. Id..ke .many obj eo tors to the whole concept 
of moral_law,_he was combatting Platonic, ~omistic, and 
Ka.ntia.n views. w.hen moral laws are thought of as "genetic 
relevance between chosen acts and foreseeable consequences 
to human valuestt there is no incompatibility with empiri-
cal approaches. Indeed, it is only when empirical data 
are interpreted according ·to some such criterion that they 
. . 
can have any meaning for distinctly moral problems. 
Wester.marok was at least self-consistent in denying the 
reality of such a problem by limiting the field of ethics 
to a study of the fact of mor~ judgments as such. Eut 
such a denial is about as unempirical as one can become. 
The sec end prong of Westermarck ts separation of the 
empirical and the normative consisted of relegating moral 
e:x:peri ence to almost exclusively emotional reactions. 
That all emotionaJ. judgments bave emotional content there 
can be little doubt. rut what judgments are free of emo-
tian? Wester.marck's own treatment of the development of 
ethics is emotiona.lly charged. Discussions such as Wes-
termarck's are fallacious in that they are founded on an 
94 
inadequate psychology of personality. The whole person is 
involved in the conceptual and overt behavior of the indivi-
dual. MOst ~otions are more or less influenced or con-
trolled by reason, just as mo~ reasoning processes are 
colored by emotion. The most careful and objective scien-
tist may have a considerable emotional stake in his investi-
gation. Does the emotion ~~r ~negate his objective judg-
ment? There is no necessity that such be the case. Even if 
it were true (though in fact it is extremely doubtful) that 
~oral reactions are wholly emotional in their first ap-
pearance, it does not follow that such early emotional re-
sponses must remain unaltered by conceptual thought upon 
the experiences which give rise to the emotions. If ra-
tional influence upon moral judgments be allowed to ma-
ture persons, there is no clear impediment to reason be-
coming at last the controlling factor, thus completely re-
thinking-and redirecting the entire moral judgmental pat-
tern. When such would have become the case, morality 
would cease to be a mere reflect ion of emotion, and might 
involve a degree of evaluation whereby the individual 
would be motivated to bring certain ~otions more and more 
under c antral. The object ion to a union between empirical 
investigation and moral evaluation which is based on 
claims that moral pronouncements are exclusively emotional 
must be set aside because of their unrealistic compart-
mentalization of personality. 
Thus both Westermarck's attempt to limit ethics to 
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an either-or choice between absolutism and complete relati-
vism an~ his r~le~a~io~ of mora?:. jud~~n~s ~o_ ~<>_~ion~l_r~~ 
aoti<;>ns, -~ail_~o nega~e the approach of ___ this inves~~g;~tion. 
2. The Postivistic Denial of all Normative Ethics. 
. . . 
A. Ex.position. 
Representative of the approach of the positivists is 
Alfred J • .Aye~ 's ~guage, Truth and Logic. In his cri ti-
- -'"" 
que of ethics, Ayer holds that all value statements, includ~ 
ing ethical statements, must be "scientific 11 • Ethical phil-
- -· . ~ 
osophy is thus limited to 1'proposi tiona -which express de-
. ~. . \ .. . 
fini tians of e~hical t~rms, or jutg-ments about the ~egi tim-
acy or possibility of certain defini tiona. utSl All other 
types of ethical inquiry are ruled out of consideration. 
If one attempts to translate ethical judgments into "non-
ethicaltt terms, as do subjectivists and utilitarians, .Ay'er 
would still contend that a normative ethics is impossible. 
Rather, one is ceasing to make moral judgments at all • 
••• in our language, sentences which contain norma-
tive ethical symbols are not equivalent to sentences 
~ich express psychological proposi~~ons, or indeed 
empirical propositions of any kind. · 
Absolutistic approaches are ruled out, since these 
assume non-empirical sources of information, such as reve-
lation, intuition, and the like. There ia no way asser-
tions made on suah grounds can be verified because they 
refer to nothing testable. 
The central reason why all normative ethical judg-
61~ A'3'er, · LTL;-103. 
62. Ibid., 105. 
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. .. ~·.- -- ~ ... ,,.. -· .... 
.. 
IE:~~~- a.re u~a.J:l~l!zable is ~h~'!i they are -~eal_~Y ps_~'!l?-<?:~~!1-... 
()ep~s •.. -~~-~~ ~~e~~D.-0~ <?f_a~ e-:th:ic~~-sy:w.bol in a pr~p~~-~~ion 
adds nothing to its factual content. n63 All the ethical 
,_ -~- .. - - -~ - -- . ~- .... -·· ...,, __ . ------ ~--··· 
s_ym.bol do~s is __ t<?. no~e e!I!-?tional ~oil.e_o~ to :rou~~_feeling 
and thus stimulate action. This emotional quality may 
take on the tone of a command. 
Careful distinction is made between 11 the expression 
of feeling tt and "the assertion of feeling. 11 'D:le posi ti vis-
tic view of an ethical statement is that it is merely the 
expression of a feeling without any assertion that the 
feeling belongs to the speaker. There cannot even be de-
--. . -
bate, then, about ethics or about any other value-claim. 
-- - . . 
~st apparent arguments about morality are_really argu-
ments about the facts in the circumstances. That is, the 
argument is not that one is taking the wrong ethical view 
of the facts in question, but that one is mistaken about 
the facts. Whenever one does encounter some person hold• 
ing a different moral view, one usually discounts that 
position by regarding it as inferior. There is no way we 
can argue against the va.lidi ty of the "inferior" mora.li ty. 
Thus: 
There can be no such thing as an ethical science, 
if by ethical science one means the elaboration 
of a. 11 true u system of morals. For • • • as· ethical 
judgments are mereexpressians of feeling, there 
can be no way of ·%~terming the validity of any 
ethical system ••• ·· 
The Kantian· categorical imperative is analyzed as 
63. Ayer, LTL, .107. 
64. ~bid.' 112. 
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fear of a god's displeasure, or of society's disapproval. 
. . .. .. . ~ . ~ 
Hedonistic morality is also a form of turning psychologi-
~ - . -· . . , - . .. -- - . 
ca~ con~ent i!lt() __ mora_li 'o/.1.. viz.., a r~cogll:~ ti_()~ _o~ the 
?onn_~ction betw~_19n happiness and so?ia.l appr_()_:V~~-· All 
other mor.a.?-. th~o:z:-ies are, equal,ly, cases ?f regarding 
causes of ethical feelings as moral norms • 
.B. Cri ti ci sm. 
~ere is little in the positivistic denial that 
ethics can employ an empirical approach to cause us con-
cern. The arbitrary assumption underlying the entire 
discussion of ethics, namely that experience must be limit-
ed to thought about existents in the sensory world, de-
serves little more than a prompt dismissal.. As Lepley 
ably points out in Verifiabilitx of Va~ue 65 , verification 
for other minds of private experiences can be achieved by 
showing them to be coherent with public facts. ~ere re-
mains no support for the p.oai tivistio exclusion of non-
sensory consciousness. 
~e only definite objection to translating moral 
judgments into statements about experience is the rather 
weak claim that it has not been customary ttin our 
language. 11 Neither has it been customary in our language 
to l~it ethics to definition of ethical terms, but that 
causes Ayer no great concern. It is not clear what bear-
ing customs of language usage ha. ve to do with limiting 
the scope of a study. 
65. Lepley, VOV, Chap ts. , III, IV, IX, .X. 
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Much that was said in criticism of Westerma.rck's 
definition of ethics solely in terms of socially condi-
.- . - .. , . . .. . . . •· -" .... 
tioned emotional responses can be repeated against posi-
..... w- • " • ··'· ·.··- ---·- • -·· • • •.•• . . • • -· --..--· , 
tivism. It lacks comprehensiveness and presupposes a 
faulty psychology. It fails to distinguiSh between the 
"feeling" of obligation and the verification of obliga ... 
tion for reason. An analysis of the rise of moral feel-
ings, however accurate, provides no basis for assessing 
the rational validity of moral precepts. Meanwhile, the 
positivist has said nothing which would render illogical 
the following steps to empirically est~bliShed moral 
laws: defining values in terms of experiences of per-
sons; noting genetic relevance between chosen acts and 
consequences to such value~; searching for universals in 
personalit,r and empirical values; showing that certain 
resulting prescriptions for principles of action will be 
obligatory upon every rational person. And such are the 
step~ prescribed in this study. 66 
The net result of facing several of the most em-
phatic objections to an empirical approach to moral laws 
is a clearer imperative that such an approach be vigor-
ously pursued. 
66. For an excellent refutation of complete ethical 
relativism, see stace, COM. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
WHAT MAY PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES CONTRIBUTE 
TO THE SEARCH FOR MORAL LAWS? 
I. The Relation of the .f! to the Qug'ht-to-Be. 
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Discussion of questions faced thus far has made some 
references to ibis problem unavoidable. Before proceeding 
further this relation must now be treated directly. 
It is clear that if there really is an ethical pro-
blem the !! and the ought~to-be eannot be equivalent. 
Studies in psychology, sociology, economics, anthvopology, 
and other deseripti ve approaches to human experience and 
intercourse would achieve all that one could hope to ac-
complish, and there would be no function for the ethicist. 
If the ·~ arid ougb.t--to;..be are equivalent,_ w~ had best 
adopt the positivistic de~inition of ethics. 
But empirical fact is persistent, and there are 
few facts more persistent than man•s moral judgment of 
his own actions. To deny the reality of problems concerned 
with moral rightness is no more justifiable than to deny 
the existence of problems of adjustment to physical law. 
If all philosophers should chant in unison that descrip-
tive studies of the way things are must replace complete-
ly concern for the way things ought to be, still the con-
science of the individual person would demand that he do 
the best J?Ossible. New philosophers would have to begin 
again on the problem their predecessors had tried to de-
100. 
fine out of existence. 
Whatever else the ought-to•be is or is not, it is 
<Jle~rly_ a jud~ent tha_t something is ;r:ig:J::L~ a(Jcording -~o 
some criterion, and 1herefore is obligatory upon those 
. . ~ . .. -. ., 
ca~able o~ aahievi~ it. There is no necessity that the 
ougnt-to-be concern a condition now existent. All that 
needs be shown is that such a condition is a possibility. 
. - . .. . . ~ 
Possibility must be a part of the empirical OUght-to-be, 
however, for it is meaningless to speak of obligation to 
t~e impossible. This we have discussed preV1.ously in de-
fining moral laws. 1 It probably is true that-there is a 
place in an effective idealism for the impossible ideal. 
Such an ideal might be, for instance, that of becoming a 
completely whole person. There is little evidence to in-
dicate ihat such an ideal ever is actually achieved, but 
it might well be of service in preventing too ready satis-
faction with less than the best possible. The real danger 
of the impossible ideal is that it become the basis for 
demanding from one-self the impossible, with consequent 
guilt-feelings and loss of personal respect. SUch a situa-
tion is at the heart of many maladjusted and ill personali-
ties. Certainly no Wholesome idealization of the ultimate-
ly impossible can be achieved except as possible ideals set 
the growth pattern. 
A defensible criterion for the ought-to-be must be 
raced before moral laws can be formulated, but this is not 
'1. Cffiap. ftiree, Sec. I. 
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the question now before us. The present point is that the 
~u.ght-to;,..be is :p;roperly distinguished from the !~accord­
ing to the extent to which the phenomenon under considera-
. ~ . . ' - . . . " - . . ' 
tion 11measur~s upn to __ tl:le __ criterion, -~atev~r __ it :presc~ibes. 
Now since the net result of psyChological investiga-
tion will be expanded understanding of 'What is, how may 
. -· . . . . -- -
such an investigation serve the .~.-~~t-to-be? The answer 
is as follows:· ib.e ought ... to-be must be just as verifiable 
as the is. While psychological researCh will never dis-
-
cover a phenomenon ~ioh can be bottled and labeled ~ugnt~ 
to-be, it can be of great assistance in turning up the in-
-~---
gradients out of which a verifiable ougnt-to-be can be 
formulated. Insight concerning the nature of persons, 
values real to persons, and constancy of genetic rele-
vance between choices and foreseeable consequences for 
those values, can be greatly augmented by a study of what 
is. This means, of course, not merely what ~ regarded as 
right by some individual or culture at a given moment, but 
what !!. concerning the ingredients for the ougpt-to-be men-
tioned above. One might sum up the relation by saying; 
~ile the ought-to-be must be distinguished from the ~' 
a verifiable ought-to-be must be formulated from ingre-
dients that ~ or may be. The more we know of the ~' 
the more information we have regarding the may be, and 
the better equipped we become to formulate a criterion 
for the 6ug1lt-to-be. Herein lies the important contri bu-
tion of ps,ychological studies to the search for moral laws. 
10·2 
II. Mores and Moral :raws Differentiated. 
The principle of distinction here is synonymous 
. . 
with that by which one differentiates between the is and 
. ~ .. 
~e qwsht-t~~· Morea ~:rE! l!J.O des of thought or p~ tt~rna 
of behavior which any society sanctions and approves. 
They may be based on reason or superstition, and their 
effects on persons living in a given society may be 
. . . 
Wholesome or utterly unhygienic. ~ey are not to be 
confused with moral laws as the. term is being used in 
this investigation. We are not interested merely in 
what is approved or has been. We are discussing searCh-
- . . 
ing among empirical data for evidences that certain thought 
and behavior patterns Should be approved by rational per-
sons. 
At a later point in the discussion it will. be 
Shown that mores are important factors in supplying con-
tent to the conscience of the individual. It is entire• 
ly likely, further, that the results of an empirical ap-
proach to morality will sustain the rational validity of 
same mores which are or have been held. But moral laws 
are no more limited to nor necessarily equivalent to 
mores, than scientific accounts of the cause of lightning 
are equivaJ.ent to popular understandings of it. 
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III. The -~tationa of Psychological· Method. 
Si~ce the pr.esent investigation is primarily con~ 
cerned with the use of PS!~h~logical data as ~ type of . 
empir.ical_ data, the substitution of ":psychological" for 
"empirical tt should now be made. Some :have opposed utili-
zation of psychological data for the derivation of moral 
laws because they assumed that such a procedure would in-
vol~e the_ application of psychological method to problems 
. ' . 
of ethics. If such were necessarily the case, the objec-
tion would be well-justified~ But what has gone before 
in discussion of' the ~' the ought-to-~' mores, and moral 
laws, should make it clear that :psychological method is 
not proposed for fue construction of moral laws. Psycho-
logical method is legitimately applied to the accumula-
tion and classification of' psychological data. After 
years of relatively fruitless effort to adapt methods of 
the physical sciences to problems of psychology, many psy-
chologists have now turned to the development of methods 
more adequately suited to their study. Results are most 
encouraging. Yet these of necessity remain primarily 
methods for 5l;escribing experiential phenomena. The psy-
chological problem concerning behavior is "what is the 
cause?". The ethical problem always involves the ques-
tion, "what is the value?". The commendable awakening 
among some counselors and psychiatrists to the fact that 
true therapy involves attention to values and moral obli-
-- . . 
gation simply calls attention to the fact that personali-
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ty is not adequat~ly understood within the limitations of 
strictly psychological methodology. 
The actual formulation of moral laws remains a 
philosophical problem. Psyohologi. cal data must be weighed 
and evaluated, and their significance determined by refer-
- . 
ence to ax~ological norms. The :philosopher's use of :psy-
chological data is ·a :problem for the reason, wi. th compre-
. . . 
hensive adequacy and coherence the dual criteria of truth. 
This has tever been the :philo so:pher • s task in bringing 
significance to the descriptive sciences. 
. CHAP~ SIX 
:PEROONALI TY IN PSYCHOLOGY 
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I. .Ambi~ui ty of the Term Personality .Among Psychologists. 
. ~ - -·- ~ . ~ . ... -
For the field of psychology, no term is more ambigu-
ous than personality. This ambiguity was partially inher-
ited from the parental family, :philosophy. But :psycholo-
gists, in going their diverse ways in pursuit of diverse 
" . . ... 
purposes, have succeeded in liquidating any areas of com-
mon understanding of the term that may have remained after 
two thousand years of philosophy. 
1. Allport's survey. 
One of the most comprehensive psychological studies 
of :personality ever made is that by Gordon w. Allport, en-
titled, Personali!z: A Psychological .Approach. In trac-
ing backgrounds and development of the concept, Allport 
begins with earliest usage of :pers,ona, which in the I.a.tin 
meaning referred to a mask used in Greek draJIB.. T.b.is 
term was adopted for use in the Roman theater sometime 
during the last pre~christian century. Rapidly the term 
was adapted to other fields and its ambiguity, Which was 
to increase with the centuries, was born. Allport quotes 
F. Max MUller to Show at least four distinct usages of 
:persona in the works of Cicero (106-43 B. C.)t1 
(a) as one appears to others (but not as one really is); 
(b) the part someone {e.g. a philosopher) plays in life; 
(c) an assemblage of personal qualities that fit a man 
1. Allport, pER; 26. 
106 
for his work; 
2 (d) distinction and dignity (as in a style of writing). 
Allport proceeds then to trace the development of the term 
through theological, philosophical, juristic, sociological, 
biosocial, and psychological meanings. 3 He classifies 
psychological meanings into omnibus definitions, integra-
tive and configurat~onal definitions, hierarchical defini-
tions, and definitions in terms of adjustment. 4 In a same-
~at unique diagr~ Allport at last assembles and shows 
inter-relationShips of.fifty specific meanings of the term 
personality, as discussed in his survey. 5 
2) Bertocci's Survey. 
Peter A. Bertocci's treatment of personality in 
T.he !nCyclopedia of Psychology (Harriman, ed.), is even 
more detailed concerning application of the ter.m in con-
temporary psychology. Examples are cited of omnibus, in-
tegrative, hierarchical, biological and behavioral, social, 
organismic, eclectic, and personalistic definitions. 6 
Additionally, Bertocci lists and discusses numerous 
"approaches tt to the concept & Approaches from abnormal 
psychology, from cognitive function, from constitutional 
type, from "understanding," from behavioristic and associ-
atienal research, from factor analysis, from Gestalt and 
Holistic concepts, and from personalistic philosophical 
2. MUller, Bw;-3"2:r. 
3. Op • cit. , Cf , 2? -4 7 • 
4. Ibid., 43-4?. 
5. Ibid. , 49. 
6 .. Bertocci, .Art. (1946), 457-458. 
7 
ar gt.l1!len t s. 
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3. Examples of Diversity in Definition Among Psycholo-
gists. 
Examples of diverse psychologica 1 defini tiona are 
plentiful. 
A. William McDougall thinks of the human person in 
terms of an original human nature characterized by inborn 
!endencies such as fear, anger, tenderness, curiosity, sex; 
and tendencies to seek the company of one's fellows, to 
11 display and assert .. oneself, to submit to the powerful, 
to turn away from that which is foul, to cry for help when 
in despair, to seek and consume food and drink, to con-
struct and arrange, to hoard, to make merry, and to re-
8 
spond a.ppriately to bodily sensations. These tendencies 
are 11 stirred to a.ction 11 and continually modified by the 
circumstances affecting the individual, by degrees of suc-
cess and failure in achieving satisfaction, and by numer-
ous other experiences. Aperson, for MCDougall, is the 
resulting product of the interaction of innate tendencies, 
environmental stimuli, tastes, exercise of will,_propen-
si ties, purposes -- in short a 
a system of energies, each distinguishable part of 
which owes something of its nature to its place in 
the wh~le and its active relations with all other 
parts. 
B. In striking contrast to MCDougall's discussion of 
7. Bertocci, .Art. (1946 ), 460-475 .. 
8~ C:f. McD>ugall, CCL, 16-20. 
9. McDougall, CP, 16. 
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such matters as "tendencies, u "propensities, 11 11will, u 
"purposes, tt etc., J'. E. Watson sought, in the interest 
of scientific study, to red~ce personality 11t9 thing_a __ . 
w.J:li?h can be seen _and ob_served objectively. ul~. _The re-
sult~ng definition of_personality_is the foll~wingt 
••• the sum of activities that can be discovered 
by actual observation of b.ehavior over a ·long 
enough time to give reliable information. · In 
other words, personal~ty is but the end product 
of our habit systems.~l 
c. Even within the same 11 school" of ~peey:'clloJ.p.g:l..c.al in-
terpretation there is likely to be great divergence of 
opinion concerning the elusive •'personali ty. 11 Few psycho-
logical schools reveal this internal disharmony more sig-
nificantly th~n does psychoanalysis. 
(i) Sigmund Freud, the father of the school, left no 
clear"out definition of just what a normal personality 
is. Interested primarily in abnormalities of persons, 
he dealt primarily with the study of such abnormalities, 
without ever developing a. unified picture of normal per-
1 . t o. h t i -t d .. 12 lib-t "'·o, 13 sana ~ y. ~c erma as unconsc ous, • , ·~ 
14 . 15 16 17 . 18 
eros, ego, . super-ego, Oedipus complex, narc~saism., 
death inatinct,19 have become part and.parcel of aubae-
Io. watson, ~' 220. 
1~. Lac. cit. 
12. Freud, EI, Chap • II. 
13. Freud, 11 The Transformation of PUbertytt, 610-612. 
14. Freud; EI. 
15. Ibid., Chapa. II & III. 
15. Ibid.; OPA, Chap.; II. 
17~ Freud; !OD, 308-309, Cf. also TAT, 906-909, 917, 927. 
18. Freud, TAT, 875-876. 
19. Freud, OPA, Chap. II. 
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quent ps:ychologi cal di acussion. Yet their very pictures-
. .. 
queness gets in the way o~ clear elucidat~on, and_w.hen 
one attemp~s to understan~ wh_at_~ i~ an~, conception_ Fr·eu~ 
~a~. of normal ;peraonali ty, the search becomes.~- ~~~~-t.~ess 
one. The clear implication is that the only ~ortant 
- . ( . . . . . . 
difference between nonnal and abnormal persons is a mat-
ter of degree of conflict between the life-thrust and the 
environment. 
(ii) Neopsychoanalysts have sometimes been more careful 
to state explicitly a theory of personality, with there-
sult of considerable disharmony. Franz Alexander, in many 
ways the most orthodox Freudian on the contemporary scene, 
develdps a wholly biological conception of personality. 
What we call personality. is the total expression of 
integrated activity on the part of a complex biolog-
ical system subject to the laws of heredity but af-
fected also by post-natal experiences.~O 
According to Alexander, there are two ab.ief principles by 
~ich the psychodynamics of the human person are to be 
understood: stability and economy. All life is charac-
terized by continuous development and·output of energy. 
Interaction with the environment is constantly necessitat• 
ing the expenditure of energy. Such expenditures disturb 
the equilibrium. When such disturbances appear in the 
form of "needs 11 and 11wishes 11 seeking satisfaction, they 
·are psychological disturbances. The organism endeavors 
to keep the intake and output of psychological energy at 
llO 
a constant equilibrium. ''Homeostasis" is the term applied 
to comparable activities of the organism relative to in-
ternal conditions. 21 While there are numerous unlearned, 
automatic functions with which every human organism is 
equipped, there are many complex demands for adjustment 
to the environment, solution for Which must be learned. 
The learning process goes through two phases: 1) random 
or "groping" attempts through trial and error, 2) repeti-
tion of those patterns which through trial and error 
have proved useful.. Soon such patterns become »automatic 
and effortless 11 • Thus the principle of economy is ful-
filled, bringing the best possible adjustment with the 
smallest ex:pendi ture of energy. 22 With these two princi-
plea in mind, Alexander makes a vector analysis of the 
life pro c e s s : 
From the point of view of energy, life can be 
viewed as a relationship between three vectors: {1) the intake of ener~y in the nutritive sub-
stances and oxygen; (2) their partial retention 
for use in growth; and (3) the expenditure of 
energy to maintain existence, its loss in waste, 
in heat, and in erotic playful a.ctivities.23 
(iii) In sharp contrast to the position of Alexander 
is that of Karen Horney, another neopsychoanal.yst. She 
fails to provide a concise and clear-cut statement after 
the pattern of Alexander 1 s, but implications of her 
views on personality are quite definite. Horney rejects 
21. Alexander, F.P, 35f. 
22. Ibid., 37. 
23. Alexander, FP, 44. 
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the Freudian-Alexandrian view that the drives of p e't'!;!on-
ali ty are wholly rooted in the biologi ca 1 organism. 24 
. " . -
Further, Horney regards personality as indefinitely fluid, 
.. • # ,. • - • 
in contrast to Freud and Alexander, who think of chil~-
- • « • ~ 
hood as stamping an indelible pattern on the person. 25 
Her own view represents personality as a fluid energy 
seeking fulfilment of needs in a given environment, ex ... 
. . 
ercising same initiative, and making value judgments con-
cerning experience, actu.al or possible. The two most 
basic needs are !afety and security. The basic anxiety 
in a neurotic personality is 11a feeling of helplessness 
toward a potentially hostile world. 1120 Safety· and se-
curity can be achieved only in adequate adjustment to 
other persons. As the developing individual seekE sat-
isfaction of his basic needs in relations with other per-
sons, he develops a healthy, effective personality if he 
finds satisfaction; becomes a neurotic if such satisfac-
t . d . d 27 'tT. • f th l ~ons are en~e • norney conce~ves o e norma , 
heal thy personality as.:.·:ch2:ma.oterized by spontaneity of 
feeling; an aliveness and responsiveness to emotions ap-
propriate to particular experiences; and 11'!holehearted-
ness ••• -- to be without pretense, to be emotionally sin-
cere, to be able to put the whole of one's self into 
24. Horney, Nw.P, 70. 
25. Ibid., 152f. 
26. Ibid., 70. 
27. Horney, OIC, 42-43f. 
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one's feelings, one's work, one's belief. n28 
(i v) _ Closer to Horney than ~o Freud and .Alexander, but 
presenting a still different picture of personality, is 
. -· . 
Erich Fromm, also of the psychoanalytic family. Neither 
human nature nor culture are fixed, says Fromm. Person-
ality develops as man adapts himself to the conditions 
in which he lives. Yet there are specific properties ~n. 
man's nature which help to determine adaptive patterns.29 
rtBy personality I understand the totality of' 
inherited and acquired psychic· qualities·· .. 
which are characteristic of the one indivi-~ 
dual and which make the individual unique. nvO 
Fromm proceeds to describe personality in terms of 
11orientatio.ns 11 , which are personality patterns as they 
cluster about flpoles u of requirement~interest. 1hese he 
first divides into two broad classes, the non-productive 
and tb.e productive. Each is then subdivided into sub-
species. 31 In the process of living, the individual 
comes into one or both of two types of relatedness to 
one's social .environment; assimilation and socializa-
tion. Assimilation is the process of taking into one's 
own nature patterns of response whiCh are the results of 
one's relatedness to other persons. Socialization is 
the process of relating oneself-to others, the emphasis 
here being on internal changes of external aspects of 
. - . . ·- . . . . - - .. . .... . . """ ~ . '·-
relatedness. The discussion of personality orientations 
28. Horney, OIC, 242. 
29. Fromm, MF.H, 22. 
30 ~ Ibid~ , 50. 
31. Ibid., 62-115. 
is finally summarized in the following table: 
.Assimilation 
I. Non-productive orientation 
a. Receiving 
(Accepting) 
b. Ex:ploi ting 
(Taking) 
Socialization 
MasoChistic 
(Loyalty) 
Badia tic 
(Author~ ty) 
113 
c. Hoarding 
(Preserving) 
d. Illfa.rketing 
(Exchanging) 
(Assertiveness) · · · Destructiwe ·· · } 
Indifferent Wi thd.rawal 
II. Productive Orientation 
Working 
D. Gordon w • .Allport. 
(Fairness) . 
Loving, Reasoning32 
Gordon w. Allport's treatment of personality, 
classified as a 11personalistic psychology n, shows much in-
fluence from the dynamic aspects of psychoanalysis, but 
introduces still further variations. 
11Personali ty is the dynamic organization w.i. thin 
the individual of those psycho-m'hysi..C.a.:l.~--- sys-
tems that determi~~ his unique .aajustments to 
his environment." 
Allport gives an important place to traits, atti-
tudes, interests, sentiments, and intentions, as con-
trasted with preoccupation, with endocrinology, condi-
tioned reflexes, physiological determinisn. 34 He recog-
nizes that the factors convE?rging to produce a given per-
sonality are many and complex, and are weighted different-
';. 
32. Fromm, MFH, 111ff. 
33. .Allport, PER,- 48. 
34. Ibid., cf. Chaps. VIII-XIV. 
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ly from individual to individual. Yet there is one law 
. -· . .. -- .... 
which <?J?er~~~s, ~-~r. ~~1, w~ th?_~t _e:x:ceJ?tion t tteyer~ __ per::: ... 
sonali ty develops;~ continually from the stage of' infancy 
--·· ... ---- --·· " . -· ....... ~ '-'· ....... - ~-- ... ' ···- ... -~ -- -- ... ···----.. 
~t~~- d~B.rt1:l 1 ~9--~*pugb.out _:\ih~_s ___ ~.a.~--~ t .P.~:;'~~sts even_ 
though it changes~· u:35 Though there are obvious affini-
-- ··-- . .. - . . ·-
ties between Allport•s view and MPDo~~all's instinct-
purpose psychology and psychoanalysis, there is for All-
- - - - - -
port a 11principle of functional autonomy" which differ-
entiates him from both t 
"The dynamic psychology· proposed here regar~s adult 
motives as infinitely varied and as self-sustain-
ing, contemporar{ systems, growing out of a.ntece-. · 
dent systems, bu functionally independent of them. 
J"ust as a ab.ild. gradually repudiates his dependence 
on his .parents, develops a will of his own, becomes 
self-active and self•determinll;~g, and out-lives his 
parents, so it is with motives~'· Each motive has a 
definite point of origin wllich may lie in the hypo-
thetical instincts, or, more likely, in ••• organic 
tensions and diffuse irritability ••• Theoretically 
all adult purposes can be traced back to these seed-
forms in infancy. ·But as the individual matures 
the bond is 3groken. The tie is historical, not functional. 
E. Interpersonalism. 
(i) One of the most recently developed approaches 
to personality is termed "the psychology of interperson-
alism 11 • SUch writers as Stanley Cobb, Gardner Milrray:, 
o. R. Mowrer, John Dollard, N. E. Miller, and Paul E. John-
son are representative contributors to this developing 
position.37 Perhaps the principal point of' emphasis in 
35. Allport, PER, 102. 
38. Ibid., 194. 
3?. See Bibliography for works by these writers. 
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interpersonalism is that while eaCh person is an indivi-
dual, he is an individual in continual dynamic interaction 
with a society. Personality, thus, cannot be adequately 
understood except as one studies the developing individual 
in his successive stages of growth and the social situa-
--
tiona in which he grows as an indivisible Whole. 
(ii} The aocio-psychological studies of Kurt Lewin 
have greatly influenced the new interpersonalistic sbhool. 
Lewin seems, indeed, to ha~e carried what might be called 
•· 
the 11 social panorama u view of personality to the ultimate 
degree. Lewin's approach is unique in many ways, one of 
the most striking of these being that even though he con-
oeives of the person as much more than the sum of its 
physical factors, he attempts to develop a mathematics 
Whereby the behavior of persons can be understood. This 
leads to the introduction of a. Whole new socio-paychologi-
cal vocabulary. For instance, Lewin speaks of "spatial 
relations" in the socio-paychologiGal situation, but dif-
ferentiat~a such spatial concepts from EUclidean space.38 
He speaks instead of tttopologica.l space n 39 , which is non-
metrical space, divisible into various psychological and 
social regions; nhodological space 1140 , by which the d.ir-
ec tio n the individual is moving in relation to va.ri ous 
groups is represented; "phase space tt4l, which designates 
38. Lewin FTSS, 15lf. 
39. Ibid. , . Chap ·•> VJ ... 
40. Ibid., 25-26, 151. 
41, Ibid., 91, 94, 200, 234. 
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that quite deliberately only a few fa~tors or "phasestt 
of the total inter~relationship ;o~ir:e being treated; and 
11life spacett, consisting of "the person and the psycho-
logical environment as it exists for him1142 ~e be-
havior of the individual (as close as Lewin comes to 
~ecifically defining personality) is described in terms 
of the total life space. Behavior (mental and physical) 
is a function of the person and of his environment l 
B • F(J?,E) 
"This statement is correct for enotional outbreaks as 
well as for 'purposive• directed activities; for dream-
ing, wishing, and thinking, as well as for talking and 
acting. n43 ~is particular formula is not in itself 
~ique, but the extent to which Lewin analyzes the vari-
ous factors and indicates their complexity of inter-relat-
edness by formulae and charts based on his concept of top-
ological space is both exceptional and productive of in-
sight. 
These selected illustrations of varied definitions 
of and approaches to personality are sufficient to indi-
cate what is meant by speaking of the ambiguity of the 
term in this field. These are only representative varia-
tions, to which many more could be added were it not that 
the point under discussion is eufficiently documented al-
42. Lewin, xi., ·Cf. also 55-59, 127, 170, 244, 248. 
43. Ibid., 239. 
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rea~. AsP. A. Bertocci writes, rather picturesquely: 
The human personality has been stretched and 
shrunk, measured and classified, injected with 
1tforces 11 and reduced to nerves, muscles, and 
glands, .all in the name of Science, which, after 44 all, is itself' a production _of human personality. 
It certainly must be obvious by now that in any in-
vestigation such as the present one, for Which ~pre­
suppositions concerning the nature of personalit,y are fund-
amental, some basis for selection must be established. 
II. Problems of Elements and Methodology. 
1) Why No Common Elements? 
Ambiguity of the term, personality, for the field 
of psychology is due neither to ineptitude nor lack of 
dilig~ll;C'e''"• in research on the part of psychologists. On 
first thought, one difficulty seems to lie in the fact 
that commonly accepted elements have never been distin-
guiShed. It would be most remarkable if psychologists 
were in virtual agreement concerning the nature of per-
sonality while in such complete disharmony regarding the 
elemental components thereof. One may well imagine What 
the condition of research in natural ·science would be if 
numerous scientists were busily at work conducting experi-
menta ~~ different and sometimes contradictory lists of 
elements, contending that his own list is the only true 
one. 
2) Holistic versus Analytic ~thod. 
But why, one may well ask, are the elements of per-
44. Bertocci, Art. (1946), 470. 
ll.8 
~~I?:~l:it;r __ not _ ~er1e!ally a~::~a:"t~:P.?n_ ~ ~ _ _t~~S. _late date? ---~~ 
answer is tha. t :for much too long p sychologi ats concen trat-
ed on the_s~13.rch __ :for_~lements witho~~_gi_vi~g adequate_ at-
tention to the undissected personality as it appears in 
- .. .. . . . . - . ~· ' . 
experience. MUch impressed with the success of natural 
.. ·- . 
science as a technique :for describing and predicting con• 
stant behavioral patterns in physical phenomena, psycho-
logists mistakenly suppose~ they C?ould arrive over-~ight 
at the same degree of specificity. They easily overlooked 
the :fact tha.t 2600 years were required to bring the natur-
al sciences to their present place of precision (excepting, 
~erhaps, Aristotle's ~Anima). _What\now are regarded as 
the ultimate elements of matter, :fields of :force in larg-
er electromagnetic fields, were recognized only day be-
:fore yesterday, and they are quite unlike what used to be 
called 11elements u. 
Western science began in Mi.letus. in the sixth cen-
tury, B. o. The :first problems had to do with defining 
and analyzing the physical world a.s experience~. It would 
have been impossible to begin at the other end. No one 
ha.s ever experienced an electron. The concept of an elec-
tron is a postulation, a hypothesis to account more ade-
quately :for matter as experienced. Between the :first an-
alysis-of matter into such elements as earth~ air, :fire, 
water, and ether, and the conceptualization o:f a non-em-
pirical electron, there was a painfully sl.ow process of 
working :from what is given in experience to more and more 
remote postula tiona by whiCh to give a com;prehensi ve and 
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coherent account of that experience. Science bas been pro-
~cti v~ _OJ?:lY wh~n- i~~ ~b~~-~act __ ;p~s~ul~tion~ haye b~el_l __ re~­
larly _checke_~ _against their ability to afford adequate ex-
planations and predictions of experience. 
-· •· '· - • • • • - "' • • • ·• ~• • • r .. "• •· • -- • 
Psychologists, by contrast, jumped at once into a 
pursuit of ultimate eleme~ts, with no cl~ar conception of 
an empirical whole in whiCh the unknown elements were con-
tained. The result was the ambiguity illustrated above. 
But what was even more self-defeating, for a long time a 
comparatively few psychologists were even aware that there 
was any whole to Which their various elements must belong. 
It has been only comparatively recently, and now only by 
tacit acceptance rather than by general declaration, that 
it has been recognized that the only good reason for 
studying psychology is to assist in the understanding of 
personality; to help develop normal and healthy persons; 
and to contribute to therapy in the case of distorted or 
unhygienic personality patterns. Even so-called 11applied 
psychology" has no legitimate application beyond facili tat ... 
ing co-operation with the dynamics of normal persona for 
the accomplishment of mutually beneficial ends. 
Fortunately the days of rigorous analysis of an 
ttr Know ]Tot What" or of a stlll more vague "I Care Not 
Whatn are on the wane for the field of psychology. S.l.ch 
psychologists as Lewin, :nnurray, Dollard, ·lllfiller, Mowre:J;, 
.Allport, and Johnson, among many others, are beginning 
with the empirical fact of personalities as individual 
~ntities ~unctioning dynamically in social contexts, and 
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are attempting to understand that total empirical fact as 
given. Slowly they are developing a body of concepts. by 
Which to account for the empirical facts. While this 
development is yet in its infancy and While from worker 
to worker varied terms are employed to designate similar 
or identical phenomena, there is evidence of a hearten-
ing degree of convergence. 
When .Allport defines personality as 11 the dynamic 
organization within the individual of those psycho-physi-
cal systems which determine his unique adjustment to his 
environment 11 ; and Lewin includes in tbe 11life space 11 of 
a person both his innate physical and psychic qualities 
and other persons who make up his environment; and Horney 
describes the basic personal needs as "safety" and nsecur-
itytt, obtainable only in adequate relationships with 
others; and 1\lfilrray or J'ohnson speak of the ttdynamicstt of 
interpersonal relatio~ship; -- it is not difficult to 
note much basic agre~ent on the necessity of thinking 
of personality as a total system, nor to hope that the time 
may not be too remote when the adoption of a common vo-
cabulary will bring such converging investigations still 
closer together.. The very SJ.ccess of the attempt to un-
derstand personality as encountered in experience -- suc-
cess in bringing a significant measure of essential con-
-rergence of opinion ... - is its mandate for continuation 
and intensification. 
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III. Diverse Purposes in Defining Personality. 
The faet that for so long psychologists insisted on 
starting at the wrong end o:f the problem was not the only 
reason for ambiguity in definition of personality. Another 
reason was that there were many diverse purposes to be 
served in definition. Now it is quite legitimate to state 
one's purpose and to define any object of study in consis-
tency with that stated purpose. Thus, for instance, it 
was quite legitimate for J.B.Watson to declare that he in-
tended to discover what could be known about personality 
by scientific method, and to define personality so as to 
l~it its scope to elements for which the scientific meth-
od is applicable,- :for ~urposes of such a study. O:f course 
it has ever since been a matter o:f conjecture to determine 
just why anyone would set up such a purpose. There is no 
more obvious reason for limiting one's stu~ o:f personali-
ty to what can be discovered by the methods of natural 
science than for limiting the study of the stars to what 
can be felt by young lovers under the stars on a clear 
cold night. Either kind of limitation must exclude an 
enormous amount of important data. Since the scientific 
method to which watson alluded is a technique for study-
ing physical phenomena, limitation of the study of per-
sonality to such a method is arbitrarily unempirical. 
Still, Watson has a perfect right to state his purpose 
and define personality in terms of that purpose, so long 
as he does not then declare arbitrarily that there is 
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nothing about personality which lies outside the limita-
tion he has established in compliance with his own pur-
pose. Neither does he have a logical right to reduce 
those el~ents of personality which are extra-physical to 
over-simplified or distorted physical concepts merely be-
cause he has chosen to limit himself to traditional 
natural scientific method. 
Again, Freud, whose interest was primarily that of 
euring the extra-physical disorders of his patients, had 
a perfect right to limit his study of personality to the 
abnormalities he encountered in his practise. But when-
ever it is ~~ed that the unique and picturesque ter-
minology Freud developed for discussing personality dis-
tortions is exhaustively adequate for describing the nor-
mal and healthy personality, a logically illegitimate 
transfer has be_en made. ~e only way such transfer could 
_be made legitimately would be through demonstration that 
a healthy personality as an empirical fact can be compre-
hensively and coherently accounted for within such con-
cepts. Over-simplification or distortion of personality 
to fit concepts which were developed for the purpose of 
describing abnormalities is never legitimate. 
The principles discussed here may now be applied 
. . 
to this investigation, and the question raised, "How com-
prehensively must personality be defined for purposes of 
discussing the possibility of deriving moral laws from 
psychological data?" The limited applicability of defini-
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tiona conceived for the exclusive aahiev~ent of limited 
purposes should make us wary in answering. Further, we 
face the fact that the experience of moral obligation is 
not an isolated, pure kind of experience reserved for a 
single area of the personality. It is intertwined with 
the whole of experience and is thereby bound up with the 
entire personality. Definition of personality for the 
exclusive purpose of investigating evidence for mor.al 
laws would therefore be unfruitful, even for such investi-
gation. Certainly it would be meaningless to talk of moral 
laws with no understanding of the psychology of moral ex-
perience. And if one aspires to understand moral experi-
ence, it must be understood as a fact inter-related with 
all other 6XI)erienoes of persons. Thus the view of per-. 
sonalit,y on Which this investigation must rest must be a 
concept of the total person, into which the fact of moral 
experience fits coherently. Whether the specific view of 
personality soon to 1:e presented here, or some other, is 
adopted by the empirical investigator, is not materially 
important. What is important is that some view which can 
show itself to be most comprehensive and coherent in ac-
counting for the whole personalit,y as an empirical fact 
be the concept on whiCh investigation be based. In no 
other way can the purpose of such investigation be 
achieved. 
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IV. The Necessity of a Philosophy of Personality. 
Comprehensive study of personalit.y is unavoidably 
a philosophical problem. ~is is not to say that the 
psychologist has no contribution to make to such a study, 
or even that the philosopher ean go far in ignorance of 
the work of the psychologist. During the first half of 
the twentieth ~entury more important empirical data con-
cerning the nature of personality have been turned up by 
psychologists than were discovered through the combined 
efforts of philosophers and scientists during several 
preceeding centuries. And yet the psyahologis~ despite 
all the valuable insights he may furniSh, can never ~ 
~sycholosi~!t develop an adequate concept of the total 
personality. It is true, of course, that a given indivi-
dual p~asessing the versatility of a Willi~ James could 
funation productively as both psychologist and philoso-
pher. The point is that even such an exceptional indivi-
dual would find it necessary to call forth all his capa-
city as a philosopher if he would hope to formulate an 
adequate concept of personality. 
The reason for this is clear-cut and definite. 
The psychologist is, of necessity, a specialist. No 
single individual has the time, to say nothing of·capa-
ci ty, to work with equal success in more than a few of 
the many highly technical areas of psychological study, 
e. g., educational psychology, neuropathology, encephal-
ography, comparative psychology, testing, mental hygiene 
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(which in turn must be extensively sub-divided), in~ant 
and child behavior, etc., etc. Personality, on the other 
hand, is the most complex whole ever encountered in exper-
ience. There is no field of psychology, of social science, 
nor of physical science so ~ar as it enters a study of the 
human person, which is irrelevant to the concept of per-
sonality. Thus, not only is personality a subject reaCh-
ing far beyond any of the specialized areas in Which a 
psychologist must work; it is a subject greater than the 
combined fields of psychology. Personality is a whole 
Whose compleocity can never be understood through analysis. 
Analysis is excellent as a method for identifying data. 
But data thus identified must be given meaning, and the ef-
fect of their discovery upon the understanding of the whole 
to which they belong must be estimated. This is a task 
which the psychological specialist as such is not trained 
to handle. This is essentially the work of the philoso-
pher. 
The work of the psychological analyst and of the 
philosopher must proceed together for analysis is really 
an early step toward philosophy. Analysis without syn-
thesis results only in isolated and meaningless atoms of 
information. Synthesis without benefit of analysis usual-
ly produces only a confusing combination of gross mis-
conceptions of naive experience. When this principle is 
applied to a study of personality, it may be seen that 
we must begin with the empirical facts of personality as 
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ex:perienced; the various "facta as experienced 11 must be 
analyz~d as minutely as possible by specialists. in psy-
chology and in the social and physical sciences; and 
a philosophy of personality must evolve through synthe-
sizing into a comprehensive whole the analyses of the 
. . . 
11facts as ex:peri encedu. At last the only convincing 
credential of either analysis or syntheses -- of either 
specialized study or philosophical theory ·- is their 
capacit,y to provide a comprehensive and co~erent account 
of the facts of personality as experienced. 
127 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
A PHILOSOPHY OF PER;30NALITY 
Aph~loaophy of personality is a crucial issue in 
any phil~~ophic~ di scuasio:r:>- or ;nvea_~iga t~_on. In a man-
ner and to an extent of which J?rotagoraa probably never 
• w ' • • - , ~ • • • • - • 
dreamed, man me the measure of all things. One's under-
. ~ -.... . .. 
standing o:f the nature and aig;n;ficance of man, the per-
son, exhibits a dynamic reciprocity with metaphysics and 
cosmology on the one hand, and with one's answer to im-
mediate problema of daily living on the other. Certain-
ly any interpreta.tio,na of empirical data associated with 
experiences o:f moral obligation must be understood with-
in the framework of a well-defined philosophy o:f person-
ality. What kind of beings have mora1 experience, and 
'What is the nature and significance of such experience 
to such beings?, are the questions immediately before us. 
I. Purpose and Method of Approach. 
fhis dissertation is a prolegomena to the deriva-
tion of mo:ral laws :from psychological data. The purpose, 
therefore, of this chapter is to understand and define hu-
man persons, in a manner at once :functionally meaningful to 
the :field of psychology, and philosophically adequate. 
The purpose thus stated suggests the method o:f ap-
proach. Dii.ta utilized 'Will be drawn from psychological 
investigations of persons. Such data are selected, not 
only because of the purpose of producing a de:fini tian 
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functionally meaningful to the field of psychology, but 
also because it is in this field that the most compre-
hensive investi6ation~ of persons are being carried on. 
But in coherence with the contention abovel that a Phil-
£!~ of personality is required for adequate grasp, 
the data will be treated philosophically. That is to 
sayt It will be of interest, first, to note the actual 
data available regarding personality as experienced and 
as implied by observations of other entities believed to 
be persons; it will be of even greater interest to inter-
pret such data so as to provide the most comprehensive 
and coherent understanding of the real nature of persons. 
FUnctional meaningfulness will be achieved in direct pro-
portion to the success of the effort to take account of 
available data. While the purpose of this dissertation 
is not metaphysical system-building, interest in philo-
sophical adequacy necessitates concern for coherence of 
the emerg~ng theory of personality with a comprehensive 
theory of reality. 
II. 'What Shall J3e Included in Personality? 
The answer to this question is implied in the pre-
ceeding statement of purpose. But the question may be 
answered more explicitly. There are two ways in which 
personality may be studied. Xhe first is through intro-
spectian; an 11obaervation" of one's own personality as 
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experienced. The second arises as an inference from per-
sonal experience. We observe other- entities whose ba-
havior seems to be accounted for most adequately by re-
garding them as persons similar to ourselves. The second 
manner of studying personality, therefore, is observation 
of other entities believed to be persons. These two 
methods of stu~ persuppose two principles for determin-
ing what shall be included in personality. 
The first principle is: Include everything neces-
sary to provide the most adequate functional account of 
personality as experienc~d. To deny this principle is to 
create an irreconcilible dualism between onets mental and 
organic activities, and thus to fail to deal adequately 
with evidence of psychophysical continuity.2 This may 
be called the introspectionist fallacy. 
The second principle is: Include everything whose 
observed function is best accounted for as belonging to 
the single activity system called personality. To disre-
gard or deny the second principle is to deny that we have 
any real evidence of the existence of other persons. If 
the physical phenomena which, collectively, I call John 
Jones be not somehow continuous with John Jones as he ex-
periences himself, then I have no convincing reason to 
believe that these phenomena are evidences of a person. 
They may just as well be an unconscious organism into 
which I have. projected my own experience. Neither do I 
2. Of. Sec. I, Chap. Eight. 
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have an adequate basis fo~·accounting for the behavior of 
.. ~ . .. ~ .·. . '. - .. - . . . -· ~. ~ . ' - ·- . -·. -
the phenomena themselves.3 Denial or disregard of the 
second principle may be called the behavioristic fallacy. 
- - .... ~- . . . ... ·- ~ .. - .... 
Both principles must be observed if the resulting 
philosophy of per~onality is_to account adequately for 
the data With which it deals. 
III. Human Persons .Are, In Part, Minds. 
The most immediately given fact in all experience, 
indeed the ground of experience, is one's own conscious-
ness. It would be difficult to conceive of a theory of 
personal~~y le~s empirical than one in which the immedi-
ately given fact of awareness is ignored or denied. 
. -
1. A ~reliminar;y ~efini tion of Mind. 
Since it is necessary to begin with persons as they 
appear in experience, all that is intended at this point 
by the term mind is awareness or consciousness. The fact 
that the reader experiences visual sensations of somewhat 
patterned contrasts of light rays of varied wave lengths, 
interprets these as language symbols on a page, and these 
in turn as suggested ideas to be evaluated by the reader, 
is immediate evidence to the reader of the reality of con-
sciousness. All mind can mean at the beginning of the in-
3. T.fiis is not an epistemic monism. It is not assert-
ed that ~ohn Jones as object is identical with my 
idea of him. lhat is said is that he is a cont~nu­
ous psychophysical energy, a single entity, known 
to himself, noumenally, as subject, and to me, phen-
omenally, as object. 
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vestigation is such consciousness as immediately given. 
The preble~ is to understand such consciousness better 
through the aid of studies which have gone f~r beyond 
its .givenness. 
2. Mind Transcends Phenomenal Space-Time. 
Aperson is able to think of events that occurred 
when he was a child-, of the __ fact that at this moment he 
. . . 
is comparing his condition then with his cond.i tion now, 
and of the goals he hopes to achieve in ten years, almost 
simultaneously. Meanwhile the person as an organism has 
continued in the same temporal sequence that was occurring 
when the described thought pattern began. The mind was in 
no sense limited to that sequence nor was its activity 
measurable by the clock on the wall. To say that mind is 
11 timeless 11 would be quite unempirical, of course, since 
not all thinking in which a mind is engaged is done simul-
taneously. There is pattern and sequence. One thought 
follows another thought, and one thought-pattern somehow 
motivates a subsequent thought pattern. But mental time 
seldom matches phenomenal time. A given mind may remain 
in a state of comparative stagnation, while the body 
matures. Phenomenal years have passed, but only mental 
seconds. .Aneth er mind may mature with unusual rapidity, 
so that the psychologist, in order to describe what is 
occurring has adopted a term mich my be far more signi-
ficant than he realizes. He speaks of mental age, and 
describes a given child with a trchronological agett of ten 
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as :possessing a "mental age" of fifteen. Mental time is 
~ften.~ui~e an i~~ividual ~~ter. Two men attend a 
symphony together. ~e tower clock measures their pre-
. . ~ . '- - . ' .... . . . .. , - -. -.... 
sence in terms of two phenomenal hours. Yet in one manta 
• .... - - ~ - - •• • • ·-·. J • • • -- • ' • 
mind many and varied e:x;p eriences have occurred, allowing 
him an extended mental life in the presence of great 
music; While in the other's mind there has been little 
of interest, little awareness beyond boredom and int~r.m­
nable waiting for the passage of phenomenal time. 
Neither is mind limited to nor is it measurable 
by phenomenal space. While the organism remains in an 
easy chair by the firet the mind may re-experience events 
. . 
that took place, not only long ago, but far away. ~ere 
is increasing evidence that minds may communicate with 
one another without regard to ~atial relations of the 
t . t • 4 respec ~ve persons organ~sms. 
The capacity of mind to transcend phenomenal 
space-time is a.n important factor in an even more inter-
esting capacity -- that of maintaining sel:f'-identi ty 
through multitudinous changes. 5 The mind, aware of it-
self as currently existent, relates itself to experience 
remembered and e:x;p erience _anticipated, and identifies it-
self as currently experienced with both past and future. 
4 ~ Bee Rhine, NF.M:, ROM. 
5. Discussed at greater length, below, Section VII. 
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3. Mind serves the Tbtal Person as an Instrument 
of .Adaptation • 
. I., . - . . -
Man's proved capac~ty for survival stems from 
man's hi~ de~ree of adaptabili~y ami~st greatl;y vari.~d 
and often hostile circumstances. Yet, while the human 
person is the most adaptable of all creatures, the human 
orga~ism depends for survival upon narrowly rigid ?Ondi-
tions. ~e body possesses almost no capacity to adapt 
itself to temperature changes. Both internally and ex-
ternally the body requires a temperature as nearly as 
possible constant. Not only .must the body have oxygen, 
but it must have it in constant quantities, with a mini-
mum of adulteration. ~e body possesses no capacity to 
take oxygen from any medium other than air, and then 
only if there is a definite minimal proportion of oxygen 
in the air. The bo~ requires considerable quantities 
of greatly varied food, but possesses no instinct for 
achieving it. Neither does the bo~ possess any very ef-
fective means of defense against teeth, claws, and strong-
er hands and arms possessed by enemies. 
The great adaptability of the human person is 
almost wholly due to the activity of the mind. The mind 
interprets sensory stimuli in such manner as to under-
stand relationShips in events in the environment. B,y 
a priori (following Kant) capacities the mind classifies 
- . 
phenomenal experience, perceives laws and principles, 
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notes cause-and-effect sequences. Finally, the mind devel-
ops a highly efficient method of controling and predicting 
events in the physical environment, and directs the organ-
ism into efficient co-operation with helpful forces and 
adm.oni shes avoidance of those which are dangerous. ~us 
does the mind make it possible for the organism to sur-
round itself with warm clothing or air conditioning, ac-
cording to need; to take its own oxygen supply into the 
stratosphere or under the sea; to obtain constant supplies 
of needed nourishment, or to compound them out of ingre-
dients which taken alone are not nourishing; to protect 
itself against the superior original weapons of its ene-
mies; to mo~ across the earth faster than the fleetest 
horse, and to fly farther, higher, and faster than any 
bird; to see events occurring 3,000 miles away, and to 
hear voices on the other side of the earth. 
4) Mind Conceives Values, Sets t1.J2 PU;:poses 2 and 2 _io 
Some ~tent, Disciplines the Enttte Person Aocord-
!ngly. 
Values exist only in and for persons. To value 
anything is to be aware of it in a ~ecial way. To value 
is to regard some object of thought as !nteresting, as 
attraetive, either for its own sake or for some other ex-
perience to Whose existence it is believed to be instru-
mental. 
The mind soon recognizes that some of the most 
significant values require long-term effort, and thus are 
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:purp o ~es developed. Of c aurae there may be :purposes, 
achievement of Which would in actual fact be destructive 
. . . --. . ·- ... 
both of individual and social values. Purposes may be ir-
-. . . . - . 
rationally as well as rationally grounded. But however 
.. - ., 
mistaken a mind may be concerning supposed values, or how~ 
ever irrational may be the thought processes by Which pur-
poses are determi~ed, this essentially is the nature of 
:purpose ~- the more or less long-term effort of mind to 
achieve ex:p eriences believed to be somehow valuab:;Le. 
To degrees varying from mind to mind, and varying 
from time to time within the same mind, an attempt is 
made by mind to discipline and control the entire :person 
in order that purposes may be achieved more quickly and 
more completely. Just why there Should be such pronounced 
variation in degrees of discipline and control is not en.-
tirely clear. Such factors as exceedingly resistent phy-
sical appetites, qualit.Y of values believed in, degrees 
of :personalit.y integration or diaintegratian6 , intelli~ 
gence, general phya ical and moral health, all enter in 
and take contributing roles. There is also in every mind 
a considerable nonra.tional factor. The nonrational sets 
definite limitations on the extent to ~ich total self-
discipline can be achieved. 
6. ~nd Possesses ;mPortant Nonrational Factors. 
A. Diverse Forms of Xt:Lought. 
Not all thought is problem-solving thought. Some-
6. Of. Section IVr~~mtapteJY-:J~~-gb.t... 
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time~ .. ~J:l-7 mind is m.e~e=!-Y day dreaming; sometimes pr~_~e:r1t 
consciousness is wholly concentrated on aesthetic experi-
ence; sometimes the consc_ious content of' en;totion, such as 
intense love or hate, fill all of' present consciousness. 
.. . -- . -- - - .. - ... ·-·' . 
When the mind is engaged in problem-solving or evaluative 
activity and is pursuing patterns? which issue in or move 
toward v~rif'iable solutions~_ thought may be described as 
rational. When problem-solving or evaluative activity is 
undertaken contrary to rational patterns, the thought may 
be described as irrational. All mental activity which is 
. . ..... 
not concerned with problem solving or evaluation, e. g., 
aesthetic experience, is nonrational. These three kinds 
of' mental activity often become inextricably intertwined, 
B. Irrationality. 
The irrationality of' mind is really a ~olly nega-
tive activity. It is the rebellion against or the absence 
of' rationality. Its effects also are negative, and it is 
a oondi ti on to be progressively overcome by the heal thy ._ 
and efficient mind. When through progressive surrender 
to irra ti onali ty the mind completely loses contact with 
reality, a psychopathic condition results. While it is 
true that life is broader and riCher than reason, there 
is no substitute for reason in areas of' mental activity 
whose purpose is problem-solving or evaluati an. To at-
tempt to make any substitution is to become irrationa~. 
7. The formal stUdy of' these productive "patterns" is 
called logic. For a discussion covering similar 
ground, c:r. Burtt, RT, Chap. I. 
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This does not rule out the fact that nonrational elements 
p~rtic~p_ate in all met:l t~ ~cti vi tr. What t~~s real~y __ . 
means is that the fact of the nonra.tional must be taken 
·' - - -· --. .~. . . '. ~ ., ·-- --- . 
i!lto _aoco_11nt_ b;r_ ~ease~, a!l_d CO:tJ.S~CJ.1l~!lt. a._~j~s~ents. .~_de~. 
It does not legitimatize the subatitut~ of the nonra.tion• 
th t . 1 s ... g for e ra. J. ona • 
C. Tile Nonra tional. 
There. is of necessity a nonrational element in all 
experience. It may have any one or combination of several 
sources. 
(i) Influence of the_ Organism. 
Among the most powerful and persistent nonrational 
influences upon mind a.re the various bodily ap:peti tea; for 
. . . . . . 
food, sex expression, etc. SUch organically based influ-
8. BY far· the most·powerful attack upon the validity of 
reason, accompanie..d by a determined effort to substi-
tute both nonrational consciousness and irrational 
thought patterns, is carried on in the name of reli-
gion. This attack has become especially influential 
through the impact of religious existentialism, re-
presented by such vi ewe as those· of Kierkegaard, Barth, 
et al. For a thorough exposition and refutation of 
this a. ttack, see DeWolf, RRAR. 
9. For an excellent discussion substantially in agree-
ment with this view, of. Overholt 1 s usage of nonra.-
tional and the meaning given the term here. Overholt 
is interested primarily in a discussion of philosophi-
cal method. In consistency with that interest, he 
writes; 11 Between the theses of the extreme ration-
alists and the antitheses of irrationalism there are ••• 
some' hints of neutral ground, ·reconciliation, or pos-
sibly even Hegelian synthesis. These grounds are to 
be referred to· herein as nonra tional 0 • (RAN, 73) On 
the other hand, the term nonratio:hal as used in the 
present dissertation refers to conscious activity ex-
clusive of problem-solving activities. This is prim-
arily a psychological classification of some of t~e 
content of consciousness, without reference to the 
problem of rationalistic, irrationalistic, or nonra-
tionalistic methods in philosophy. 
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ences upon mental activity introduce the fact ~f psycho-
physical continuity. That is to say, many of the activi-
ties of persons are best understood as possessing both 
physical and mental ttaspectstt, such aspects being differ-
ent forms of perceiving the same system of energy called 
a personality. As a person. knows his own existence and 
thought,. or is assUllled to be thinking,. personal! ty is 
called mind. As the behavior of other persons is observed 
through mediation of the senses, personality is called 
body.. But personality as percei ve.d introspectively and 
personality as observed by others manifests the same con-
tinuous energy pattern..10 Later in the discussion, de-
tailed consideration will be given to psychophysical con-
tinuity. The point of interest at the moment is that such 
c.ontinui ty is the source of the nonrational influence upon 
mind. 
(ii) 
Emotion is a specifia: phenomenon wherein psycho-
physical continuity is exhibited. And while,. except in 
the very small infant, emotions are seldom wholly nonra-
tionalt emotion must be recognized as a nonrational factor 
in mental activity. 
Psychologists have long debated the. question of 
what.., if any, emotions are innate. Some of the more not-
able studies suah aa those of Mandel Sherman and Irene 
10. Cf. Sec. I, Chap. Eight, for a full discussion of 
psychophysical continuity. 
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- .. 
ll ~se Sherma.n _ _ ~_end t() _ ~~<1?-._cat_e --~~~ ~-- ~:t;e:re .~:r~e. only two 
or three unlearned emotional responses, labeled variously. 
' - - -'- . -. ' ... . . .... ". .. ..... . . -.. ·-- - . . ~ ~ - - .... - -~ . .... - ·-· - . 
~e·rms sl1~ge_stive o~ thre~ ap:par~_ntly unlearned eln:ot_i()~l 
res:ponses are "acce:ptanc e u, "rejection u, and nstartle "· 
. .. - ---· -- . -- '- . , ... - .. .. ·- ·-
Such res:ponses in infants are elicited by wholly physical 
stimuli. 
As persons grow and mature, emotional experience 
becomes much more complex and varied. Intellectual inter-
. . . 
£retatioE beco~es increasingly important. Indeed, there 
. . - -
is considerable. basis 'for questioning ~hether the_ ref~ex­
arc startle pattern of a newborn child, and the highly com-
plex emotional responses of adulthood, involving much inter-
. . 
pretative thought, should be called by the same name. 
William James and c. Lange sought to show that emotions be~ 
gin in the organism, Wholly as responses to exterior stim-
. . . 
uli, and the awareness of emotions such as fear, anger, or 
love, is the result, not the cause, of the organic stat~s. 12 
~ · t b Sb. • t 13 d ca 14 b th di t d ..,.....l::'erJ.men s y errJ.ng on an nnon , o sooun e 
the James-lange theory, however. In both experiments, :por-
tions of the Sympathetic nervous system which would be re-
sponsible for organic changes were cut in animals, with no 
marked changes in emotional behavior. Wi tb. the organic 
states rendered impossible, the animals a:ppeared. to have 
the same emotional 11feelingau as before. Even on the ani-
mal level, than, it would a:ppear that at least elementary 
!!. Cf. Sherman and fherman, PHB, Chaps. V & VI. 
12~ James, POP, II, 442ff. 
13~ Sherrington, IANS, 259. 
14. Cannon, :sp. 
.- .... 
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( 
inter:pretat~ ve :..+ ~- thought enters in to emotion. 
~. . "' .. - .. 
To.?e precise, it would seem advisable to distin-
guish be:ween ~imple (or _elementa~) __ ~.l!.o,tio~s_an~ ~ompl~2£ 
emot~..9ns, __ thoug~ thef?e· terms ~re -~ar ~rom s~tisf~c~o:t:!_._ 
A sillll?le __ emC?tion would_ then be thought o~ as a response 
of the :peripheral nervous a.ystem to physical stimuli 
- . - ~ 
which are pleasant, unpleasant, or startling. A complex 
emotion ('Which is by far the most frequent form beyond 
the first few years of childhood) may be thought of as a 
:psychosomatic resP.onse to experiences which the :person be-
lieves threaten or enhance his values. Insofar as emotions 
involve an interpretative and evaluative element, they are 
either rational or irrational. Insofar as they are organ-
ic, or color th~ught processes by organic changes, they 
are nonrational. This is what is meant by saying that 
some of the nonrational content of mind has emotional.ori-
ginS.. 
(iii) The Nonrational Given. 
Another aspect of the nonration.al in mind is what 
may be called 11 the nonrational giventt15• This term is 
employed in reference to the fact that all human minds 
are limited mindel limited in capacity for experience 
and understanding, and in its ability maintain constant-
ly either its own peak of efficiency or its commitment 
15. This term is suggested by E.S.Brightma.n·•s discus-
sion of the nature of limitation in God, though 
he uses the term to cover all aspects of the non-
rational, save those of wiii':'" Of. :Brightman; POR, 
Cha:p. Ten. 
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to its own highest purposes. 2he person does not choose 
- ~ - . . ~ . 
sucl!- lim,i t_at~on.s, nor can h~-- e~i~inCl,te _ ~h~?t."Y completely, 
though he may gain a large measure o:f control over- them. 
The hum~n ?rl:J?.~ is n~y-er. ~etpctbl:E3 of' _actua_l~~i~~ ctl?:-_ ~?.S~i­
ble experience nor o:f comprehending all possible truth. 
It -can never :function as. efficiently as the total need :for 
adjustment de~n.ds. Not only ~s i_t limited ;n ~apaci~y, 
but it is unable to :function at the peak o:f that capacity 
:for a ver.y lqng consecutive period o:f time. It :falters 
and :flickers, and its progress, however persistent, is ir-
regular_. Even the will, however good it becomes, is :far 
:from perfect. ~e nonrational given sets limits here al-
so, so that to be realistic in identifying a good man, it 
·is necessary to concentrate on that goodness of will 'Which 
is most characteristic of him, recognizing that a particu-
lar isolated sampling o:f his will might not be consistent 
- -
with his best. Fortunately, a person Who values the good 
will may progressively increase the dominance of a charac-
teristic goodness. Yet there is no empirical evidence to 
suggest that the human mind could continue that improve-
ment to the point of perfection. 
(iv) ]OCperience o:f Intrinsic Value. 
Perhaps the most important nonrational element in 
mind is experience of intrinsic value, i.e., an experi-
ence that satisfies a need in and of itsel:f. 16 To be sure, 
16. OF. Bender;-POL, 232-234, :for a classification of 
values. 
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value experiences can be compared, and Choices made be-
~'ve~n.- ~hem. This is a rational activity. Further, in-
trinsic value e~erience cannot be long maintained, in-
deed, it cannot with regularity be achieved, without the 
... ·- . ·- . - - . . . . . 
exercise of reason in recognizing and directi~g effort 
calculated to aChieve conditions under which values are 
possible. EUt still, the experience of intrinsic value 
- ' -
as such is nonrational. Aesthetic e~erience, mentioned 
above, is an intrinsic value, hence nonrational because 
it involves no problem-solving activity. Tb.e ~yster~ 
tremendum and the deep-reaching satisfaction in the en-
. . 
joyment of God's love are intrinsic values, thus nonra-
tional. The good fellowship between old friends around 
a Christmas dinner and the love of a mother for the babe 
nursing at her breast are intrinsic values, hence nonra-
tional. Value claims require to be judged by reason ac• 
-----
cording to same criterion by which valid and invalid 
claims may be differentiated. A rational person will, 
on the basis of such judgment, deny himself some exp eri-
ences for which value claims are made in order to give 
right-of-way to more real, significant, and lasting 
values. But in every case, the value e;perience is a 
nonrational e~ erience. 
( v) Smnmary. 
Summing up what has been said about the nonra-
tianal in mind, the following pattern emerges: Every 
mind possesses important nonrational elements, Which 
include all mental activity not concerned with problem-
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solving_ a.;- evaluation.l7 The nonrational must be confront-
-~ '.. . . . ~' . . " 
ed and ut;lize<J.. in probl~m-s~lving,_ but does not_ oonsti tu_te 
problem-solving. Sources and forms of the nonrational are: 
. . . . ' 
ttmental wa.nderingu, as in day-dre~ming; bodily appetites; 
• • • ~ • ,_.. I • . '- ·• - • ' . • ' 
emotion; the nonrational given; intrinsic value experience. 
The nonrational is as legitimate and important as it is 
real. All aspects of the nonrational save the nonrational 
given add to the richness and breadth of life, and even the 
given may be progressively overcome and its limiting effect 
reduced. When the nonrational is substituted for reason in 
problem-solving or evaluative activities, it makes for ir-
rationality, with wholly negative results. Every mind in 
every moment is rational-nonrational, or irrational-nonra-
tional, or same combination of these. This fact must be 
recognized as reason performs its legitimate functions. 18 
l7. Note that the term ttevaluation u as used throughout this 
discussion refers to mental activities in which judg-
ments are m£de according to criteria, and not to the 
experience of intrinsic value., 'lhus, a child's arith-
met~ici~ pa;per·may be "evaluated" according to the cor-
rect answers, without opening the question of whether 
that paper constitutes a value to any person. 
18. There is little written in development of this type of 
analysis of nonrational aspects of mind. The history 
of philosophy is full of references to nonrational as-
pects of mind, from Plato, through Thomas Aquinas, 
Nietzsche, Lovejoy, Bergson, Santayana., and Whi tehea.d, 
to mention only a few. But a recitation of the his-
tory of nonrationalism in philosophy would add nothing 
of significance to the present investigation. PsyCho-
analytic literature is replete with data documenting 
the influence of the nonrational in behavior, but in• 
dicates little if any effort to develop a concise state~ 
ment of just what is and is not included in the nonra-
tional. Approximately the same situation is found in 
references to nonrationality in other psyChological 
writings. This section of the present dissertation is, 
therefore, something of an experimental effort to de-
velop a specific statement of the content of the non-
rational aspect of mind, based upon rather extensive 
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6. 'What of the "Unconscious Mind't1 
.~ :ro many ~s;r~hologists at about the turn of the cen-
tury, it was becoming apparent that there were many semi-
- - ~ . - - . . 
conscious and 11unconscious 11 factors motivating human be-
.. . . . .. ··-. . . - ,. . - . 
havior. Among those who recognized some of the so-called 
. . 
hidden factors in human motivation were Bain, Binet, 
- ·-. . 
I Charcot, Coue, liad.field, J'ames, Levine, :ntiilnsterbe~g~ 
Prince, Rebort, Rivers, Sidis, Ta.ine, and Ta.nsley.l9 But 
while many psychologists made significant contributions, 
it was Sigmund Freud who developed an essentially new psy-
chological interpretation of man with the alleged fact of 
an unconscious mind as central. It is this interpretation 
that has come to dominate psychological discussions of mind 
for the past thirty years, and the one of which principal 
account must be taken in any effort to formulate an ade-
quate philosophy of personality. 
A. 'Jhe Freudian View of Mind. 
Freud's concept of mind is, briefly, as follows: 
Consciousness is~ synonym for present awareness.20 ~ite 
obviously, any mind taken at any moment of its existence is 
aware of only a comparatively few of its experiences, judg-
18. examination of evidences of nonrationality in thought 
processes. FOr sampling such evidence, see works by 
Adler, Alexander, Freud, Horney, Menningert or any 
standard work in abnormal psychology. 
19. FOr an excellent study of the historical development 
of the concept of the unconscious, of. Northbridge, 
MTU. Of. also Zeigler, CUPP, 83-93, for a scholarly 
discussion of philosophical backgrounds and reper-
cussions of the concept of the unconscious mind. 
Zeiglerls dissertation deals primarily with uncon-
scious purpose as a philosophical concept. 
20. Of. F.r.-eud, GIP, 90; Brill (ed. ), BWSF, 13, 544-545. 
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menta, and anti cipa.tions. 
A second 11 di vi sian" of mind is the unconscious. The 
unconscious mind is, that va~t area of alleged psyc~ological 
activity WhiCh is completely unknown to the person. 
. . . .. 
Instead of hidden, unapproachable·, unreal, Iet·us 
gi·ve a. 'truer -description a::na· say ina:ccessible or 
uri.known to the- ca·naciousness... :sy· this we mean 
only What the connection with the lost word or 
with the interfering intention of the' error can 
suggest to you, namely, unconscious ••• 21 
The unconscious contains only what is very fully re-
pressed ••• The unconscious ••• consists of muCh that · 
occurred early in life, before the indiVidual is word~ 
conscious. These early e:x;p eriencee leave· only the af-
fect or the cathexis of the situation~ and, if die-
agreeable, it is naturally repressed ••• -Iaet but not 
least the unconscious contains many inherited engrams 
·which are of a phyletic origin and wbich ordinariit32 serve the two primary instincts Lfiunger and lov~. 
Between the unconscious and the conscious there is 
the preconscious. 
There are ••• two kinds of unconscious • • • Both are 
unconscious in the psychological sense, but in our 
sense the first, which we call Ucs. is likewise in-
capable of consciousness; whereas-the second·we call 
Pea. zPrecons_ciouy. because its excitations, after 
the observance of certain rules; are capable of 
~eaching consciousness ••• We describe the relations 
of the two systems to eaCh other and to conscious-
ness by saying that the system Pes. is like a screen 
between the systems Ucs. and consciousness. The sys-
tem Pes. not only barsaccess to consciousness' but 
alao-oontrol·s the access to voluntary motility, and 
21. Freud, GIP, 90. Freud's concept was developed as a func-
tional hypothesis for dealing with mental illnesses, 
±ather than as a construct for the rounding out of a 
philosophy. On the other hand, Freud was a scholar, in 
the best ninteenth century European meaning of that 
term. Doubtless he was somewhat familiar with such sug-
gestions of unconscious motivational factors as Plato's 
Eros --which term Freud borrowed-- and Herbart's con-
ception of the unconscious. (C:f'. Northridge, :MTU, 14ff.) 
Thus to what extent Freud was or was not influenced by 
philosophical considerations is a matter for speculation. 
22. Brill, LPP, 80-81. 
has cont:t•ol- of- the emission- of a- mobile cathectic 
energy; a·~grtion of which is familiar to us as 
attention. . 
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Brill represents··the three divisions of mind with 
. ·.-'. . .. .. . .... 
24 
the following diagram. 
P\'"~t<JRS~\QUS 
Un.t.on~~l.ou ~ , 
Three other terms must be mastered if the signifi-
canoe of the Freudian unconscious is to be grasped: ~ese 
are; ego, id, and super-ego. ~ a person comes into the 
world, one of his Chief characteristics is a blind psychoM 
physical thrusting for self-expression, for self-preserva-
tion, and for satisfaction of all needs and hungers. This 
26 blind thrusting Freud calls the !~· 
The id is vague, unclassified, and lawless. It 
bri~gs along those ergies whiCh help the Child to 
maintain itself. The motive pO\ver which insti-
gates the id into action is supplied to it by the 
two great instincts-- hunger and love ••• It knows 
nothing of time or space, 2~nd it always remains the same throughout life. 
One of the earliest lessons the young child learns 
23~ Freud; IOD, 544. 
24. Brill; IJ?P, 80. 
25. Freud, EI, Chap. III. 
26. ~ill, LPP, 93. 
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is that there ~_s. m~ch hos~_il~"t:f and potential danger in 
the exterior world. The thrustings of the id are frus-
trated both __ bY. phys~cal circu~stan~~~ and_ b:f .. S9ciety. The 
ego is a non-sexual, or non-libidinous aspect of the ia.,27 
- . . ~· 
Which is developed_in response to the hostili~ found in 
the exterior world • 
• • • in every individual there is a coherent organi-
zation of mental processes which we call his~· 
This ego includes consciousness and it controls the 
approaches to motility, i.e.· to th~adischarge of ex-
citations into the external world • 
• ~. the ego is that part of the id which has been 
modified by the direct influence of the external 
world acting through the pcpt-Cs. The ego repre-
sents what we call reason and· sanity,· in contrast 
to the id which contains the passions.29 
Brill, interpreting the ego principle writesJ 
As time goes on and as the child comes in contact 
with the outside world, a part of the id gradually 
becomes modified; for the child soon finds that he 
cannot get things even though he craves them deep-
ly. Through his senses, moreover, he learns that 
the outside world is not only hostile but danger-
ous ••• part of the i Cit coming in contact with the 
outside world develops awareness of the hostile 
forces • • • This portion of 3 the id is then modified into what we call the Ego. 0 
The ego, insofar as it is able, institutes control over 
the irrational id in an effort to protect the organism 
from exterior hostility. 31 
The SUper-Ego emerges as the voice of society, 
with its restraints, compulsions, and sanctions, in-
ternalized by the person, and super-imposed upon the 
2?. ct. Freur,-GIP, 304f. 
28. Freud, EI, 15-16. 
29. Ibid., 29-30. 
30. Br: ill, LPP. 
31. Cf. Freud, EI, Chap. II; and Brill, LPP, 94ff. 
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ego. In many eases, the super-ego is the internalized 
ttfather-image", as father stood for social rewardS. and 
punishments in the experience of the child. When a 
literal father has not fulfilled this function for the 
child, some other person or an impersonal authority 
motivatesthe execution of a father image which becomes 
the super-ego. The super-ego is the Freudian equiva-
t f . 33 len o consc1ence. 
When the concepts, id, ego, super-ego, are added 
to the tri-division of the mind, the diagram cited above 
is modified as follows: 34 
----~----
til ~ 
\.ln.con~~\~U ~ 
32. Of. Freud, EI, Cha.pt .. III; and Freud, TAT. 
33. Jrreud, l.oc. ai t. Brill, (ed.) BWSF, 12; _Brill, 
LPP, 96f. The SUper-ego will be discussed a.t 
greater length in Chapter ]fi:g.e'.;4 
34. Freud, NILP. 
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The id remains throughout life a dynamic thrust for self 
expression, completely unconscious. The ego stands as a 
primary censor against the blind irrationality of the id. 
The super-ego reenforces the ego, and often takes over 
oensorship completely. All socially unaccepted tendencies 
which by any means slip through the pre-conscious into 
consciousness are either repressed, i.e., unconsciously 
forced back into the unconscious level; supressed, i.e., 
£Onsciously forced out of consciousness back into the un-
conscious; or sublimated, i.e., allowed a disguised and 
indirect satisfaction. 35 During sleep many impulses slip 
disguised through the pre-conscious into vague conscious-
36 
ness in the :form of dreams. Indeed, dreams serve as a 
kind of emotional safety-val~e. Various neuros~s and 
psychoses occur as conflicts between the ego and the super-
ego; between the ego and the exterior world; between the 
ego and the id, wi tb. the id in the ascendancy. Further 
abnormalities occur when variou.s traumatic experiences 
have upset the mental organization, and from the uncon-
scious there arise impulses toward regression, thought 
and behavior patterns become :fixated, etc. In one way or 
another, the unconscious is involved in all behavior, 
normal and abnormal. 
36. heud, EI., Chap._,; II; CP, non Narcissism11 , 
".An Introductiontt, Vol. IV; Brill, LPP, 98ff. 
36. Cf. Freud, IOD. 
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Grasp of the Freudian conception of mind necessi-
tates recognition that, within the framework of this ap-
proach, every action and every thought ·is wholly deter-
ndned. Freud cites instance after instance of error, 
chance remarks, persistent actions or thoughts, etc., to 
show that all of these really arise from predetermining 
conditions. 37 ~ill makes the determinism in psycho-
analysis quite explicit: 
Bleuler explains this feeling of freedom of will 
by telling us that the complex of psychic func-
tions Which we call our e@O has the peculiar cap-
acity to obserye itself. Now,it is in this com-
plex of cerebral organization -- in this ego --
that the resultant of an individual's strivings 
is formed. That is, of the many strivings which 
struggle wit~ one another, one gradually gets the 
upper ha.nd; a.nd this resultant, which is formed 
in the ego, we then conceive as our will. That 
is why we feel our actions spring from our own 
free choice ••• In brief, all our actions are de-
finitely determined by definite causes. But 
since we know only one small part of our acts, 
and since this fragmentary perception occu,re in 
the ego, we call it free will. Of course there 
is no such thing in psychiatry or in the natural 
sciences. Everything must be determined.38 
Interpretations of Freud's thought by certain neopsycho-
analysts are to the effect that this determinism is bio-
logical in nature. Basic is the belief that a.ll physi-
cal and mental behavior of the person is best understood 
a.s _the struggle of an organism to make necessary adjust-
ments so that elementary needs may be most completely 
satisfied within a given environment. All events in the 
3rr:--cf. Freud, PEL. 
38. Brill, LPP, 94-95. 
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physical world are determined by other physical events, 
hence all human actions are the determined actions of an 
organism. 39 
B) To What Ex:tent May Freud's View Be Incorporated in 
an Adequate Philosophy of Personality? 
It must be recognized that the basic truth Freud 
was dealing with can hardly be denied in the :face of the 
vast evidence accumulated, not only by Freud himself, 
but by innumerable other psychiatrists. ~is :fundamental 
truth, simply stated, is: Present consciousness is con-
stantly influenced by many factors not present as such in 
---
present consciousness. There are many difficul tie a, how-
ever, both in terminology and interpretation, with the 
Freudian attempt to account for this established fact. 
(i) The Preconscious. 
The term "pre•conscious 11 is not particularly ob-
' ' jectionable, and might well be adopted as a symbol of the 
:fact that a mind remembers. It is worth noting tha. t 
labeling a fact does not account for it. There is not 
at the present time any ;really adequate eX]?lanati2.E, for 
the :fact of memory. Just how previous experiences not 
now present in consciousness can be remembered in future 
states of consciousness, or what the ontological status 
of ttremembera.ble'' but 11unrememberedu experiemces may be, 
are problems about: which an honest thinker must say 
39. df'. Horney;-NWP; Alexander, FOP. 
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frankly, ur do not know. tt There is no escaping the em-
pirical f'act that minds do remember, however·, and an hypo-
thes~s which draws together into a. functionally useful in-
terpretation What is now known about memory is pre:f'erable 
to none at all. 
It would be interesting to pursue the possibilities 
o:r di:f'ferentia.ting between 11central consciousness" and 
• 
"peripheral consciousness 11 , with a view to regarding all 
memory as existing in the periphery of consciousness.40 
One knows, as a part o:r present, or central, conscious-
ness, that present ideas are relatable to previous experi-
ences. One knows also, though o:f'ten vaguely, that one re-
lates one's present consciousness to past ex.p erience on 
the one hand and to anticipated experience on the other. 
This is part of what is meant by the 0 continuity of per-
sonality." One knows also that when one is asked tore-
call all events which would seem to be related to pre-
sent consciousness and remembered experience,. .:one moves 
from one thought pattern to another, from present to 
available past to anticipated future in quite smooth and 
connected faShion. One is thus led to wonder whether in 
actual fact the following diagram -- at the risk of too 
great literalism in interpretation --might be represen-
tive o:r the relation between.present awareness, memory, 
40. Professor Paul E. Johnson, in an article signific-
antly entitled "Margins of Consciousness 11 , suggests 
a view similar to, but not identical with,the idea 
developed here. Cf. Johnson, Art. (1952). 
41 
and anticipated future experience: 
\ 
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Theoretically, there is no reason why central con-
sciousness may not be linked by successive steps with the 
whole of the peripheral consciousness. At no time would 
the entire peripheral consciousness become equally vivid. 
41. Cf. E. s. Brightman t s di soussion of the 11 da tum self" 
and its relation to past a.nd future experience, ML, 
78ff. 
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Yet if one, 
.consciousness as a kind of bright spotlight thrown here 
a.-n~ ther~ into 'What had b~en p~rip~~Y; thus illuminat-
ing the various areas of consciousness Which bad been 
.. - - ·- . -- .. . . --
vague,_ one has at least_ a possible explanation of tJ::te 
relation between memory, anticipation, and present vivid 
-. . ·-· 
awareness. ~e fact that for various reasons the person 
develops inhibitions a.gainst illuminating certain ttmemo-
ries11 and thus tends to ·push them further toward the 
outer edge of the periphery creates no difficulty for 
this possible account. 
(ii) The Unconscious. 
On turning to the term "unconscious mind," one 
finds hopeless self-contradiction. ~e only basis of 
distinguishing mind from non-mind is the presence or a.b-
sence of awareness. All that ia not in awareness or 
available to awareness is non-mind. The term 11uncon ... 
acious mind 11 , taken literally, would have to mean 11non-
mental mentality," or unconscious consciousness," or 
some s.imilar absurdity. But not only does the term 
11unconscious mind 11 involve hopeless contradiction, still 
worse, it becomes an ambiguous miscellaneous classifica· 
tion impeding analysis of the so-called unconscious in ... 
to more meaningful elements. A truly empirical ·philoso-
phy of mind must take account of the facts upon ~ich 
Freud's E@eculations were based -- facts concerning both 
normal and abnormal mental p~tterns -- without falling 
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into similar contradiction and confusion. 
To be sure, as Professor Paul E. Johnson42 and 
others have pointed out, Freud probably did not really 
mean that the so-called unconscious mind is never, under 
any condition, accessible to consciousness. But if this 
is correct, the problem of the relation between the con-
scious and the unconscious is intensified. The ontolog-
ical status of a potentially conscious unconsciousness 
is as unclear as is that of a permanently .m.consCious . 
consciousness. There is also a problem of mediation be-
tween the conscious and the unconscious which is not 
solved by attributing it to the agency of the precon-
scious. .AI3 Professor Johnson no tee, "The interrelation-
ships of conscious-unconscious processes are too inter-
active to be separated except for purposes· of logical 
analysis .n43 It may be that logical analysis may be b·est 
achieved without !eparat~~ of fue processes. But under-
standing does require that the factors involved and the 
processes by whiCh they are known be more specifically 
identified. 
·(a) Personality is dynamic, an energy, a more or less 
integrated activity. This is not a. new insigl:itw Plato44, 
42. Johnson, Art. (1952). 
43. Ibid. 
44. Cf •. especially Plato t s conc.ept of Eros (a. term 
borrowed by Freud) in Phaedrus, 244a-256e; and 
SYII!posium, 20ld-212c. -
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Lei bni z 45 , Berkeley 46 , and Bowne 47 (to mention only a few), 
all conceived of Personality as dynamic. William James, 
who was one of the few nineteenth century philosophers who 
contributed directly to the development of psychology as a 
separate discipline, called the mind "a fighter for ends u48 , 
and this figure has not been improved upon. All seriously 
held contemporary psychological interpretations of mind 
are, in one way or another, in agreement with that state-
ment. Ps,ychoanalysts have been especially insistent upon 
the dynamic aspects of mind, as .have many other schools 
of thought.49 This convergence upon a central concept is 
not difficult to account for. Everything intelligible 
that can be said about a personality is a description of 
something a personality is doing-- thinking, feeling, 
learning, adjusting, developing, disintegrating, loving, 
hating, etc. In personality especially, it is evident 
that Bowne was correct (so far as he went) in saying: 
The distinctive mark of being consists in some 
power of action. Things, When not perceived, 
are still said to exist, because of the belief 
that 1 though not perceived, they are in inter-
action with one another, mutually determining 
and determined. Things are distinguished. from 
non-existence by this power of action and mutual 
determination. 50 
The dynamic character of personality is one of the 
45. Cf. Leibniz, LM. 
46. Berkeley, TOHK, par. 27. 
417. Bowne, MET, 39, 56, a.nQ. Chapter IV. 
48. James, POP •. 
49. Cf. Chapter Six, I, this dissertation. 
50. Bowne , MET, 40. 
faators: Freud inaluded in his usa of unaonsaious. The 
ici51~ with its source in the unaonsoious,. is: Freud's 
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name for the thrust of' the organism. Freud's ego52 is 
an attempt on the part of the aonsaiousness to adjust. the 
total person to the blind power of the id. Freudian 
mythology o.an be avoided by reaognizing that personality 
as a continuous psychophysical energy is dynamia. 
Let it be granted that the mind often is aware 
only of an urgent unrest, so far as the appetites. are 
~onoerned• and that it strives$ largely by trial and 
error at firs.t.t to t.ind means of quieting the unrest. 
The appetites themselves. are really psyohophysioalt but 
the appetites as elementary consciousness are not 
labe.led and intelle·atually interprat.ed. The a,onsaious 
aspect. of these psychophysical appetites is the. vague 
unrest and the urgenay of finding a yet unknown satis-
faction. 
(b) De.velopment of Thought Patterns .• 
Seaond~ it must be recognized that, as the mind 
aeeks to fulfil its function as an adaptive instrument,, 
and furthert as it attempts to solve problems and make 
evaluations of events, it develops certain patterns of 
activity. A principle of eaonomy of effort operates to 
aut the pattern down to the most direct possible ttroutett 
betwean need or problam and satisfaction or solution. 
51. Of. Freud, EI. 
5~h Ibid. 
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For instance, a boy is faced for the first time with a 
problem in long division. At first he struggles to remem-
ber and to employ the step-by-step process that leads to 
solution -- he is attempting to develop the thought pattern 
necessary to solution of problems in long division. After 
he has worked numerous problems, he begins to recognize 
short cuts. Division of any number by ten, he finds, can 
be made quickly by placing a decimal point after the last 
digit on the right. Division by five may be made by halv-
ing the number after a decimal has been placed before the 
right-most digit, etc. As rapidly as possible he cuts the 
pattern down to the least possible minimum. 
Once a pattern has been reduced to a minimum the 
«light 11 of central consciousness is shifted away from the 
pattern as such to other considerations (following the 
diagram of possible relation of consciousness, memory, 
and anticipatiQn, above}. The pattern remains a part of 
the mind, but t~e pattern as such draws little attention 
to itself, for there are much more interesting and press-
ing matters at hand. Returning to the boy with the pro-
blems in long-division: At first he is very much aware 
of the fact that long division creates problems for him, 
and he gives great eare and attention to the step-by-step 
process, even during the period when he is reduc :ing the 
pattern to a minimum. Eventually, however, he masters 
long division thoroughly, and gives little attention to 
the fact that when faced with ~ problem in long division 
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he follows the thought-pattern developed years earlier. 
When he becomes an _engineer, ~e long-~ivi~ion pattern 
is still in the periphery of consciousness, but there 
is seldom if ever cause to concentrate upon the neces-
sar.y thought steps in long•division. 
This process, in principle, goes on all the time in 
all adaptive and problem-solving experience. The patterns 
of response are worked out, partially by trial and error 
and partially through the capacity of the mind to under-
stand relationships. Eventually the behavior elicited by 
certain psychophysical stimuli appears to be automatic •. 
Even ihougb similar stimuli are not encountered for many 
years, once the stimuli appear, the learned thought-pat-
tern is pursued in an attempt to deal with the problem 
raised with an economy of effort. In this process, Wholly 
within the ttconscious mindu, but involving the periphery 
as well as central consciousness, is found an explanation 
for alleged «unconscious tt reactions to persons and si tua-
tiona. Freud would seem correct in holding that much 
Which happens to a person never evaporates into nothing-
ness. It remains to influence subsequent behavior. 
What appears improbable in Freud•s view is the belief 
that ~very experience so persists, and that the persis-
tence i a "unconscious u. .Against Freud, it seems more 
verifiable to contend that those experiences which per-
sist are those which present sufficient problems to call 
. . 
for the development of repeated thought-patterns. ~uite 
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obviously, the patterns developed may never be really 
efficient or a.dequa te. They persist, nevertheless. 
(c) The Effects o:f Crises. 
Third, is the fact th~ in the attempt to direct 
adaptation and to solve problema, the mind encounters 
periodic crises. Crises, as used here, are situations 
in which the mind i a unable to provide a sui table re-
~onse pattern within the time-limit available. When 
this happens, various groping efforts may result. The 
mind may, for instance, repeat again and again an ob-
viously fruitless thought-pattern, (fixation) simply 
from lack o:f any insight. or the mind may revert to an 
earlier thought-pattern, developed for dealing with a 
much more s~le, though similar problem (regression). 
Or the mind may seek to shift the interpretation of the 
problem so as to avoid having to struggle with it fur-
ther (rationalization) or may choose to interpret it as 
really the problem of another p era on (projection). 
Again, substitute satisfactions may be sought in the 
:face of crisis (aublimat ion) 4 It may be that an a.ttemp t 
is made to force the problem completely out of.. eori.sciems-
ness (supp:ce.ss.i•rul.}. Or, more subtly, a thought-pattern 
by which it is hoped the problem may be :forced out of 
consciousness may be developed ~~he periphery, with 
the full light o:f central consciousness never turned up-
on it (repression). 
There are other crisis reactions. Somet~es in 
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the face of a frustrating situation the mind begins to 
make a totally new interpretation of the frustrating cir~ 
cumstances. This may even involve giving the problem a 
new contextt and imagining that solution is achievable 
within that ODntext and interpretation. Since reason makes 
it more. difficult to think oneself into the imaginary con .... 
taxt and interpretationJJ- the new approach to the problem 
is essentially an irrational one. If the problem concerns 
a limited area of experience,a. the ttwish world 11 is limited 
to what is necessary for an artificial solution of the 
comparatively limiteQ problem. If the problem involves 
the total person; then c_ontact with the real world may be 
lost.t and experience may be interpreteQ wholly in terms 
of the imaginary world. By such processes do various ill--
nesses such as paranoia, schizophrenia; and many other 
psychotic and neurotic conditions develop. Carried to 
ultimate possibilities* the unhygienic attempts to deal 
with crisis issue in complete disintegration of person-
ality .. 
It should not ba overlooked_, of course;, that en.-. 
countering crises is both desirable and unavoidable. 
Crises adequately met usually issue in more coherent 
a«aptation and more potentiali~ for the enjoyment of 
value. The ineffective and destructive reactions to 
crises occur only when, for some reason, a response pat..-
tern regarded as ade-quate cannot be developed. Interest--
ingly.t the response may be quite far from ideal; but if 
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it affords some fulfilment of needs and the individual 
intel:;prets it as adequate, personal dis:!integration, at 
least, may be avoided. 
(d) Recapitulation. 
In brief recapitulation: It has been contended 
here that the essential c ontri bu tiona of the Freudian 
conception of mind can be incorporated into a comprehen-
sive philosophy without recourse to the contradictory· 
term uunconscious mindtt and wi t.hout employing the some-
what mythical account Freud. gives of the relation be-
tween the conscious and the ••unconscious". All mental 
activity has been accounted for within consciousness by 
calling attention to the fact that many important past 
experiences are somehow "retained 11 in a memory between 
which and present consciousness there are linkages; by 
citing the fact that the total perscnality is dynamic; 
by mentioning the facts of mind-body interaction and of 
the .Lttmarational content of mind as :mind seeks to ful-
fil its function as an instrument of adaptation; by not-
ing the deveiopment and persistence of thought-patterns 
as the result of efforts toward efficiency and economy 
in adaptation and problem-solving; and by interpreting' 
various mental activities and disorders, described by 
Freud a.s influences of an unconscious mind, as groping 
efforts for adequacy in the face of crises. Within the 
interpretation here, the id becomes a name for the non-
rational influence on consciousness of the various psycho-
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- -- v ; 
physical appeti tea. 53 The ego, in the Freudian meaning, 
- - - . ~ '-" - - , . - - - . - . 
~-~ ~o p~ac~, for-: ~V'_ery e_aaential .tunc;}ti?n attr~"J?~ted -~~ 
the ego is taken over by mind as a whole. The super-ego 
-- . .... . . -. - -· 
~~. <?on~ei v~d by ll'etl.~ must ~~ .g;r_e~~l! _ al te~e_d ?':.~a_:- . 
missed, but elucidation of that aspect of the position 
. . . 
must await ~ecific treatment in Chapter Eight. 
7. The Resultant Definition of Mind. 
The di !3cussion of mind began with ~ preli~inary de-
finition; "Mind is awareness, or consciousness". This 
prelimin~ry definition would suff~ce still~ if it were 
reasonable to assume that all_which was developed in sub-
_sequent discussion would be understood by that simple and 
. . 
direct statement. Since suCh an assumption appears quite 
unwarranted, it will be advisable to draw the various 
threads of discussion together in a comprehensive statement• 
Mind is the_l£ial content of rational, nonrational, 
and irrational consciousness, including the patterns de~ 
veloped by conacious~~ss. It is Characterized by a contin-
ual effort to ad~t the total personality with its needs 
and potent~i ties to the believed possibilities of fulf.il-
~ 
ment. It endeavors to understand relationships of thing! 
and ideas, conceives values, and sets ~ purposes. It un-
dertakes to bind together past e;per~nce, yresent aware-
ness, and anticipat~d experience into ~~oherent.J evolving_ 
HP~ of consciousness. 
53. Cf. Zeigle:r; CUPP, 119-127, for an interesting inter-
pretation which possesses both similarites and con-
trasts with the view presented here. 
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CH.AP.TER EIGHT 
A PHILOSOPHY OF PERSONALITY (continued.) 
I. The Fact of Peychoph:ys ical Continuity. 
one fact brought out in the foregoing discussion of 
mind is that mental processes cannot be wholly understood 
without reference to numerous ways in which the human or-
ganiam participates in such processes. ~is brings us 
face to face with a problem which is by no means new 
either to philosophy or psychology; the mind-body problem. 
The mind-body problem has long been a real one for numer-
ous reasons, one of the chief of which is the fact of psy-
chophys iced 11interaction u in the human person. 
NUmerous solutions have been proposed for this pro-
blem. Materialists have of necessity held that mind is 
some way reducible to body. 1 Other thinkers, realizing 
that both materialistic and idealistic reductionisms fail 
to account for di:f'ferences in mind and body, have sought 
to account for the facts by postulating a parallelism; a 
condition in which mind and body are two separate prin-
ciples of being and functions, appearing to be "interact-
ingtt but in fact running parallel to one another like the 
two rails of a railroad. 2 A third proposal is called 
llinteractionism 11 , and, in one form or another, postulates 
the idea that mind and body as experienced are separate 
e:r; works cyDemocri tus, Lucretius, Hobbes, I.a.mon t, 
Sommer'll'.i J.le. ( Of. Leibnitz, Monadology; Titchener, .Art. 1898). 
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from one a.notb:er! but, at certain poin~s. Uinteract, '' or 
act upon·· one anoi;her. :rnteresti~gly both metaphysic~~. 
dualists3 and metaphysical monists 4 have defended theories 
. . . . -
of interaction. .American ~: neo-reali sts have made a fourth 
proposal, to the effect that all realit.Y is composed of 
some kind of neutral en ti ties which are neither mind n.or 
body, but whiCh in various combinations become either. 5 
The so-called double-aspect theory, to one form of which 
the name of Spinoza6 is usually attached, is a fifth sug-
gested answer. This view is that mind and body are sim-
ply two "aspects 11 of the same kind of being. Perceived 
as effects upon the sensory system of an organisiD.t this 
:form of being is called body. Ex:perienced as conscious-
ness, it is called mind. What is real is a mind-body 
form of being, the recognized existence of which dis-
solves the mind-body problem, since what is actual is a 
single form of being knovmin two different forms. ~or 
reas ens which will become appa.ren t as the discussion 
1.. 
proceeds, this latter view comes closer to doing justice 
' 
to the facts than do any of the others, though Spinoza 's 
views need modification. 
The tact is that there now is considerable evi-
dence of psychophysical continuity, pointing increasing-
ly to the necessity of regarding certain p~chophysical 
3. Cf. Descartes, MED. 
4. Of. Berkeley, TCEK; Lotze, MIO; Bowne, MET; Bright-
man, :m. 
5. Cf. Holt, et al., N.R. 
6. S!Jinoza, ~· 
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phenomena as _single, unbroken system of energy, knowable 
noumenally as consciousness, and perceivable p~enomenal-
- . . . ~ 
- - .. 
ly as bodily behavior. SUCh evidence is of sufficient 
weight to make it no longer satisfactory to defend re-
ductionism, materialism, or interactionism on purely 
metaphysical grounds. 
1. What is the HUman Organism? 
'.the term human organism will be used in this study 
to refer to all the more or less organized physical pheno-
mena whiCh are best accounted for by regarding them as be-
longing to a single physical system classified zoological-
ly as, ~· In brief, the organism is what is commonly 
called the human body. Philosoph~cally, such a defini-
tion requires further elucidation. 
What, for instance, are physical phenomena? Such 
a question may be answered scientifically, or philosophi-
cally. Indeed, contemporary scientific answers render 
philosophical answers indispensable to the mind seeking 
real comprehension. The scientist defines physical phen-
omena in terms of molecules, atoms, proton, electrons, 
positrons, and neutrons. 7 All of these terms signify 
quantities of energy, held together in organized patterns. 
The energy seems to be electrical in nature, with only 
the energy itself doing the 11energizingtt. Why there are 
such patterns of energy; or why they should be organized 
as they are (or, indeed, organized at allJ) are questions 
7. Of. Eins'tein and Infeld, EP; Whi trow, SOU; and 
Chubb, WWA. 
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from which the physicist rightly excuses himself as lying 
beyond the scope of scientific method. 
- •••• i' -- - •• -
Philosophically, it is most coherent to think of 
Pll,~sical ph.eno~ena not O_llly as organized .. patte~:ns o~. ener-
gy, but as patterns whose organization and whose activity 
are expressions of intelligence and will. In no other way 
can one account adequately for the fact of cosmos as con-
trasted with chaos; for long-term persistence of suCh ex-
tent, complexity, and duration as to suggest purpose; for 
the emergence of thinking minds; or for .the fact of va.lue-
experience.8 The chief alternative to such a view is 
mechanism, but this is really only a description of ob-
served phenomena, and stands itself in need of being ac-
counted for. Tb.a.t is to say, all known machines are con-
structs developed by minds for carrying on certain routine 
activities which serve the purposes of minds. ~erefore, 
even though for some purposes the universe might be de-
scribable as a machine, such a description would strongly 
imply a purpose responsible for the machinery. SUch a 
view further necessitates reducing mind to some function 
of body -- a position ~ich facts of psychophysical con-
9 tinuity themselves will not support. 
Suan philosophical considerations as the foregoing 
serve to orient the reader concerning the more ultimate 
8. For careful and thorough delineation of such a 
world-view, Cf'., Bowne, ]/JET and PER; and Brightman; 
PR, NAV, and ITP; and such predecessors as Leibniz, 
Hegel, and IPtze, 
9. See discussion following. 
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significance of the term human organism.. For purposes of 
~he present study the more innne~ate meaning has greater 
significance: The human organism refers to those_ organized 
physical phenomena zoologically classified as man. 
2. Participation of Organic Phenomena in Mental Pro-
ceases. 
A. Organic prerequisites of Consciousness. 
The mind comes into being only when certain bodily 
conditions are present. These bodily conditions consist 
of the existence and proper functioning of a central ner-
vous system. Proper functioning depends upon complexity 
of interconnection and sufficient health to generate a 
minimal electro-chemical energy. Studies in electro-
encephalography (abbreviated EEG) have developed means 
of measuring and graphing same of the electro-chemical 
energy of the central nervcus system. Several different 
frequencies and rhythms have been distinguiShed, and 
these, in turn, correlated with both typical nonnal and 
abnormal thought patterns and emotional reactions.lO As 
frequency and rhythm of 11brain waves" vary, so varies 
thought-content, and, to sane degree, rationality. The 
entire cause of these electrical discharges and their 
rhythmic pattern is not entirely known. The rhythm may 
be controlled by some sub-cortical center, or may be a 
property of the cortex itself. 11 As for source, 
'io. Cf. Theisen, Art. (1943), 8-15. · 
ll. Lee. cit. 
It has· been demonstrated ·that the physicochemi ... 
cal environment of' the brain cella·and,their 
metabolic rate exert an important influence on 
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the frequencies and-amplitudes of' the potentials 
recorded in the electroencephalogram. Especial-
ly important are changes in-the carbon dioxide,··· 
oxygen, and sugar content of the cerebral blood ••• l2 
Dercum holds that not only is a nervous system as 
. ' ' - . 
suCh necessary to consciousness, but, further, that this 
system must be faced with the necessity of adaptation 
and adjustment: 
Consciousness is·only in the 11adjustable 11 re-
sponses; that is, only in those responses which 
are attended by a changing, an actively varying 
relationship among the neurones •••• Conscious~ 
ness is only present in neurones that are active-
ly concerned in transmission. Consciousness is 
itself a phenomenon of cortical transmission.l3 
Maturation of the mind does not take place with-
out minimal maturation of the central nervous system. 14 
However, the facts do not permit us to regard neurological 
maturation as the causal agent and mental maturation as 
one ~esult. For though a minimal organic maturation 
seems to be an invariable in mental maturation, there are, 
additionally, many s ocio-psychological factors such as 
intense purpose, rewards and puni~ents, early involve-
ment in responsibility, fear -- all of which may have 
either a facilitating or inhibiting effect upon mental 
maturation. Of course, it may be argued with consider-. 
able cogency that all suah factors are stimulating neuro-
!2. toe. cit. 
13. Dercum, POM, 106•107. ~otation of this passage 
does not imply thorough agreement with illercum's 
interpretation; i. e., "consciousness is a pheno-
menon of cortical transmission, 11 only. 
14. Cf. I.aslett (ed.), PBM. -
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logical "ad.a:ptation, 11 thus effecting neurological matura-
tion as a basis for mental maturation. It can hardly be 
denied that such neurological adaptation does take :place 
. ' . 
under these circumstances. However, care must be exer-
cised in distinguiShing between fact and interpretation 
at this :point. One-one causal relationShips cannot be 
establiShed here on the basis of present evidenc~. It 
is by no means possible to show that every new mental 
capacity is either accompanied or :preceeded by a new 
neurological connection or 11brain wave"· But even if 
such could be shown, the facts themselves would suffer 
no violence in an interpretation which would.regard this 
as a :psychophysical change of the entire :person, rather 
than one in which the neurological change is regarded as 
a basis for the mental development. 
B. Continuing Effects of Organic Phenomena. 
The mind is, throughout the life of the :person, 
as we know him, constantly affected by bodily conditions 
and functions. 
(i) Perhaps the moat fundamental organic influence u:p-
on the entire personality and hence upon mind is w.hat is 
known as temperament, sometimes called chemique:5 Con-
temporary :psyChologists have changed the ancient view-
point very little. Allport writes: 
It is seldom doubted today, any more than it was 
among the ancients, that temperament is dependent 
somehow u:pon the biochemical constitution •••• 'lhe 
following definition of temperament meets stand-
Ir.-cf. Woodworth and Marquis, PS4, 121. 
ard psychological usage.... Tem,peram.en t ref' e-ra to 
the characteriEiti c · phenomena of an indi vi dual:"TS· 
emotional nature, IncUuding his siiSceptibilitYto 
emotional· stimulation·, his customary·· strength· and 
!!Peed of respon-se,· the %uali t~:f ·his ~revailin~. 
mooQ, and all peculiari ies of:riUCttia ion ahd ~h­
tensity _in mood; these phenomena ?eing regarde·d- a~ 
dependent upon: conatitutional.·make-tip, and there-
fore largely heredi ta.ry ·in ori~~.l6 __ 
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Temperament appears to set definite limitations 
within which predisJ?osi tiona toward persons and events 
will be establiShed. 
(i i) _ Endocrine glands have long been known to be 
definitely related to certain aspects of personality, 
and numerous studies have been made of this relationship. 
An endocrine gland produces one or more ~ecies of her-
monee--chemical compounds which have definite facilitat-
ing or inhibiting effects upon organic functions which 
are reflected in both mental and non-mental aspects of 
personality. FOr instance, if the thyroid fails in its 
function, a di sea.ee known as myxoedema may result. ~is 
disease is characterized by dryness of skin, wrinkling 
of the face, and apparent mental de~eriorization, among 
other symptoms. It was found that my:x:oedema can be cured 
by the feeding of sheep' a thyroid. ~e direct eff'ec t of 
thyroxin seems to be regulation of metabolism. When 
~~a.boliam is very low, symptoms bordering of myxoedema 
./ 
appear; When metabolism is raised greatly above the nonnal 
level, such psychophysical symptoms as irritability, in-
stability, vague predisposition to worry, restlessness, 
~-- . :C6. Allport, PER, 53-54. 
_.....,.--
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are present. Studies have shown that even in moderate 
cases ~f malf~nction of the ~oid gland, the extent to 
which school children utilize their "nativett intelli-
17 gence may be affected •.. 
~y other psychophysical effects of the endo-. 
crine glands have been noted. 18 
(iii) In other connections, reference has been 
made already to the fact that there are bodily needs, 
. . . 
or appetites for which the mind is the principal agent 
of fulfilment. These bodily appetites are responsible 
for certain unlearned drives, a drive being understood 
to mean an investment of energy in quest of some sat-
isfaction. These drives for organic satisfactions make 
an impact upon consciousness as part of the content of 
the nonratianal. As noted previously, such drives as 
those for satisfaction of hunger or of sex desire, 
while originating in organic conditions, quickly become 
psychophysical. 
0. Mental ~tivities and Capacities Organically 
Conditione d. 
Certain specific forms of mental activity and capa-
city are known to have organic prerequisites. Intelli-
genae, understood as the measurable capacity of a person 
to make effective adaptations to the demands of the en-
vironment and to deal successfully with problem situa-
17. Cf. Witty and Schachter. .Art. (1936), 377-392. 
Also Shock, .Ar,t. (1940) 139-141. 
18. Cf. Lurie, ~t.(l938), 1531~1536. 
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tiona, is a case in point. T.he central nervous system, 
pa:rti c'll1ar~y the .cerebrum, is the o~g~~.c pr~J:-~9-u~ ~i te 
:for ~ntelligence. 19_ It has been shown that certain 
areas of the cortex of the cerebrum can be designated 
-.' 
visual area, motor area, auditory area, etc., and that 
vaguely outlined.areas near these centers of sensation 
and motor activit,y are involved in interpretation of 
- . - - . . . . . 
sensation. 20 In all ada.p tive and learning a.cti vi ty, 
the brain appears to function in wide-spreading pat-
terns, rather than in clear-cut localization of fUnc-
tions. However, there is convincing evidence that the 
brain is involved in most mental activity. Injury to 
or removal of a11 a1most any part of the cortex brings 
either a permanent or temporary loss of specific learn-
ed capacities. Injury to or under-development of the 
cerebrum are often the causes of feeble-mindedness. 
There are other significant facts suggesting the 
importance of the brain to mental activity. Injury to 
the occipital lobe of the cerebrum may result in visual 
agnosia. This is a condition in Which the subject ex-
hibits no ability to understand ~at he looks at. Yet 
there is nothing wrong with the eye or the visual 
nerve. There is also auditory agnosia and soma.esthetio 
agnosia. In.all these, the subject still senses but 
does_ not a.ttach meanings to sensation. 21 
19. Cf: CarmiChael, .Art. (1940), 93-158. 
20. C:f'. Woodworth and Marquis, Pl:ff., 244-260. 
21. Woodworth & Marquis, PSY·~~ 26~f. C:f. also, Pen-
field, Art. (1950). 
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Woodworth and Marquis, __ report the case of a New 
York Stock EXchange broker Who suffered from severe 
head_a.ches, a1Jsent-mind~dliess, loss of me~or_y, a:nd pro-
1 d . 22 onge unconsc1ousness. When ~ray revealed a tumor 
-- -
growing on the frontal lobes of the brain, an opera-
tion was performed, in which the frontal lobes as far 
back as the motor area were removed. The patient made 
a. rapid and satisfactory recovery·, but with the _loss 
of much tba t bad before been part of his character and 
mental capacity. He took no sense of responsibility, 
showed no interest in returning to work, was uncon-
earned about business. He talked quite freely concern-
ing sex, and seemed to enjoy risque jokes, though he 
made no move toward sex expression even with his wife. 
He became very boastfUl, and, on occasion, belligerent. 
He often appeared nervous and apparently lacked the 
capacity for concentration or long-ter.m purpose. One 
can hardly discount the close ndnd-body relationship 
exhibited in such a case as this. 
Such further facts as the loss of memory due to 
injuries; the us.e of electric shock and various drugs 
in treatment of mental illnesses which appear to have 
an organic basis; and the development of various mental 
illnesses as a result of long physical torture or con-
finement, all point as well to the importance of organic 
and physical prerequisites of mental capacity and activity. 
22. Woodworth & Marquis, PSYf, 262-264. 
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Finally, in this connection, Should be mentioned 
the fact that when the central nervous system undergoes 
• •• " • • • ·- • •· • "' •' •· -· I • • • ·' • • 
certain injuries, suffers certain diseases, or is inllibi-
-- - . . . - ··- .... ' - -·· ,_ - ·-
~ed through the adm~nistra tion of drugs, ~on~ciot.tsn.-~ss 
seems not ~o exist until health an~ normal functioning 
of the nervous system are restored. 23 so far as any 
, . . .. 
memory as evidence is concerned, it appe_~rs~ also, that 
consciousness ceases sometimes during sleep. While 
sleep seems not to be a wholly physical phenomenon, it 
is certainly partially so. 
The evidence that organic conditions and functions 
are pre-requisites of many mental activities and capaci-
ties, as well as of mental malfunctions, is sufficiently 
important to cause some who are working in the field of 
psychosomat~c medicine to look for explanations and 
causes in the organism rather than in the mind. Dr. Ives 
Hendrick writes: 
MY hypothesis is that psychosomatic diseases 
are based upon a physiologic lability of the auto-
nomic nervous system normally found at immature 
development levels, and that these phenomena might 
well be considered another type of the regression 
or fixation at an infantile functional level with 
Which we are frumiliar in the mental characteris-
tics of the psychoneuroses. The hypothesis can, 
therefore, appropriately be referred to as the 
principle of ~ysiologic infantilism, and def~ned 
as the tendenct to .. discharge conflict in those -
organs where t e physiolo~ic lability of nor.mal 
23. Cf. Penfield, Art.(l940), 55•58. 
i:il.li:llatur~ly has b"een retained or can be reestab-
~ished. 
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3. Participation o£ Mental Phenomena in Organic Pro-
ceases. 
No less impressive than the evidences of effects 
of body on mind are the evidences of the converse rela-
tionship. 
A. Memory Traces. 
One of the interesting results of men tal activity 
in learning is the probability of structural changes in 
the cerebrum. Such structural c~anges are called memory 
!races, and while submicroscopic, are asaum.ed to occur, 
by many physiological and neurological psychologists. 25 
If it be argued that the memory trace indicates that the 
entire learning has actually been an organic modifica-
tion and that consciousness was a mere reflection of the 
organic change, such an interpretation is hardly adequate. 
Take, for instance, a case of abstract learning, such as 
a graduate student struggling to understand Professor 
Whitehead's use of the term "consciousness". There is no 
stimulation to the paper and ink symbol "consciousness 11 
that could arouse such mental activity apart from a most 
ext~rganic ~nterpretation. The facts that Whitehead's 
f.~ocess and Realitl was written, that ~e student is 
reading it, and that the use of the term poses any ape-
24. I. Hendrick, in a personal communication to · 
~. L.W.Sontag, cited in Dunbar, SPDT, 55-56. 
25. Cf. Woodworth and Marquis, PSY, 549, 205. Soma 
psychologists-are much lees sure of the reality 
of 11memory traces. n Cf. Adrian, Art. (1940 ), 6-7·. 
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cial problem, are matters which are c~~plete~! .i:ncompre-
hensible within the framework of an.account confined to 
stimulus and modificatio~ of an organism. Yet here is 
the book, here is the student reading it, and here is 
the occurrence of the problem. The existence of the 
book as a physical object and the fact that the student 
relates himself to it in such manner as to receive vis-
ual stimuli from it are both results of the mod.ifica-
tion of physical events by thought; that of Whitehead, 
and that of the student. The occurrence of the problem 
is quite beyond a.n organic explanation. And the pro-
cesses of learning, while probably employing physical 
devices as aides (pencil, paper, file cards, additional 
books, etc.), is a process of learning to relate ideas 
to one another. Once the student has learned to use 
the term consciousness in the Whiteheadia.n sense with 
ease, ideas have been associated together meaningfully, 
and lasting modifications have occurred in the neural 
organization of the central nervous system. 
B. Participation in the Learning of Physical Skills. 
An equally suggestive fact is the influence of 
attitudes, expectations, and prejudices upon the speed 
and efficiency with which physical skills are learned 
and executed. 26 This is another way of saying these 
skills are partially dependent upon what they mean to, 
. -
how they are inte;:preted by, the subject. 
26. Cf. any good book on psychology of learning; 
e. g., Mowrer, OR. 
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C. Participation in Sense Perception. 
Sense perception, which certainly begins as a phy-
- . . . 
sical phenomenon,. is notorious~y susceptible to influence 
by interpretation, expectation, etc. 27 Every clever 
lawyer makes capital of the fact that tleye witnesstt 
testimony can be unbelievably faulty, and that several 
honest and sincere witnesses to the same event may dis ... 
agree radically in what they 11 saw. u Strictly speaking, 
we do not sense events or objects; we sense light rays, 
air waves, chemical reactions, etc. Immanuel Kant was 
very close to what modern studies in psyChology reveal 
When he held that mere sensory stimuli do not constitute 
sense experience; that experience occurs only when sen-
sation is classified and organized according to ~~iori 
28 
categories. · While there would be considerable debate 
concerning the existence and function of ~ prior~ cate-
gories, there would be, at least, general agreement that 
what is e?!;l>erience?- through sensory stimulation depends 
to a considerable degree upon mental elements. 29 
D. Capacity of the Will to Command Psychophysical 
Co-ordination. 
(i) Freedom of the Will an Ultimate category. 
The Empirically verifiable capacity of the will to 
27. Cf. .Any standard work in general psychology, e. g., 
Woodworth & Marquis, PSY. 
28. Kant, CPR; A-l25f:f. 
29. Cf. Ruch, PL; Woodworth & Marquis, PSY or any other 
standard text in general psychology :for a discus-
sion of perception and for ci ta tiona of nUilierous 
exper~ents ~ustaining the discussion presented here. 
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command and obtain a large measure of psychophysical co-
ordination-is further evidence of influence of mind on 
bo~, or sometimes of a body-mind-body sequence of events. 
~ . . .. . . '" .. , - . 
I~--~hought on any_problem is to bave any meani~, some 
degree of 11freedom of the will" must be assumed. In this 
sense, Professor Whitehead is quite correct in regarding 
freedom as an ultimate category. 30 It is impossible to 
- . - . 
discuss the time-honored freedom-versus-deter.minism is-
sue without assuming that the discussants, at least, are 
sufficiently free to investigate the evidence and choose 
the most reasonable hypotheses. It is unproductive to 
debate at length a concept which must be assumed if de-
bate is possible. One cannot choose to believe in com~ 
plete determinism without assuming a power of choice, 
thus rendering the belief in absolute determinism inco-
herent. Yet if it is argued that there really is no 
choice, that the determinist is mechanically predisposed 
to believe in determinism, While others are mechanically 
predisposed to · .. ~lieve iri various degrees of free will, 
rational thought becomes meaningless, and each belief is 
equally "true u. 
Few if any responsible thinkers contend that there 
is a 11willll free of all limiting and predisposing factors. 
What is held is that in nany actions there is an element 
of choice exercised by a thinking mind, and that this 
element of choice often makes the difference between what 
30. dr. Whitehead, P.R, 41, 74-75. 
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is rational or irrational, well-advised or ill-advised, 
morally right or morally wrong. 
(ii) Allport's Analysis of Will. 
While the nature and place of llwill 11 in the total 
personality may be represented in numerous ways, Gordon w. 
Allport has presented diagramatically one of the most com-
. 31 prehensive and coherent accounts. 
' ~ertinent Skills 
lii ~ 
Stimulation In-
citing to Action 
~Specific In ten tiona 
~egional and 
~Conventions 
~ ~Temperament 
---
~ersonal Traits 
. HMotivational and 
,.,. Stylistic) 
\ --4, 
Aspect 
Aspect 
.ALIPORT'S DIAGR.AMATIC SCHEME OF BEHAVIOR 11 AS A CONFLtJEW'g:m 
OF .ADAPTIVE PERFORMANCE AND EXPRESSIONS 2' 
According to Allport's analysis (which for pur-
poses of this discussion, is adopted) every act is the 
result of the 11confluence 11 of expressive factors, which 
3r;- Allport, PER, 464-474. 
32. Ibid., 466. 
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~. ' -· -~ ~ ' -- - --- i 
are largel~ involuntar,y, and adaptive factors, WhiCh are 
largely voluntary. He' recognizes that as it stands, this 
c - - '- ••• 
diagram is an oversimplification of behavior, and adds ad-
ditional 11 determinants 11 : 
a. 
b. 
c. 
h~ 
i. 
j. 
k. 
racial tradition 
regional convention or faShion 
transitory emotional states or moods, 
not characteristic of the person at 
other times 
conditions of strain and fatigue 
age 
sex 
pe·culiarities· o:f native muscular struc-
ture and bodily build 
conditions of health and disease· 
accidental deformations of the body 
special habits arising from special 
training. (e. g. elocution, dramatics, 
military training) wh~ch :may overlay 
and mask subtler individual expression 
accidental candi tiona of the physical 
environment ••• 33 
Allport rightly nates that factors a, b, c, and d are real-
ly classifiable as "expressive" determinants, and j and k 
are 11adap ti ve u. Factors e to i are difficult to fit in to 
any such scheme, and simply must be recognized as con~ 
stituting additional influences upon the whole of person-
ality. 
~is analysis is significant for the present in-
vestigation for several reasons. First, it is excellent 
to illustrate the present major topic of consideration --
the extent and intricacy of psychophysical continuity. 
Secondly, it illustrates objectively what is usually 
spoken of as "freedom of the will. 11 .Employing Allport's 
approach, it may be seen that in many acta such factors 
33. Allport, P.ER, 468. 
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as "task ~t-~~tu_d.e_"~·- ~1;pertine~~.s~ills 11 ,_~~9- ~~:PE:l<?i:fic in-
tentions", as a.da.pti!l;l_a.spects, depend upon !~lit-ion 
i.e., response consciously chosen by the individual, that 
... , .. "'' 
choice depending upon suCh conscious factors as values, 
purposes, prejudgments, and cultivated skills. It is this 
adaptive aspect of behavior which is to be understood here-
inafter as the term nwill 11 is used. Thirdly, this kind of 
an~l~sis is valuable in giving specific psychological mean-
ing to such terms as the good ~; "chosen consequences, tt 
etc., all terms which must be employed in further discus-
sions of moral laws. 
(iii) The Will in Psychophysical Continuity. , 
It may now be seen that most acts involve 11conflu ... 
ence 11 of voluntary and involuntary factors. The involun-
tary factors determine definite limitations, and, to some 
extent, range of interest. The voluntary factors are the 
ground for initiative, defying analysis which would ac-
. -
count for them as disguised involuntary factors. Indeed, 
one may go quite beyond Allport and Show empirically that 
sometimes voluntary elements may exercise control over, 
facilitating or inhibiting to a considerable extent, ele-
menta which in themselves are "involuntary. " A person, 
for instance, may recognize that certain aspects of his 
temperament are destroying his effectiveness as a teacher. 
He may, by taking thought, learn a new behavior pattern 
which, usually at least, supercedes behavior motivated by 
unfortunate temperamental factors. Thus to a. greater ex-
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tent than is immediately apparent, the power and dominance 
~f. volunt~ry factors in behavior may be prog:t"~s_sive:Ly in-
creased, provided goals involved are sufficiently well-
defined and valued. 
A further important fact here is the extent to which 
voluntary behavior may change the relative potency of vol-
\ 
untary and invo11:1ntary factors (both umental and physi<?al tt ~ 
in future action. Choices which, in terms of productivity, 
are well-conceived to utilize possibilities in moving 
toward given goals, often open new possibilities not pre-
viously present. Conversely, poorly conceived choices may 
create limiting conditions from which some future choices 
have been entirely excluded. 
Will is an ultimate category in the sense that its 
operatiol_l must be assumed if problem-solving thought is 
possible. Will also may be analyzed in terms of the psy-
Chology of psychophysical behavior, as above. In most 
acts of will, there is the fact of psychophysical co-ordin-
ation. Since will as such is Wholly an act of mind, this 
fact becomes important evidence of effect of mind on body. 
E. Inferences from Psychosomatic Medicine. 
~e very development of psychosomatic medicine is 
itself recognition of the important extent to whiCh organic 
function may be effected by mental states. In the intra-
duction to EWAopsis to PsyChosomatic !Uagnosis and Treat-
~ent, ~. Flanders Dunbar writes: 
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Recent researcll, by-physicians applying the ·pay• 
chosomatic approach, has made steady- inroads to;.. 
ward the solution of ·many disease ·problems. While 
e·ssential-links are still missing, in some syn-
dromes much has· been accomplished toward the clari-
fication of a specific constellation. This is es-
pecially true in certain types of cardiovascular, 
gastrointestinal diseases, fractures, rheumatic 
disease, asthma, and diabetes. In other syndromes 
such as urticaria, hayfever, and functional hyPogly-
cemia-for example, elements have been found to· in-
dicate that they, too, will fit a specific constel-
lation. 34 
In the same work a Dr. Lewin is. quoted in an even 
more emphatic recognition of the psychological factor in 
certain organic malfunctions: 
What psychosomatic medicine does is to turn the 
methods of psychological medicine to use on the 
hither-to so-called purely organic illnesses. 
It subtracts nothing; it adds to the techniques 
of anatomic, chemical and physical research, and 
anatomic and physiologic clinical investigation • 
••• Psychosomatic medicine requires a paragraph 
under the account of each illness which would 
state that certain definite psychological facts 
are important to the illness, either as central 
or as contributing causes, in large or small 
measure explanatory of the manifestations known 
as symptoms.35 
4. How Shall This Continuity Be Understood? 
A. Principles to Be Observed. 
There are two principles to be observed in any 
adequate understanding of this continuity. They are; 
1. functional adequacy, and 2. philosophical adequagy. 
Functional adequacy prescribes that the suggested 
interpretation provide a workable hypothesis for dealing 
with the phenomena under consideration. For purposes of 
34. Dunbar;-Siffi'T, 21. 
35. Ibid.' 27. 
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'- -- .... -· " 
psychological study, this means that _the_proposed inter-
pretation must enable the investigator to predict psycho-
physical behavior, to understand deviations from normal 
--· , 
patterns, and to prescribe therapies whereby normalcy 
·- - - ~- - . -· - . - - - -. . -. -
may be restored when such deviation may occur. When none 
of these ideal standards are realized completely ~- as is 
the case in psychophysical investigation at the present 
time ~- then that interpretation which most clearly moves 
in the direction of such standards must be regarded as 
stronger, at least until a more productive hypothesis is 
suggested. Functional adequacy is of most immediate im~ 
portance to the present investigation. 
. -
Philosophical adequacy requires that the function~ 
al hypothesis be coherent with best possible results of 
other approaChes to the facts in question. In the case 
of the continuity under consideration, this means that 
the proposed interpretation must at least hold possibili-
ties of coherence with metaphysical aspects of mind-body 
relationship. 
It should be recalled that the broader problem, 
of which the current discussion is an integral part, is 
that of the nature of persons. Specifically, the pre-
sent question is; "Shall our picture of personality in-
clude both psychical and physical phenomena, or shall 
that picture be confined exclusively to one of the two, 
with the other accounted for on some different basis 1 11 
It may be seen, thus, that the principles deliniated 
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above ?rin~ specific a~p~i?a~ions of the pr~~~;ples for 
de~erming_what ~hall_b~ included in the definition_of 
personality: 1. Include everything necessary to provide 
the most functionally adequate account of personality as 
. ··-. ' . 
experienced; 2. Include everything whose observed func-
tion is best accounted for as belonging to a single activ-
ity system. 36 
What, now, within the limitations of such princi-
plea as those delineated above, is the best interpreta-
tion of mind-body phenomena 1 
B. May Mind and Body Be Regarded as Completely Separ-
ate Forms of Being ? 
The mass of evidence of unbroken psychophysical 
activity, of which the foregoing section is suggestive, 
makes it unmistakably clear that no dualism is adequate. 
Only by the postulation of same mystical, and objec~ive­
ly non-existent, "bridge" between :rp.ind and body, could a 
dualism be defended. The postulation of such a 11bridge u 
would be excess baggage, both functionally and philosoph-
ically, and on the principle of economy, 37 must be dis-
missed. The problem of understanding the nature of such 
a 11bridge 11 would simply be a transference· of the original 
problem, with no net gain. 
36~ c:r. This Chapter, Section I. 
37. Of. Occam's Bazar, applied. 
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C. May Mind Rightfully Be Regarded as a Function of 
Body? 
One phenomenon may be said to be a function of an-
other under the following conditions: If phenomenon (b) 
appears with phenomenon (a), disappears with phenomenon 
(a), varies concomitantly with phenomenon (a), and if 
specific factors in phenomenon (a) can be shown to be 
~enetically relevant to specific factors in phenomenon 
(b), then phenomenon (b) may be regarded as a function 
of phenomenon (a.). There is no more reason to regard 
mind as a function of body than to regard body as a 
function of mind. The fact seems to be that a human 
organism, capable of certain degrees of inter-neural or-
ganization and of the production of a minimum of electro-
chemical energy, is a prerequisite for the presence of 
mind in human persons as we kno\'V' them. But there is no 
evidence of one-one functional cor~spondence38 between 
organic states and mental patterns. Even if evidence of 
one-one correspondence Should be discovered, there would 
remain, as indicated previously, a very real question in 
many instances whether organic changes were causing men-
tal patterns or vice versa. 
It is important to note, further, that mental 
activities such as valuing, purposing, holding constant-
ly to a productive personality orientation, and others 
38. This term is used in a strictly technical sense. 
cr. Burtt, RT, 325. 
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w.hiah constitute the more highly complex m~ntai. activi~ 
ties, seem with increasing age of the person, to depend 
-- - - . 
less and less upon ~ecific organic condition~ The ner-
vous system itself often deteriorates extensively with-
out deficiency in such activities as those just cited. 
And when, in extreme deterioration of the central ner-
vous system, valuing, purposing, and persistence in high 
character appear to be affected, there remain two pos-
sible interpretations. It may be that such personal 
mental qualities actually are being lost with deteriora-
tion of the nervous system. On the other hand, it may 
be that the real limitation is confined to the nervous 
system itself as an instrument of communication with 
the individual mind and other minds. To use a homely 
example: a poor telephone connection may distort two 
persons' statements, replies, and understanding so com-
pletely as to leave both confused about that conversa-
tion. ~e minds of the two have been limited, not by 
any incapacity in themselves, but by the faulty connec.-: 
tion. So it may re as the mind of a person appears to 
disintegrate alon~ with a deteriorating nervous system. 
The choice between these two possible interpretations 
is finally a choice between two rival metaphysical 
schemes within Which personality is understood, and lies 
beyond the scope of the current investigation. 
JUst what interpretations will yet come of exten-
sive research in extra-sensory perception, mental tele-
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pathy, a~~ p~rapsychology in general cannot be predicted 
at this ti:rn~. SUch e:x:perim~nts as those of_ Bhine_ at D.:tke 
University39 leave little doubt that such mental phenomena 
are factual. It remains an open question as to whether 
• 
this will indicate eventually that minds of persons as 
we know them are able _to communicate entirely indepen-
dent of bodies, but at present this seems one possibility. 
If such should prove to be true, a major blow would have 
been struck against the reduction of mental activities to 
bodily functions. 
It is closer to the facts to recognize that in 
persons some mental phenomena are continuous with same 
physical phenomena; but that it is entirely likely that 
some mental phenomena have no physical counterpart; and 
that same physical phenomena have no mental counterpart. 
Only thus can adequate account be taken of both psycho-
physical continuity and of the significant differences 
of psychical and physical phenomena. 
D. Is It Satisfactory to Regard the Body as A Part 
of the Personality's Environment? 
Borden Parker Bowne regarded interaction as the 
most coherent interpretation of the mind-body problem, 
and the personalistic school of thought, following its 
founder, has generally subscribed to this view. The 
position is coherent with personalistic metaphysics, and 
has been regarded by personalists as following necessari-
39. See Rhine, ROM; and Journal of Parapsychology. 
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ly from other metaphysical considerations. 
Briefly, the interactionist theory is as follows: 
Mind ~nd body are separate and discontinuous orders of 
being. These two 11 orders mey- be two distinct m,etaphysi-
cal ultimates (as in Descaxtes' kind of dualism) or they 
may be :rmnifestations of ontologically separate minds 
acting upon one another (as in Bowne's personalism, with 
all physical phenomena regarded as the active will of 
God phenomenally perceived). By some process mind acts 
upon body, and body acta upon mind, with the action in-
itiated . first on the one side, and then on the other. 
In all interaction, mind and body are held to be totally 
metaphysically or totally ontologically distinct from 
one another, with some mediator between the two required. 
Personalists have traditionally regarded the personality 
as limited to the mind, with body --phenomenally per-
ceived activity of God -- regarded as part of the en-
vironment. 4 0 
E. s. Brightman, one of the leading contemporary 
exponents of personalism, makes the environmental inter-
pretation of body quite explicit: 
The whole self or per son... consists of all the 
conscious experience that is or has been or will 
be present in all the empirical situations that 
constitute the history of the person. fhe unity 
of personality, therefore, is the unity of con-
sciousness; personality includes consciousness 
only, and does not include any of its environ-
ment -- physiolo~cal, subconsonscious, or social 
-- as part of it. 41 
40. Cf. Bowne, MIDT, Part III, Chap. II. 
41. Brightman, PR, 358. 
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This quotation throws into clear relief basic disagree-
ments between Brightman's position and that developed in 
. . . 
this dissertation. As will be shown, the view set forth 
here includes at least part of the behavior of the organ-
ism, all of the 11 subconsci ous u, and, in a sense, part of 
the "social" within the _£ntologi cal unity of personality. 
Brightman's argument is quite empirical, for in 
addition to metaphysical considerations, Brightman gives 
much more attention to personality 11as experienced." He 
argues for distinction between consciousness and all as-
pects of the physiological by differentiating betwee~ 
11 Situation Ex:perienced 11 and -"Situation Believed-in. tt 42 
He argues that only consciousness is within the Si tua-
tion Experienced, and that the total organism, together 
with all the remainder of the environment, belongs to the 
Situation Believed-in. Thus, only consciousness can be a 
part of personality experienced. But this argument can-
not dismiss the fact of psychophysical continui'liJ7f (not 
mere interaction), for several reasons. To limit person-
ality to what a given individual can experience is to beg 
the question. It is quite obvious that only conscious-
ness can be experienced. But the real question is, ·~ust 
personality be understood as constituting more than What 
the person experiences as himself? 11 There seems reason 
to believe that the Situation Ex:perfenced is ontological-
ly continuous with, and incomprehensible apart from, part 
42~ightman, PR, 358-359. 
*see p. 1S5 for explicit sta·t"ement of the nature of 
continuity. 
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of the situation Believed-in. 
FUrther, Brightman's argument overlooks the fact 
that there are two ways of viewing personality; from 
within, and from withou~ noumenally and phenomenally. 
~- - . . -. .. 
MY consciousness, for me, is a Situation Experienced. 
But my consciousness, for another person, is a Situation 
Believed-in, deducible from other Situations Believed-in, 
one part of which is my physical organism. For that 
other person, my consciousness and part of my organic 
activity are indistinguishable. Let it be granted that 
I may distinguish between my consciousness and all acts 
involving my organism (though for many practical pur-
poses such distinction renders both consciousness and 
acting meaningless}. Let us call my consciousness Sit-
uation Experienced, and my acts involving my organism, 
Situations Believed-in. It will remain true that no 
such distinction can be made by others "observing11 my 
personality from without. And the question still re-
mains as to whether or not my Situation Experienced is 
thoroughly comprehensible when regarded as completely 
discontinuous with all Situations Believed-in. The 
fact is that one often gains new understanding of one 1 s 
own personality through consul tat ion with those Who view 
the personality from without and who cannot draw the 
. 
line between consciousness and act. Personality viewed 
from within and from without is better understood than 
When viewed from either standpoint alone. 
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The traditional personalistic position on the 
mind-body problem is functionally cumbersome. "Inter-
action tt suggests that some distinction can be made, but 
as foregoing data have Shown, there are some points at 
vfuich psychical and physical phenomena seem to be one. 
Some personalists, themselves, are recognizing the hand 
writing on the wall. In a penetrating article entitled 
"A personalistic Re-EKamination of the :Mind-Body Pro-
blem, n43 Professor L. Harold DeWolf attacks the environ-
mental, interactionist hypothesis on both scientific and 
metaphysical grounds. Professor Paul E. johnson, who 
describes himself as "an ardent, yet unsatisfied person-
alist u44 finds interactionism wanting in functional ade-
quacy. He expresses the conviction that: 
They ~ind-body phenomen~ are evidently multi-
ple aspects of one system that holds them to-
gether in functioning unity. To reduce mind to 
body or body to mind is no solution because in 
either case there is an overplus to be account-
ed for. But as the unity of personality be-
comes increasingly clear through the work of 
these many sciences, we are led, if we are not 
to do violence to the empirical facts, to postu-
late a system larger than either and that is in-
clusive of both in organic wholeness.45 
Johnson cites a similar trend among other personalistic 
psychologists by citing Allport's definition of person-
ality, in which the latter speaks of adaptation of psy-
chophysical processes; 46 and Stern's discussion of the 
43". DeWolf', Ai't.(l952~. Further reference to this 
article will be made shortly. 
44. Johnson, Art. (1952). 
45. Ibid. 
46. Allport, PER, 48. 
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integration within per,sonality of multiple factors, some 
·- .. - . . - ~ 
of which are organic.47 
The interactionist position is not only under at-
tack as functionally inadequate, but as metaphysically 
inadequate as we11. 48 
E. The Person as A Continuity of Psychophysical Pro-
ceases. 
Reductionism, parallelism, and interactionism all 
fail, on principles of functional and philosophical ade-
quacy, to deal adequately with psychophysical continuity 
within persons. It is most nearly satisfactory to for-
sake all views ~ich attempt to explain away or dodge the 
fact of an important measure of such continuity, and ack-
nowledge it. The functional superiority of such a posi-
tion is strongly supported by the fact that more and more 
psychologists and psychiatric specialists are adopting 
some such view as offering the only basis for dealing 
with personality problems. In addition to foregoing c ita-
tiona to this effect, the opinion of KUrt Goldstein, one 
of Euro~ts eminent psychologists, may be regarded as sig-
nificant: 
Neither of the two realms L_Physical or men tay 
can be regarded ~.Eriori as dominating and de-
termining the other, leaving to it, at best, a 
modifying influence ••• If one makes that mis-
take, the term 11mind 11 loses its special mean-
ing completely, While at the same time one can 
also no longer do justice to the "somatic"· ••• 
A univocal description of living processes re-
47. Stern, GPPS, 84-85. 
48. DeWolf, Art. (1952). 
quires that the terms psychological and physical 
be used at the outset in a sense indifferent to 
the real· processest as : .all.ltiliary tools of des-
cription. Although we are. fo~eed to speak of 
physical and psychological phenomena, we must 
always bear in mind that, in doing so •. we are 
dealing with data which have to be evaluated in 
the light of their functional significance for 
the whole.49 
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r,hat personality must be regarded as an energy sys~ 
tem is apparent on grounds that personality can be studied 
only as an activity, never as an inert object. As a person 
is conscious2" and~ by inference, attributes c:onsciousness 
to others, this energy thus known or inferred is termed 
mind. As this energy is sensed and perceived as space~ 
time phenomenat. it is called E2S!• As noted previously,_ 
some personal energy may be exalusively mental) and some 
ex.alusively physicalJ but the terms 11mental 11 and 11 physicaln 
are really names for ways of perceiving the single energy 
system called personality.50 This is what is meant by 
psyahophysical continuity. Such a view avoids all the dif-
ficulties of dualism~- parallelism~ and interactionism~ 
while at the same time achieving functional adequacy. But 
what of the second requirement; philosophiaal adequacy? 
Such a view is fully coherent with an adequate meta~ 
physics. It is to be noted that it is not claimed that-
body is personality.. Let the human organism be regarded as 
interrelated with the entire physical universe. As sucht 
49. Goldstein, ORG, 338-339• 
50. Professor L. Harold DeWolf 1 working independently, developed a view similar to the one suggesteQ here. 
The present discussion is enriched by access to Prof~s­
sor DeWolf's view prior to publication. 
Of. DeWolf 1 Art.(l952)a. 
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the body remains part of the perceived activity of God. 
However, the hi.uilan body is not Only a part of 
the ·larger cosmos and 4!1 illustration of-its 
laws~ Some of· its processes are peculiarly 
individual,· expressing not' the order of the 
whole material realm alone, nor even of the " 
biological realin, nor yet of human physiology 
merely, but in addition to these tb.-e unique 
singularity of the human individual. The pat-
terns of individual huma.n behavior, from the 
characteristic personal electroencephalogram 
to-the gross habits of speech, manner of walk-
ing, handwriting, eating and shaking hands 
all appear as a complex spatial field or pat-
terri of activity superimposed upon the pat-
terns of the divine activity observable through~ 
out nature.· This, I am suggesting, is precisely 
what a human person is, as-he appears and so far 
as he appears to human spatial perception and 
interpretation. 51 
Let it be admitted that the manner in which human behavior 
may be "superimposed" upon divine behavior. is a mystery. 
Observable facts should not be denied because of the ab-
sence of a full explanation of how the facts could be. 
And such ;o-aupe.:ttimposi t:Lon poses no greater mystery than 
does the ontological separation of the individual mind 
from the divine mind. 
A person as ~is noumenal~- for himself is 
~
mind. But a person may b~~rved phenomenally, also, 
as organic behavior, f~tiona~and ontologically con-
tinuous with his noumenal self. SUch a, view calls for 
no other change in a personalistic metaphysics, and 
achieves the functional adequacy which interactionism 
lacks. Thus is it seen to be philosophically adequ~te. 
51. DeWol'f, ·At-~(1952 ). 
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II.. Human Persons as We Know Them .Are Social :Ehti ties. 
It ~y be said _without qu_alificatio~ _ t?at no p~~­
son. • ever comes into existence apart from every society 
bf persons. In one sense, the social context within 
which .a person develops may be regarded as !.. ;part o~ the 
~erso~. Social context is not ontologically identical 
with the persons who compose it, of course. Yet each 
person is what he is partly because of the extent to 
which he has assimilated and made a part of himself th~. 
response patterns called forth from him by his society. 52 
1. SOcial Participation in the Organism. 
Social effects upon persons are by no means limited 
to mental patterns. The body, too, is what it is partly 
because of its development in a particular society.. For 
instance, comparative study of vital statistics concern-
ing draft inductees of the two World Wars developed some 
interesting findings. Sons of World War I draftees tend-
ed to be ten pounds heavier, one to two inches taller 
than their fathers, and. to have had fewer lasting effects 
of childhood diseases. 53 Since the growth potential of 
a body is determined by biological heredity, the only 
conclusion seemed to be that draftees in World War II 
had grown up with more nouriShing food and better balanced 
diets, more sunshine and freSh air, and more Skilled medi-
52. Cf. Fromm, MFH, 58-59f. 
53. Cf. Tb.Drpe, CPD. 
.. 
·. 
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cal attention all factors contributed to or made pea-
ai ble by the society. 
There are many other examples ~f social condition-
ing of human organisms, or lack of it. Perhaps the most 
striking illustration which might be selected is that of 
the well known 11 Wolfchildrenn of India, .Ama.la and Kamala. 54 
Their bodies as well as their minds reflected the appar-
ent fact that from infancy they had been. members of a 
wolf pack. · Back and leg muscles were developed for 
1 qua drip ed rather than biped locomotion. Their teeth ap-
peared more as animal fangs than as human teeth. They 
preferred raw meat to cooked food, and had less difficul-
ty in digesting it than children of their ages raised in 
a human community would have had. Their voices were bet-
ter equipped.for t~e grunts and howls of wolves than for 
human speech. They had unusually keen night vision. Their 
bodies were otherwise under-developed and emaciated be-
cause of their completely inadequate diet. 
Mention might also be made of the special neuro-
muscular co-ordination developed by athletes, musicians, 
and various craftsmen. 
2. Social Participation in the Whole.Personality. 
A brief return to Kurt Lewin's concept of socio-
psychological spatial relations55 is helpful in recogniz-
ing the extent to w.hich society participates in the total 
personality. Recall that Lewin holds that: 
54. Cf. Gesell, WCRC. 
55. Cf. Section I, Chapter Six. 
In ··s'lllimla:ry, one- can·· say· that behavior· an.a· · devel-
opment. depend upon the state of the person and 
his Emvironment, ·B = F(P,E). · In this equation 
the 'perSon (P) and his environment (E) have to 
be viewed as·· variab~es which are mutually depen-
dent upon· each other. It1 other words; to ililder.:.. 
stand or· to predict behavior, the person arid""hi·s 
environment have to be·considerea as one constel-
lation of interdependent fac·tors·~ We ·call the 
total"i tY ·of these factors the life §J.Pace (LS,p) of 
the individual; and write·B = F(P,E) ~ F(Lsp). 
~e life space, therefore, includes bo"th the per-
son and his psychological environment.56 
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The concept of life~space is Lewin's means of recogniz-
1 
ing that no person can be understood apart from the so-
cial context which contributes to that person 'a being 
as he is. In a very real manner, the society and the 
individual personalit.Y participate in one another. 
Numerous investigations and experiments in socio-
psychological studies have indicated the extent to which 
all activities of the person, and indeed the so-called 
basic structure of personality itself, are affected by 
social conditioning. 57 Emotional reactions, available 
intelligence, 11 charactern, rate and efficiency of learn-
ing, aesthetic awareness, capacity for leaderanip, 
11 sense of htimor 11 , choice of occupation or profession, 
are only suggestive of the many areas probed by social 
psychologists, and all such areas and activities of per-
sonality have been shown to bear the mark of social con-
ditioning. The life-space conception of Lewin makes all 
this quite graphic, concentrating as he does on ac-count-
56. Lewin, FTSS, 239-240. 
57. Cf. Newcomb and Hartley (eds.), RSPJ and Young, SP. 
200 
ing for the behavior of a person at a given period. For 
illustrative purpos~s.,_ Lewin ana:J-Y.zes_a ___ t:r~ical adoles-
cent personality according to 1his concept. 
~ , ~· ~ . . 
Adolescence, says Lewin, is a period of transi-
tion. This transition affects the total personality. 
First, it is a change in group belongingness; a change 
of status. He has considered himself a child and been 
·' 
considered so. Now he is resolved to leave the status 
of childhood. Secondly, the shift from childhood toward 
adult status is a shift toward the unknown. "An unfamil-
iar surrounding is dynamically equivalent to a soft 
ground. • •• the lack of a cognitively clear structure 
is:, likely to make every action an uncertain one. n58 
Thirdly; there are bodily changes which are unfamiliar 
and disturbing. Fourthly, since the adolescent is a 
person in transition, he is not strongly attached either 
to the childhood pattern from which he is emerging, nor 
to the adult pattern toward which h.e is moving. This 
makes for much freedom of action, providing the basis 
for much radicalism in attitudes and actions. Fifthly, 
the life space is broadened, not only geographically 
and socially, but temporally as well. Instead of think-
ing in terms of a few days or weeks, the adolescent be-
gins to look years ahead. In attempting to do this, the 
adolescent often finds the impact of the adult community 
quite self-contradictory. 
58. Lewin, FTSS, 138. 
A variety of confli.ctirig religious,. political, 
and occupational values is obviously powerful 
within that group. A child may fail' tcf bring 
to adolescence a well-established fraln.ework of 
values; or he :fua.y have thrown the values of lii s 
childhood away. In- either case the structure 
of his· adolescent time perspective will be u.n;.. · 
stable and undetermined, owing to·the uncertain-
ty of not only what· can be done~ • ~ but ·also of·· 
what should be done. The uncertain character of 
the ideals and values keeps the adolescent in a 
state of conflict and tension which is· the great-
er the more central these problems are. The 
wish to structure these fields in a definite way 
• • • seems to be one of the reasons behind the 
readiness of the adolescent to follow anyone who 
offers a definite pattern of values.59 
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Finally, the shift from childhood to adulthood may be 
quite sudden, or it may occur by very slow degrees. Or, 
the adolescent may find himself a. "marginal man 11 --
standing on the bound.:fil;y between childhood and adulthood, 
belonging to neither. In such a case emotional instab-
ility, sensitivity, boistrousness, shyness, aversion 
toward other groups, are then characteristic forms of 
behavior. 
All of the physico-socio-psychological factors in-
volved in the above analysis of the life-~ace of the 
adolescent must be recognized as dynamically related to 
one another, and as relating the person to the group of 
which he is part. 80 
An analysis similar in principle could be made of 
the child, and of the adult. The chief difference would 
be that areas of freedom and limitation, values, purposes, 
59~ Lewin, FTSS, 141-142. 
60. Ibid., 145-154. 
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goals, would be more clearly defined in these two stages 
than in the adolescent Who is.~rimarily a transient. 
Thus does Lewin set forth a moat graphic and comprehen• 
si ve eli scussion of the particj_pa~io:n. of group dynamics 
in the specific makeup of a personality at a given stage 
in its career. It is not as correct to think of a per-
son as an entity conditioned by society, as to think of 
a complete.account of what a person is as including his 
life ... space. 
As a. means of transition to the nex:t step in the 
present discussion, it Should be pointed out that a per-
son is neither totally a social construct, nor a mere 
plastic putty upon which the social group puts its stamp. 
A person is a psyChophysical center of energy ontologie-
ally distinct from society, but in dynamic interaction 
with society. It is empirically correct to say that a 
person is a socio-psycho-physical center of energy. 
Society and the. person are ontologically synonymous to 
whatever extent_!he person assimilates response patterns 
called forth by membership in a society. There are fur-
ther characteristics of personal energy itself which now 
must be investigated. 
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III. Persons Develop as Potentialities Are Actualized. 
A person throughout his existence is in a constant 
process of development. What a person becomes in any mo~ 
ent of his existence is an actualization.of one or more of 
the potantialities inherent in the immediately previous 
stage. The person as a single cell is potentially two 
cells through sub-divisiont or a deaQ cell. The single 
cell will actualize one of those potentialities open to 
it• and thus the development is begun_, never to end so 
long as the person lives. There are potentialities open to 
an organism composed of two cells whieh were not open to 
a single-celled organism. Similarly.t there are potential-
ities open to a six months fetus not open to a three 
months fetus. What those potentialities aret and whiah 
ones are actualized, depend upon the reciprocal relation 
of heredity:t physical environment (the womb and the 
mother's body) and a configuration of vaguely defined 
ultimate maturation potentialities. 
The fact of 11 ultimate maturation potentialitiestt 
introduces a fact of nature both wonderful and mysteri~ 
ous. Every living thing~ plant or animal, has certain 
matruation potentials whiah both relate the being to its 
species and genust and help to mark the being as an in-
dividual. An ac.orn has the maturation potential of be-
coming an oak tree. The oak tree does not resemble the 
. acorn,. nor is it in any way present in the acorn. Literal-
ly 2. the acorn is only potentially a tiny plant with a 
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limited food supply. Yet it is quite possible to predict 
that, under reasonably favorable circumstances, the acorn 
. ~ " . ... . . 
will develop fro.m stage to stage, with new potentiality 
~erging at each stage, becoming at last a mature oak 
tree. This tree will possess sufficient characteristics 
common to other oak trees to allow accurate classifica-
tion by genus and species. Yet it Will be different in 
form and shape, in number of branches and leaves, and 
even perhaps in organic function, from all other oak 
trees. This fact which is here called maturation poten-
tial is found throughout all of nature. There is an in-
escapable teleology constantly at work in al+ things 
natural. 
The developing human fetus also has its ultimate 
maturation potentialities. But here the potentialities 
are much more extensive and complex than anywhere else 
in nature. The mature human organism is the most complex 
biological study. 
Yet what has oeen said thus far about personality 
makes it clear that there is a much more amazing fact to 
be accounted far. The human person is not merely a bio-
logical organism, but a socio-psycho-physical energy 
system. This means that for every newly conceived cell 
of human protoplasm there are ultimate soci~~yc~­
£hysical potentialities. Just what stage of the develop-
ing human organism possesses the potentiality of element-
ary consciousness no one can say. But that consciousness 
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was not an immediate potentiality of a newly conceived 
cell of protoplasm is quite obvious; and it is equally 
obvious that in a normal week-old infant elementary 
consciousness has become a fact sometime previously. 
The fact of social assimila:tionbegins at least as early 
• -+• .• 
as consciousness, possibly sooner. With the emergence 
of consciousness and the beginning of the development of 
a total life~space, many new potentialit~es emerge with 
the step-by-step evolution of the person. Aesthetic ex-
perience, rational judgment, will, valuing, and purpos-
- -
ing are only some of the more significant of these emerg-
ing potentialities which are usually actualized at least 
to some extent. 
1. Functional Autonomy of Potentiality. 
The fact that eaah new stage of development opens 
potentials Which were not immsdiately present at previous 
stages provides a basis for Allport's principle of the 
autonomy of motives. 61 New motives emerge at various 
stages in the development of the person as thrusts for 
actualization of potentialities which have not before 
been immediately present. The principle of functional 
autonomy of motives rests back upon a principle of func-
tional autonomy of potentiality. 
2. Teleological Potentialities. 
The fact of autonomy of potentialities is, as has 
been seen, but a partial truth. There is the further 
61. Cf. chap. Six, Section I, this dissertation. 
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fact o:f ultimate socio-paycho-physical potentialities. 
The emergence of the capacity :for rational thought is 
autonomous in the sense that it was not immediately pre-
sent as a potential long before it was actualized. And 
yet, just as the acorn was somehow always potentially an 
oak tree, the developing fetus is somehow a potentially 
rational thinker. There are teleological potentialities 
real to, but not immediately present in, a personality 
at any stage of its development. If this appears para-
doxical, it is at least an empirical paradox. 
Teleological potentialities are what the person 
may possibly eventually become, under ideal circumstances. 
Their actualization is what is meant by such phrases as 
"being a real personu. Functionally autonomous poten-
tialities may or may not be actualized. They emerge as 
potentialities along the pathway to teleological poten-
tialities. They are not all 11good" in the sense that 
their actualization will necessarily open the way to 
further progress toward teleological :.c.PJ:otentialities. 
For instance, reasoning and rationalizati~ are both 
functionally autonomous potentialities of consciousness. 
Reasoning actualized and trained will render new value 
experience possible, while rationalization actualized 
will but lead to unreality and the impoverishment or de-
struction of value. 
Significantly, will itself is a functionally 
autonomous potentiality of highly developed conscious-
207 
ness. Will may be exercised to an·important degree in 
the actualization or repression o£ numerous potentiali-
ties. .AI3 will be seen later, this is one £act which 
makes moral problems real. 
. .. 
No one can say what the limitations on ultimate 
potentialities o£ persons may be, nor indeed, that 
there are limitations. Tbat a newly conceived indivi-
dual will pass through successive stages o£ actualiz-
ing £unctionally autonomous potentialities, becoming 
at last a mature person, is empirically veri£iable. 
For all we know, so-called mature personality once 
achieved, may be but an introduction to undreamed £unc-
tionally autonomous potentialities which overpass death 
itael£ in £ul£ilment o£ unlimited teleological pote~-
tialities. ~e e~olution £rom a single cell o£ proto-
plasm to a more or leas integrated aocio-psycho-phyai-
cal energy has been su££iciently marvelous to suggest 
great possibilities. Eut here again we are on the 
borderline o£ a question which can be settled only as 
one integrates a philosophy o£ personality with a:~com­
prehensive metaphysics, and must turn back • 
. .. 
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3) The Fact of Needs. 
A need of a person is a condition necessary to the 
emergence or continuation of some aspect of the person's 
existence, or necessary to the actualization of poten-
tialities which are coherent with teleological potentiali-
ties. If an organism is to be perpetuated, it must have 
food. Food is, therefore, a need. If a mind is to na.ture 
to the point where it can fulfil its ~ecial functions, it 
must communicate with other minds. Communication, there-
fore, is a need. 
A) ~ives and Motives. 
Conditions Which constitute needs for persons at 
various stages of .their development motivate the person 
to invest some energy in attempts at fulfilment of those 
needs. Such investments of energy may come about without 
the person being conscious of specific needs. IJ!he person 
may be conscious only of physical discomfort (which prob-
ably is the experience of a hungry baby), or of a vague 
unrest (such as the experience of missing human companion-
ship before identifying the cause of the uneasiness). 
When the person is unaware of the need as suCh, the in-
vestment of energy in quest of fulfilment may be termed a 
~~· T.hus a person may be said to have a hunger, a sex 
drive, etc. w.hen the person becomes aware of a need, 
real or imaginary, and takes thought in controling and 
directing the investment of energy, such investment may 
be called a motive. 
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B. Potentiality, Drives, and Motives. 
The d~amic thrusting character of pers~nality is 
accounted for as drives are motivated by needs. That 
there is a close relation between potentialities and 
. ~ -· 
drives now becomes clear. How is it that certain autono-
mous potentialities are actualized at ea(Jh stage of_de• 
velopment? The answer is that the person needs certain 
potentialities. It is the nature of a person to £ecome 
some of the potentialities available at each stage. This 
need becomes a~~ for fulfilment of potentialities, 
The drive as such is unconscious, hence blind and unin-
formed. Of all the :potentialities open at any stage of 
development, those which are flbest 11 for the person are 
not always actualized. The drives sometimes become 
focussed toward incidental or destructive possibilities. 
However, the driv~s are directed toward actualization of 
"best 11 potentialities with t·cro great regularity to be ac-
counted for on the basis of chance. The path of evolu-
tionary unfolding from the single cell to a socio-psycho-
physical center of energy is too effective to allow one 
to ignore the probability of some guiding principle at 
work. 
It is, therefore, on wholly empirical grounds 
that the concept of teleological drives toward tele-
ological actualization is postulated. It is inconceiv-
able that billions of persons could evolve from most 
elementary beginnings to highly complex stages as they 
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do, wholly uncaused. Aristotle was attempting to account 
for the same fact with his concept of final cause. ~ust 
as the empirical fact of somewhat predictable unfolding 
forces the postulation of both autonomous and telelogical 
potentialities, the same fact forces postulation of 
autonomous and teleological drives. AUtonomous drives 
arise as the person feels needs for actualization of eer ... 
tain autonomous potentialities. Teleological drives to-
ward teleological potentialities operate throughout the 
life of the person, assuring much more than a chance 
evolution in the direction of teleological possibilities. 
Drives toward the flbest" potentialities at each stage are 
drives toward those potentialities which are instrumental 
in the eventual achievement of teleological potentiali-
ties. 
Investments of energy in quest of need fulfilment 
become motives when the person becomes conscious of the 
needs and seeks to understand, control, and direct the 
investment. There are some needs which cannot be ful-
filled until they become motives, since their fulfilment 
involves certain kinds of experience. The sex need is 
one of these. Studies in the psychology of sex indicate 
increasingly that on the human level, the only adequate 
overt fulfilment of the need for sex expression is an 
act of love for another person. This can never occur so 
long as sex remains only a drive, hence unconscious. But 
since thought may be irrational as well as rational, 
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motives may develop on the basis of misinformation or 
poor reason. In such cases motives get in the way of 
and become barriers to the actualization of both autono-
mous and teleological potentialities. Such a pers.on may 
be helped by such ex:peri ences as p. ersonal counseling• 
group therapy, or, in extreme oases, by psychiatric 
treatment. 
Motives may be either autonomous or teleological, 
as well as are potentialities, needs, and drives. 
C) Empirical Significance of !hia Philosophy of 
Potentialities, Needs, Drives, and Motives. 
The terms "teleological potentialities, 11 ttautono-
mous pot en tia.li ties," "teleological drives, 11 autonomous 
drives, 11 and "teleological motives" are introduced for 
the first time in this dissertation. The term 11autono-
mous moti ves11 is borrowed from Allport •s Personality. 
But ~ile the terms and the concept they express are 
new, this philosophy has been implicit in much philoso-
phy and psychology at least since the time of Aristotle. 
All personalistic philosophy and psychology certainly 
presupppee.; such a concept. This philosophy has been 
tacitly presupposed because the empirical facts force 
such assumptions to render them intelligible. The ver,y 
fact of the existence of a science of mental health pre-
supposes that there are teleologioal·potentialities to 
be actualized in each person, and that the mentally ill 
person is failing for some reason in the quest for such 
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actualization. T.he fact that techniques of non-directive 
counseling and group therapy, are proving effective indi-
cates that there are within the person drives and motives 
thrusting toward actual:ization of certain llbetter 11 poten-
. - -
tiali ties, and that the princip-al function of therapy is 
to clear away socio-psychological debris ~ich is blocking 
fulfilment. The fact that there can be a science of 
mental health, or of personal adjustment, or of psychiaM 
try, indicates that, While every person's potentialities 
bear the mark of his own individuality, they partake of 
. . 
a considerable ~iversality. A science can never be 
developed relative to elements, all of which are wholly 
individual, and principles of which are never repeated. 
(i) ~e philosophy here in traduced combines to 
some extent McDougall's instinct psyChology with All-
62 port's autonomy of motives. McDougall must be sus-
tained in what probably impressed him most and led.to 
his postulation of an instinct theory of human behavior: 
The fact dealt with in these pages, that ~ principle 
operates by Which a person passes progressively through 
various stages of development toward goals, many of whiah 
are wholly unknown to the person. This is the fact that 
has led in this dissertation to the postulation of teleo-
logical potentialities, needs, and dri vee. But :McDougall's 
choice of terminology is unfortunate for more than one 
reason. An instinct, strictly speaking, is both a drive 
62. Cf. Section I., this Chapter. 
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toward specific fulfilment .~ and unlearned c~p.aci ty for 
fulfilment. 63 There are in this sense of the term, few, 
if any, human instincts. MCDougall's theory fails also 
to account for the fact that certain drives do not exist 
as such from the moment of conception, but emerge only 
at various stages of development. 
(ii) Allport's discussion of the autonomy of mo-
tives is strong where McDougall's view is weak. This 
is a more coherent account of the empirical fact that 
specific drives emerge at new stages of development, and 
cannot be accounted for as modifications of a few elemen-
tary ninstincts u. This empirical coherence is what re-
commends Allport's principle for incorporation and ex-
pansion in. this dissertation. Allport's approach fails, 
however, to deal with the problem which McDougall regard-
ed as most significant. If there is on~~ autonomy of mo-
tive to account for personal unfolding, if each new stage 
is in every way a complete break with the past, one has 
on one's hands the impossible conception of a series of 
completely uncaused events developing with a degree of 
pattern and predictability wholly impossible apart from 
some guiding principle. Within the philosophy proposed 
in this dissertation, the strengths of both McDougall's 
and Allport's theories may be utilized and their weak-
neeses eliminated. 
63. Cf. Woodworth and M9.rquis, PSY, 272. 
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(iii) This ~hilosophy of potentialities, needs, 
drives, and motives has also an axiological significance. 
The essence of value consists of the best possible ac-
tualization of potentialities -- in other woras, of need 
fulfilment. 
4) Some Teleological Needs. 
Teleological needs are needs for the actualiza-
tion of teleological pot en tiali ties. That there are such 
needs is evidenced by the more or less predictable evolu-
tion of the personality from stage to stage in the direc-
tion of teleological YWJOten tiali ties, and by the malfor-
mation or impoveri~ent of personality which results 
from failure to fulfil such needs. studies in mental 
health, personal adjustment, and psychiatry have revealed 
what some of these teleological needs are. It is entire-
ly possible, even probable, that there are further teleo-
logical needs completely unknown to present familiarity 
with personality. Some of the recognized teleological 
needs are as follows: 
A) "We 11 Eperience. 
Because many of the ~oten tiali ties of persons de-
pend upon social participation in the life space (to use 
Lewin's term) of the person, group belongingness, or "wen 
experience, is a need of considerable significance'.,;\; As 
references to ~rious developments in dynamic psychology 
and to the emergence of "interperson~l tt psychologies 
have indicated, the importance of adequate participation 
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in human communi~ is increasingly recognized. For in-
stance, Karen. Horney speaks of two ba_sic needs, safety 
-. ...,.and securitYj64 both dependent upon participation in 
human community -- and regards frustration of the attempt 
- . -
to. establish satisfactory social relati_qnships as the 
basic cause of all neurotic conditions. 65 Allport writest 
Modern psychology teaches us: Maximize situations 
where the individual. (child or ~dul t) oa.ii ;partrcr:: 
pate fully and 2n terms of equal status In proj ec~ 
of join: t concern to himand to his associates. . In 
so doing affiliation will be realize~L self-esteem 
safe-guarded, and hostility reduced.6o 
Fritz Kunkel expands the concept of uwe 11 experi-
ence to include not only a satisfying relationShip with 
human community, but also a relationShip with Gad. Kunkel 
regards the fundamental problem of psyChological matura-
tion as a process of l··o:vercoming the "sham-ega" and de-
veloping a strong sense of oneness with humankind and 
with God. 
Our duties towards ourselves and towards our so-
c.ial e:riviranmen t ·coincide. Indeed, there is only 
one duty, namely, to grow mature. To find our-
selves, our center, our highest value, means to 
find our grouJl, our spiritual home, and our pasi ... 
tive relationShip to God. It means unlimited 
growth, bath of indiv;dual creativity and of ex-
panding brotherhood.6 
64. Cf. Horney, NWP, 74-75. 
65. Of. Horney, OIO, 40ft. 
66. Allport, Art.(l95l). 
67. Kunkel, ISM, 191. 
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B) Creative Experience. 
Less has been written by psychologists on the need 
~or creative experience than of some o~ the other needs, 
yet it is nonetheless real •. Whether it is the creation 
of' an imaginary play situation in childhood; or the crea-
tion o~ a work of art, piece o~ music, literary produc-
tion, scienti~ic theory; or the creation of' a new life 
within marriage; the experience o~ creation is a need in 
. 
itself', for which no substitute satisfaction is possible. 
Much human behavior is incomprehensible apart ~ran a.n 
understanding o~ the reality of' this need, generating 
drives and affording the basis for many motives. 
0) Aesthetic EKperience. 
Closely al~ied to the need for creativity is the 
need ~or aesthetic experience -- the need for the non-
rational awareness of beauty and sublimity. ~is need 
seems not to be equally strong in all persons, nor does 
it develop equally early in all. But in varying degrees 
of intensity this need is real for all, and When ful-
filled, opens new areas of experiental satisfaction not 
previously known to the person. Aesthetic experience, 
in addition to being a need in itself, may also be in-
strumental to general mental healt~ an instrument of 
c·a'tharsis or vicarious expression of repressed feelings. 
The use of dramatic productions as a means of therapy is 
based partly upon the therapeutic possibilities of 
aesthetic experience, partly upon the need for 11we• 
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exp erl. ence. 
. -. 
D. ~ral Bightness. 69 
Of most importance to the present investigation is 
the need for moral rightness. ~at such a need is real 
is one of the most_ apparent _facts of experience. Not 
specific rules of conduct, but the need to be able to 
think of oneself as right, ?:Y whE7t_ever standard is recog-
nized, is wh§t is meant here. Even our rationalizations 
of what we regard. as morally wrong ?onduct prove our 
need to think of ourselves as right. 'What exactly is 
moral rationalization~ . Is it not the imaginary rearrange-
ment of and distortion of the facts, in order that our 
remembered action may be viewed in a different context 
and thus made_to appear right? But why all the concern 
to appear as right, even when the events are wholly men-
tal and known only to oneself, except that one needs to 
be right before oneself? There are few, i:f' any, sub-
jects upon which so much has been said and written for 
so long a time, as upon the nature and content of moral-
ity. There are few, if any, subjects which ro:us·e more 
wide-spread interest, in all levels of society. And 
there is no more serious and complex mental illness than 
those originating with unresolved moral problems. 
~is description of the experience of moral right-
ness as a teleological need is somewhat contradictory to 
68:--cf. Moreno, PSY. 
69. Cf. Bender, Pol, 57-60. 
218 
widely accepted current views. Such views are based on 
the Freudian ~alys~s of conscience as the super-ego, 
the "internalized" voice of society. The c omp ara ti ve 
- . . 
validity of the position taken in this dissertation and 
- . 
rival view-points will be the subject of intensive dis• 
cussion in the neoct chapter, as the nature of moral ex-
.. . .. I 
perience is discussed. Since the present discussion has 
to do with the development of a philosophy of personali ... 
ty, it suffices for now to note that, according to this 
philosophy, persons are beings characterized in part by 
the potentiality for moral experience and by a need for 
the actualization of such potentiality. 
J."Jl.... The Person as a Uni tas Mill tip lex.? 0 
SUccessive consideration of factors which must be 
considered has born out the early contention that per-
sonality is the most complex study the mind of man has 
ever encountered. A person is a mind; a person is a 
psychophysical continuity; a person is rational; a per-
son is nonrational; a person is irrational; a person 
faces deterministic limitations; a person acts with some 
ini tia ti ve as "freedom of will 11 to work for the achieve-
ment of values, or their destruction; a person is a so-
cial entity; a person may be rm:Ldeveloped or .:. ma:tadjust-
ed because of society; a person actualizes potentialities 
immediately present; a person evolves in such manner as 
7o. Cf., Stern, GPPS. 
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to indicate the operation of a guiding principle, of the 
reality of teleological potentialities; a person develops 
.. . - . . . . . . .. - . - . 
drives and motives which are as autonomous as potentia~i­
ties are autonomous; a person pursues teleological drives 
and develops teleological motives for actualization of 
teleological potentialities; a person has a pas~ a present, 
and a future, all of which may be to some extent present 
in consciousness. A person is composed of a multitude of 
diverse and somatimes opposed factors. Yet, to a greater 
or lesser degree, the person is an organized and unified 
energy Which is constantly perishing, constantly, persist-
ing, constantly becoming. 
Of all factors of which a personality is c amposed, 
it appears to be the ~ -- the conscious choice of 
values, purposes, and goals, and the exercise of whatever 
possible initiative in an effort toward their achieve-
ment -- which is the organizing and unifying factor. It 
is the will which makes of the diversified multiplicity a 
}!ni tas multiplex. The will, of course, nay be hampered 
in this by physical, mental, or social factors. Drives 
arising out of organic appetities may, for instance, be-
come so powerful as to greatly increase the nonratianal 
factor in mind and, perhaps lead to irrational thought 
processes. or the will may be frustrated by fear, or 
.continual failure, or by apparently insurmountable so-
cial difficulties. Under such circumstances the person 
may fall far short of being a true unity. Drives and 
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motives, or drives and values, or will and accompliSh-
me~t, maY be in oppositio:n to one another. The essential 
problem of being a .real person is faced in the effort of 
the will to bring all the forces within the perso~na:li tl 
- - . . . ' - . . .... 
together, and to tie past, pr~h and future e?SPer~ence 
together, into an integrated energl directed toward the 
actualizationof teleological ;pote!!,tialities, in so far 
as these are underst~~· To the extent that this is not 
accomplished, the personality is an unintegrated (or per-
haps a disintegrating) energy pattern, with the various 
factors inhibiting and excluding one another. 
V~ .. ,~.-.. What is a Person? 
It is apparent that even an attempt at a brief 
statement concerning the nature of a person must itself 
be a unitas multiple~. The diversified elements of per-
sonality cannot be· brought together in a single compre-
hensive sentence. · The best that can be offered is a con-
'. 
cise recapitulation of the foregoing investigation of 
personality. While such a statement may bring together 
in comparatively brief space a summary of What has been 
said, much of it will be meaningless unless the more ex-
haustive discussion has been followed through. 
A person is a more or less integrated pattern of 
diversified socio-psycho-physical energies, which, within 
the personality are ontologically of one order. 
The hi~ly complex organism classified zoological-
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ly as man,)is the immediate biogenetic agent of human 
personality. When the organism has matured to a certain 
point, persons become capable of thought. Mind is not 
rightly regarded as a function of body, but constitutes 
a new dimension of personality. 
The mind is the total content of consciousness, 
including the patterns developed by consciousness. It 
is characterized by a continual effort to adapt the tottil 
personality with its needs and potentialities to the be-
lieved possibilities of fulfilment. It endeavors to un-
derstand relationships of things and ideas, conceives 
values, and sets up purposes. It undertakes to bind to-
gether past experience, present awarene.ss, and anticipat-
ed experience into a coherent, evolving unity of conscious-
ness. 
The behavior of persons exhibits confluence of vol-
untary and involuntary factors. The voluntary factors of 
behavior include attitudes, values, purposes, and learned 
skills, and are collectively known as will. 
There are many social influences in a person's 
life-space. The en tire person assimilates his own reac-
tion patterns elicited by social environment. To that 
extent the society participates in the person. 
Persons are in a continual process of becoming --
of actualizing both autonomous and teleological poten~ 
tialities. Autonomous and teleological needs, autono-
mous and teleological drives, autonomous and teleologi-
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cal motives, are all operative within the person as re-
sponses to pot en ~iali ties~ 
A person is a uni tas mul ti_plex, more or less in-
grated by voluntary factors of behavior, chief among 
. . 
which are certain mental activities. Personal integra-
tion is directed toward the actualization of potentiali-
ties. 
CHAPTER NINE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL OBLIGATION 
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Whatever else may or may not be said about moral 
obligation, it is a form of experience of persons. 1 It 
is for this reason, principally, that data drawn from psy-
chology may be expected to l:la.ve relevance to the problem 
of moral laws. ~e present chapter is concerned with the 
question of the most adequate psychological theory of 
moral obligation. Views most widely held among psycholo-
gists, sociologists, and many philosophers of the present 
are greatly influenced by Freudian theories. Understand-
ing and evaluation· of the Freudian interpretation are 
thus essential in dealing with the question now before us. 
I. The Freudian Psychology of Moral Obligation. 
Freud asserts that .a considerable degree of self-
love is in the makeup of every person. ~is self-love he 
terms 11narci ssi am 11 • 
Narcissism Li!?•·· the libidinal complement to the 
egoism of tne instinct of self~preservation, a 
measure of which may justifiably be attributed to 
every living creature.2 
In childhood narcissism is vigorous and largely free of 
repression. But development in society brings changes. 
Original self-love tends to be brought into question and 
repressed as the libido finds itself in conflict with so-
ciety. 
1. For a discussion of experience, awareness, or mental 
activity, cf. Chapter Seven. 
2. Freud, CP, IV, 31. 
We have learnt that libidinal impulses are f'a.ted to 
undergo pathogenic repression if they come into con-
flict with the subject's cultural and ethical ideas 
••• if he recognizes them as constituting a standard 
f'or himself and acknowledges the claims they make on 
him. Repression, as we have said, proceeds from the 
ego ••• from the self-respect of the ego. The very 
impressions, experiences, impulses, and desires that 
one man indulges or at least consciously elaborates 
in his mind will be rejected with the utmost indig-
nation by another, or stifled at once even before 
they enter consciousness. The difference between 
the two ••• can easily be expressed in terms of the 
libido theory. We may say that one man has set up 
an ideal in himself by which he measures his actual 
ego~ while the other is without the formation of' an 
ideal. • • • 
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To this ideal ego is now directed the self-love 
which the real ego enjoyed in childhood. ~e narciss-
ism seems to be now displaced on to this new ideal 
ego, which, like the infantile ego, deems itself the 
possessor of all perfections•·· He is not willing to 
forego hia narcissistic perfection in his childhood 
••• he is disturbed by the admonitions of others and 
his own critical judgment is-awakened, he seeks tore-
cover the early perfection thus wrested from him, in 
the new form of an ego-ideal. That which he projects 
ahead of him as his ego-ideal is merely his substi-
tute for the lost narcissism of his childhood.3 
F:reud•s introduction of the ego-ideal (later called 
the super-ego) is quoted at ~onsiderable length in order 
to show clearly that the emergence of the ego-ideal is pri-
marily a measure of self-defense. It is the erection of' an 
imaginary ego, or sel:f, which can be given the characteris-
tics o-ne wishes were actual. This ego-ideal is then 
assumed to be one's real ego, and loved and esteemed to a. 
degree the real ego cannot be in the light of objective 
criticism. 
The erection of an ego-ideal Places greater de-
3. Freud, CP, IV, 50-51. 
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mands upon the ego. The ego is constantly watched now 
and judged by the ego-ideal. 4 'lWe may say that what we 
call our £bnscience has the req~J:ed characteristics 11 5 
Lfor the task of watching the egrfl. Studies of paranoida.l 
patients reveals, says Freud, that their feeling of "be-
ing watched 11 stems from the rise of conscience. 
That which prompted the person to form a.n ego-ideal, 
over which his conscience keeps guard, was the in-
fluence of parental criticism ••• reinforced, as time 
went on, by those who trained and taught the cgild 
and by all other persons in his environment ••• 
The person desires free expression, struggles to liberate 
himself from all these 11censorialtt forces, and then it is 
that "his conscience encounters him in a regressive form 
as a hostile influence from without. n'l What is true to a 
pathological degree of the paran·oiac, is true in a lesser 
degree of everyone, Freud makes clear. Conscience is the 
voice of judgment, o:f censorial criticism, generated by 
all the coercive and corrective forces in one's environ-
ment. The conscience becomes the censor, not· only of 
.fully conscious thought-content, but of dreams as well, 
and in this latter function is called the "dream censor."8 
In The ~o and the_~, Freud discusses the devel-
opment o:f the ego-ideal, or the super-ego, in somewhat 
different terms. There he begins by noting that in early 
4. Freud, ep, IV, 52. 
5. Loc. Cit. 
6. Ibid., 53. 
7. Loc. ·Cit. 
a. Ibid., 54-55. 
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experience every person identifies himself with his 
father. 9 In the case of male infants, sexual desire for 
the mother and identification With' the father exist at 
first side by side. When the father is recognized as 
an obstacle to sexual desire for the mother, the Oedipus 
1 . l.O cQmp ex ar~ ses. Ambivalent feelings thereafter exist 
toward the father. 
Later both the Oedipus Complex and the "object-
cathexis" of the mother must be given up. In their 
place is often an intensified i:dentificatio-n with the 
father (in the case of girls, identifi.ca tion with the 
mother) and the compatible retention of affectionate 
feelings toward the mother. 11 In moat actual cases, 
which are characterized by bisexuality, there may be a 
major identifica.tion with the parent of opposite sex 
and a minor affection for the parent of equivalent sex. 
The broad genera~ .• ?utco~f the~al phas! 
governed by: the Oedipus c£_m;plex maY., "therefo~, 
be taken to be the forming ~_l?J£e:·cipi ta.re-1!!, 
1he e~ 1 consisti~£f__these tw~ identification~ 
in some way combip.ed together. ~a modifica- . 
tion of the ego retains its special ;position; 
it stands in contrast to the other constituents 
of ti~ .e~ in the !Orin of an e~-ideal or su:E_er-
!:.~· 
The super-ego is more than a mere 0 deposi t" of 
earlier 11object-choices" of the id. It constitutes ala o 
. . 13 
a reaction-formation ~gainst those choices. 
9. Freud, EI, 39. 
10. Ibid., 40. 
11. Ibid., 41. 
12. Ibid., 44. 
13. Ibid., 44-45. 
This double aspect of the ego-ideal had the task 
of effecting the repression of the Oedipus com-
plex, indeed it is to that revolutionary event 
that it owes its existence. Clearly the repres-
sion of the Oedipus complex was no easy task •••• 
The strength to do this was, so to speak, bor-
rowed from the father, while the more intense the 
Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it suc-
cumbed to repression (under the influence of dis-
cipline, religious teaching, schooling and read-
ing) the more exacting later on is the domination 
of the super-ego over the ego -- in the form of 
oonscirace or perhaPS of an unconscious sense of 
guilt. 
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The origin of the super-ego, continues Freud, is 
the result of two factors: l) the lengthy dependence of 
human childhood, and 2) the fact of the Oedipus complex::. 15 
We see, then, that the differentiation of the 
super-e~ from the ego ••• stands as the repre-
sentative of the most important events in the 
development both of the individual and the race; 
indeed, by giving permanent expression to the 
influence of the parents it perpetuates the ex-
isten~e of the factors to which it owes its ori-
gin.J.~ 
In the fact of a super-ego there is an explanation, 
not only of conscience, but of all the so-called higher 
nature of man. Religion springs from the longing for a 
father;l7 conscience is present as a censorShip from 
parents, teachers, and others influential in our develop-
ment;18 moral guilt is a tension arising in the conflict 
between the ideal and the actual;l9 "social feelings rest 
on identifications with others, on the basis of an ego-
14. LOc. Cit. 
15. Ibid. , 46. 
16. Lo c. Cit. 
l 7 • Ibid. , 4 7 • 
18 • Lo c • Cit. 
19. Loc. Cit. 
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ideal in common with them. u20 
' The above analysis of the rise of the super-ego 
renders understandable the more familiar references to 
conscience in Tbtem and Taboo. ~ere Freud writesa 
Conscience is the inner perception of objections 
to definite wiSh impulses that exist in us •••• 
Taboo is a command of conscience, the violation 
of which causes a terrible sense of guilt which 
is as self-evident as the origin is unknown.21 
In SUlllDlary; Moral experience, for Freud, is a 
replacement of 0rigina.l narcisstic attitudes with an ego-· 
ideal which is all the real ego fails to be, and which 
exercises increasing censorship. over the real ego; and/or 
moral experience is the replacement of the original Oedipus 
complex with a super-ego which contains a large measure of 
identification with the father, and which serves as a re-
preesive force against the impulses of the id expressing 
themselves through the ego as an Oedipus complex. Vlhether 
the super-ego arises as an ideal-ego to supers;ede the true 
ego, or as a super-ego to repress the Oedipus complex, the 
conscience is the internal representative of the moral com-
mands of the parents, of teachers, of moral literature, 
and of the system of rewards and punishments by which the 
society enforces its commands relative to the activities 
of the id. 
20 • Lo c • Cit • 
21. Freud, TAT, 859-860. 
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II. Bertocci's Criticism of the Freudian Account of 
MOral Obligation. 
One of the most penetrating and searChing criti-
cisms of the Freudian account of moral obligation is 
Peter A. Bertocci 1s «A Reinterpretation of Mbral Obliga-
tion.n22 This article not only successfully resists the 
psychological reductionism of the Freudian account, but 
helps to keep the way open for the probability of univer-
sal moral laws at a time 'When irrefutable evidence of at 
least some kind of moral relativity has convinced many 
that moral laws are impossible. It is sufficiently im-
portant to merit prolonged attention in the present in-
vestigation. 
l.· Moral Obligation A.1:J a. Prima. Facie Ex;perience. 
Bertocci begins his "reinterpretation 11 by turning 
attention to "first person e:x:.periencen23 of moral obli-
As I analyze this experience ••• and compare it 
with other experiences, I find that the nthis 11 
Lin any 11 I ought to do thisg always refers to 
a.n act which at the time seems good, or consis-
tent with the -Good or Best I know or conceive at 
that time. The 11 thiaes" vary in their specific 
content from occasion to occasion, or from time 
to time. For example; I ought to tell the truth 
in this situation, but I ought to deceive in 
this other. Why? Because in those moments at 
least I concei.ve ,those actions to be in accord-
22. Bertocci, Art. (1945). · . 
23. uFirat person e:x:perience 11 is a term regularly em-
ployed in w. H. Werkmeister's epistemological 
discussions, and is borrowed here because of its 
obvious utility.. Of. Werkmeister, BSK • 
*Of. Brightman, i\U., 64-68. 
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ance with· the best... It would seem, then, tha. t 
the full.~. psychological content of 11 I ·ought to -
do this 11 is: · "I ought to do the Best (the GOod) 11 • 
'Jhe objective of the experience is always the 
Be· at ~s int~~preted at the time I am having the 
experJ.enc e. 
This awareness of obliga·tion to do the Best as understood, 
however the understanding of the Best may vary from occa-
sion to occasion, is of primary significance, both to an 
adequate understanding of moral experience, and to a 
criterion for rationally defensible moral rightness. 
It is clear, Bertocci continues, that the ought ex-
perience is neither of compulsion, nor of fear, but of ob-
1igation. Compulsion and fear may actually be important 
in determing w.hat a person does, but they do not enter in-
to "obliga toriness 11 • 111\liy experience of' obligation is .one 
of' qualitative expectancy of' the best from the self'.u25 
Similarly, a failure to will the best as understood is 
aocompanied by an ~erience of' moral guilt. MOral guilt 
~such is distinct from fear, though fear may be a part 
of' the total conscious state. 
Disagreement as to the nature of the Good, or the 
Best, in no way eliminates the experience of' obligation 
to the best as conceived. 
Two individuals, a head-hunter and a St. Paul, a 
Nazi or a believer in democracy, may disagree 
about the nature of' the Good, but each experi-
ences in the presence of his conceived good the 
obligation to execute it as far as possible. 
Ideals change, but obligation to the present ap-
24. Bertocci, Art. (1945). 
25. Ibid., 272. 
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proved ideal is an unwavering expectation.26 
However values be understood, and, by whatever system of 
thought, intuition~ or feeling they may be arrived at, 
the moral experience is an expectation by the self of the 
self that assumed values be served. 
2. Refutation of Freudian Reductionism. 
The conflict with the Freudian account of moral 
obligation is clear~cut. Dominant in the Freudian sense 
of guilt is 11anx:iety or uncertain fear of actual or pos~­
S.i.ble reproach or :punishment. u27 Berta cci 's refutation 
consists of returning to moral obligation as a first-
person experience. In so-doing, he believes it is indub-
itably factual that there is a fundamental :prim~ facie dif-
ference between the experience 11 I ought" and the experi-
ence 11 I must. u That difference cannot be explained away. 
"MUst" refers to a forced sequence imposed upon 
my will by other :parts of my nature, by the ap-
proval or disapproval of other people, or by my 
position in the realm of nature. But 11ought 11 is 
an experience of another order, expressive of 
quality expected, regardless of cir~mstance, 
but not forced willy-nilly upon me. · 
It is true, continues Bertocci, that ~~ of 
the parental-social code has influenced content of the 
individual's moral code. What happens is that there are 
in the person underived "moral sensitivities"·which can 
be influenced by various sanctions, rewards, and punish-
26. Bertocci, Art(l945). 
27. Ibid., 2?4. 
28. Ibid.' 275. 
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men ts. ":But it remains to be proved that it can produce 
an ought-:fu~ctioning by strategic o:r;dering o:f rewards and 
punishments. n29 To speak o:f an individual wholly with-
out oughting capacity but who can be ucondi tioned 11 into 
such a capacity, is to attribute miraculous powers to so-
cial conditioning. Properly understood, conditioning has 
to do with the shaping and channeling of _ _:functions or cap-
acities that are already present. A whole new order of 
:fUnction cannot ·be 11 condi tioned tt into existence. 
There is some limit to w.hat learning can do, and ••• 
the moment we argue that learning not only modi-
fies, develops, or differentiates already exist-
ing :functions, but also crea tee basically differ-
ent ones, then we have no ground :for establiShing 
any psychological ultimates ••• Unless we are guid-
ed by some such limiting principle, there is little 
reason :for supposing there are· such irreducible 
types of experience as sensing, emoting, remember-
ing, thinking, and feeling.30 
It is possible to show, further, that the experi-
ence of moral guilt cannot be reduced to fear. Here 
again, :first-person experience must be appealed to. In-
terestingly, it is quite possible to experience moral 
guilt and :fear simultaneously as distinct experiences, 
or either in the absence of the other. It cannot be 
argued in reply, says Bertocci, that moral guilt as dis-
tinct :from fear is really another complex of fears de-
tached :from original stimuli and merely regarded as a 
distinct experience. If this could b.e held, then ac-
29 • Lo c • ci t. 
30. Ibid., 276. 
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tiona in compliance with conscience in disregard of spe-
cific fears, could be accounted for as dominance of a 
given fear-approval complex, the origins of which are 
forgotten. But thi e explanation. is weak in application. 
Bertocci takes the case· of a soldier who fears to face 
the enemy in battle, but who, because he believe the 
cause for which he fights is right and because he be~ 
lieves he ought to risk his life for his country, re-
si sts his fear and obeys his conscience. Now according 
to the Freudian thesis, the basic motivational desire 
is for life, and the ought represents the a~justment of 
the individual in an effort toward survival. IJllus, how 
could an ought ever act in opposition to the desire for 
survival, as in the case of the soldier? Such an account 
fails completely to fhow how the fear of death can be 
opposed by an ought which is i t.seli' allegedly a fear-
31 
reaction in an effort for survival. 
There is the .further fact that moral guilt often 
is felt when society is disposed to excuse or even to 
approve. If conscience b~ ~nly the ·internalized voice 
of society, then one must account for the fact that, on 
occasion, the individual, without making any unmotivat-
ed demands on himself, feels conscience against that 
Which is the only source of his conscience -- the atti-
tude of society. 32 SUperficially, it might appear that 
31. Bertocci·, .'Art. (1945), 277-278. 
32. Loc. cit. 
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this could be accounted for adequately by pointing out the 
fact that __ somet~mes the __ voice of soc.iety is ambivalent. 
Yet closer examination will reveal that such an "explana-
tion" gives rise to more questions than it answers. First, 
w~ is the voice _of society ambivalent on m.ral quest~ons? 
Is it not because there are differences of o~inion about 
what is right independen1 of society's attitude? Second, 
When society's moral injunctions are ambivalent, on what 
basis does the individual choose? Tb argue that choice is 
then a matter of yd.elding to the heaviest pressure would 
require an amazing qual~tative analysis of v~rious social 
re\!ards and punishments. Third, when society's moral 
directi vee are ambivalent, why is it that the individual 
sometimes sides with the minority perhaps even a minor-
ity of one -- and feels moral approval instead of moral 
blame? ~e very mention of the fact of moral ambivalence 
on the part of society would seem, therefore, to reveal 
significant inadequacies of Freudian-like accounts. 
Now if the experience of oughtness be merely the 
result of past conditioning, and a new social demand 
emerges, now setting up a new standard to which to con-
form, why should there be resistance to the new condition-
ing of society? The earlier conditioning would not have 
elicited resistance in the name of 11right. 11 Why should 
later condi tion.ing elicit such opposition, especially 
when the most respected groups and institutions in one's 
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social environment are the sources of the new conditioning?33 
Bertocci calls attention also to the likelihood 
that rationalization of ~ersonal and social mdsdeeds is 
an attempt to .make the a.cts appear acceptable to an in-
ner demand for the best. 34 
The conclusion concerning the true nature of moral 
obligation is: 
Along with other distinct and unique functions 
of the self, suCh· as sensing, feeling, an·d know-
ing, there is· an 11 oughtingn, a moral imperative 
whose satisfacti·on is experienced as moral ap-
proval, a unique moral emotion·, c oncomi ta.nt with 
but not reducible to elation or pride. Disobedi-
ence produces the emotional-state of moral dis-
approval or guilt, not reducible to fear. !Ihe 
experience of moral obligation might be impos-
sible without conative drives·like hunger, curios-
ity, mastery, fear, and anger~ but it cannot be 
equated with any one or any combination of them 
all. 11 0ught 11 ·does not exist in a "cubbyholeu 
all by itself, bUt its experiential referent is . 
this imperative which is· distinct from mere want35 ing on the one hand and compulsion on the other. 
3. The Significance of Bertocci's Reinterpretation. 
A. Bertocci's account is more empirical, more com-
prehensive, and more coherent with the facts which must 
be accounted for. The Freudian thesis was developed 
through an a..ttemp t to account for abnormal behavior, and 
had to be so constructed as to fit the requirements of an 
assumed biological determinism. The effect of 1he super-
ego upon the person is predominantly a frustrating one, 
often resulting in the kind of mental illnesses Freud en-
33~ Bertocci, ~t. (1945), 278. 
34. Lo c. Cit. 
35. Ibid. 
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countered in: his patients. It is completely inadequate 
as an account of the experience of oughting in the healthy 
person, Where this experience is often closely bound up 
with Wholesome self-expression and need fulfilment • 
.Bertocci's contentions that conditioning cannot create a 
new capacity for ezperiencet and that oughting is a dis-
tinct and irreducible form of experience, are unanswer-
able. Yet the importance of conditioning in giving ~­
tent lbo belief concerning the good is preserved. All the 
-
Freudian thesis achieves is a workable hypothesis for deal-
ing with some mental illnesses in cases where the ~~­
tioning of moral experience has been unhygienic. That, of 
course, was all that was originally hoped for it. But a.s 
Bertocci points out, it cannot be applied with comprehen-
si ve coherence beyond that very specific use. Further, 
the mental illnesses for which Freud sought solution can 
be understood equally well within the reinterpretation 
Which Bertocci proposes. 
1hua, because Bertocci 'a reinterpretation is more 
coherent with the facts of first-person moral experience; 
recognizes the distinct irreducibility of oughting as a 
form of experience; and leaves the door open for at least 
· ~ adequate an understanding of abnormalities as that 
afforded by the Freudian account; it must be regarded as 
empirically and rationally superior. 
B. T.b.~ .. l'~i~_terpr~ta_t.ion_ Bertoc~ ~reposes both sus-
tains and is sustained by the contention in Chapter Seven 
_of tl?-is disse:t:ta:t~on ~at m~ral_ri~~ness ~:B.!3- t~leological 
need. Comprehensive coherence of each is increased when 
. ~ . .. . . - .. 
the two views are fused. One may agree with Bertocci that 
the moral imperative is not ttan independent drive for a 
specific type of satisfaction, like the drives, hunger, 
r • <' • "' -·• • 
sex, curiosity, or sociality u, but rather "a demand for 
quality .of expressio.n among existing a.bili ties and 
drives. n36 __ The fact remains that such g,ual~t;z_constitutes 
a unigue form ot: __ e;;peri ence not contained in the satis:f'a£_-
tion of any other drives as such. The net effect of deny-
ing that moral rightness is a distinct need among other 
needs is to enlarge its scope. satisfactions of all 
drives are incomplete until they have made their contribu-
tions to the need for moxal rightness -- that is to say, 
until their satisfactions have been placed upon the high-
est possible qualitative level. One cannot, of course, 
experience moral rightness in a vacuum. One is moral or 
immoral in all specific experiences in ~ich values may 
be foreseeably affected by choices. Mbral riggtness is 
thus a teleological need37 of a particularJ:l complex kind. 
(a) It is the investment of the entire personal energy 
in quest of best possible fulfilment of teleological po.-
36. Bertocci, Art. (J:945), 282. 
37. Cf. Chap• Eigb.lh, Sectionm, 2, this dissertation 
for definition and discussion of teleological needs. 
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tentialities and of all autonomous potentialities which 
are coherent with them. (b) It is a unique form of ex-
perience which cannot be sought for i~ts own sake, but 
which occurs when the investment of available energy de-
scribed in (a) is made. In other words, the good will 
is at the heart of moral experience. But only that will 
which wills personality fulfilment is good. 
C) If Bertocci is correct -- and he appears to be --
in contending that oughting is a demand that one do one's 
best in all circumstances, the question, 1'What is Best? 11 , 
may then be raised. The obligation, of course, is to the 
best as understood, and not to unchallengable truth. If 
- -
the latter were the case, moral obligation seldom if ever 
could be met with human intelligence. Intellectual capaci-
ties and training differ widely, and even the best trained 
among the most intelligent often fail to recognize that 
course of action which is even tua1ly shown to be; best. 
Obligation to the best as understood gives to mor.ality a 
distinct and irreducible individuality. 
Yet to agree that one is obligated to the best as 
understood is to entail the necessity of understanding as 
clearly and as thoroughly as possib1e. Anything less 
than the best possible understanding cannot be honest1y 
believed, and therefore falls short of the moral demand. 
Thus does moral obligation entail the use of man's most 
dependable and productive capacity for determining truth 
{in this case, about what is best) -- his reason. HUman 
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re~sonii1g capaci t~ e s are not infa.lli ble, but th~ _ .:L~n~ _!.J:u-
man searCh for truth reveals that reasoning persons come 
- ·-
closer to truth oftener than do unreasoning persons. No 
~ ·- ·-· - v. " • .• - --
appeal to revelation, or intuit ion, or other extra-ration-
. - - - . " . . . . . - ·~- .. ... ·- -
al sources of information, can negate the moral obligation 
to be reasonable. Even if one allows the possibility of 
extra-reasonable sources of information, the validity of 
such i~ormation_ ean be established_ only by showing them 
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to be reasonable. Thus one has not done one's best 
until one has done one's best to be reasonable about What 
is good, or better, or best. 
What is most reasonable is not merely a matter of 
opinion. When one sets out to be reasonable, there is a 
necessity of dealing with facts according to certain well-
defined 11laws of reason. 11 These laws of reason are not 
a.rbitrar.y creations by scientists or philosophers. They 
are necessary patterns of thought, regard for the rela-
tion of ideas, which centuries of attempts at problem-
solving thought have show.n to be productive of conclusions 
Which are both rationally and empirically verifiable. 
Reason is, of course, at last its own judge (not necessari-
ly the reasoning capa.ci ty of a given individual), for vvhen 
one sets out to reason, one assumes the validity of 
reason and submits to it as an objective principle. Tb 
reason about moralit.Y is to introduce the element of 
3s. For an enlightening discussion of criteria of truth, 
Cf. Brightman, IT.P, (2nd. ed.), 44f. 
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objectivity. Thus, When one agrees that the oughting ex-
perience is a demand to do onets best, one is really say-
ing that oughting entails a willingness to be reasonable, 
and hence objective, in moral judgments. 
The demands of the oughting experience have not 
been met, then, until the person willa certain acts and 
consequences because they are believed, at the moment of 
willing1 to be best. The demands are not fulfiled by con-
formity through fear of punishment nor hope of rewards 
disassociated with the willed consequences. ~e reason 
must be convinced, not coerced nor bribed. 
Reasoning about the best points to the probability 
of an evolution of a given individual's conception of the 
best. In this fact we have the answer to a question which 
has arisen at one time or another in the experience of all 
of us, and which has been discussed by philosophers at 
least as far back as the time of Plato' uis one obligated 
to keep a bad promise, even if when the promise was made, 
it appeared to be good?" The answer clearly is, No. To 
will an act Which now is seen to be bad merely because it 
once appeared to be good is to enthrone error at the ex-
pense of a growing understanding of the best. It is liter-
ally to will less than the best, and thus to fail to ful-
fil the demands of moral obligation. 
D., This l'einterpretatio:n implicitly calls attention to 
the :fact that these are two distinct problems of moral 
evaluation. Failure to recognize them as distinct pro-
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blems has been the cause of great confusion, both ~ong 
ethicists CI.D:d laymen. One :problem is tha~. ()f _asses~dng 
moral :praise or blame in the cases of s:p ecific indi vi-
duals and societies. Here, the criterion is: Did he 
will the best aB he under a tood it, and did he do his best 
. . 
to improve his understanding? Thus if a head hunter used 
his capacity for understanding, the best, within the time 
and social context in Which he lived, and willed his 
understanding, he was no more guilty of a :personal moral 
wrong than was the missionary 'Whose head was removed. 
Individual moral res:ponsibili~, or moral responsibility 
of a given society, never extends beyond willing the beat 
a.s understood. It is on this ground that it may be ex-
pected that there will be a difference in the moral re-
s:ponsibili ty of a trained man and of an untrained man, 
of a superior intellect and of an inferior intellect, of 
a civilized :person and of a savage. 
But there is a second problem, which is really 
the problem of the ethicist. This problem might be stat-
ed thus: Wba t is the moral standard which, in the light 
of present knowledge, appears to be best and likely to 
remain best during the foreseeable future? Mere delinea-
tion of various moral codes of the past does not deal at 
all with the real :problem of ethics. Let it be granted 
that at least some men of ancient times were measuring 
up to the best they knew in treating their wives as 
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slaves. All that one then bas granted is that those men 
.had a __ sp_e?ific moral respo:J3.sib~li ty relative to their 
knowledge. SUch a judgment~ however, cannot be used 
- -
l~gi tima tely to a_rg~e that their moral standard wa~ just 
as good :for the ancient man and wife as the present ideal 
of equality is for modern families. The problem of deter-
minimg What moral standard is best is quite distinct :from 
that of assessing particular moral responsibility. It 
may even be damonstrable that, at least to some degree, 
What is morally best has varied with extrinsic circum-
stances. Nevertheless, the problems remain distinct, and 
the distinctive ethical problem can never be dealt with so 
long as these two are confused. One might even say, the 
real problem of ethics is to determine what ought-t~ 
recognized as moral laws. 
Considerations such as these are what render pay-
chological data significant for the :formulation of moral 
laws, while psychological laws remain insufficient. From 
the accumulation of the ways persons think and behave 
there come new insights concerning what persons can do, 
and so, what their best can be. It is :from the vast area 
of human possibilities that the best must be determined, 
and the best possible is the ought-to-be, the body of 
moral laws. Psychology :furniShes the data, but not the 
standards, of ethics. 
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III. The Validity of Kant's Moral A Priori. 
It may be recalled at this point thatt following 
the exposition of the Kantian ethics, it was maintained 
that Kant had attampted two goals~ so far as his discu~ 
sion of morality is concerned: 1. To show that moral ex~ 
perience is an a priori category of thought 1 underivable 
from experienc.a but rendering moral experience possible; 
2. To show that there are specific a oriori moral laws by 
which behavior.may be evaluated.39 Considerable space was 
devoted to showing why the second of these goals had not 
been aahieved., It was asserted_. however, that the first 
goal had been achieved. The analysis of moral obligation 
as first-person experienae now shows direa.tly the valid-
ity of Kant•s claim of an underived capacity for moral 
experience. It seems highly probable that it was some 
introspective consideration of suah experience that 
deeply impressed Kant with the reality of "the mnral 
law withinu •. one formulation Kant gave to the Catego~ 
ical Imperative was 1 11Act only according to that maxim 
by which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal lawu. 40 Is it not clear that Bertooci 
was saying very nearly the same thing Kant had in mind 
when Bertocci wrote that oughting "always refers to an 
act whiah at the time seems good.t or consistent 
39. Of. this dissertation~ 74. 
40. Kant, FOM_,, IV, 42la 
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With the Good or :Best I known41? Leaving aside the ques-
tion of how one knows what one would be willing to have 
become a universal law, or what is consistent with the 
Good or :Seat, the two statements are equivalent. The 
differences between the two do not center upon the above 
analyses of oughting as first person e:xperi ence. Rather 
the differences are: 1) Kant, as has been seen, denies 
all consideration of consequences in deter.ming the good, 
while Berto cci recognized the inescapabili ty of such con-
sideration: 2) Kant represents the categorical impera-
tive as a restraining force, coercing a will that would 
not otherwise be good, 42 while ::Bertocci emphasizes the 
voluntary nature of the moral response. .A$ has been 
noted previously, Bertocci's account has the advantage 
of greater coherence with experience as it occurs, yet 
certainly almost all have experienced at some times the 
restraining power of the moral imperative. ~e fact 
here would seem to be that the moral imperative, or 
moral expectation of the self, when successful, brings 
voluntary compliance despite the lure of what is less 
than the believed best. 
:Basically, ::Sertocci's reinterpretation of moral 
obligation is a reassertion of the validity of xant•s 
claim that the moral conscience arises as an~ priori 
category. To call oughting a unique and irreducible 
41. ~ertocci, ~t. (1945), 271. 
42. Kant, FOM, IV, 412-413. 
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kind of experience is to say the same thing Kant said 
about the basic nature of moral experience, but to say 
it in terms more familiar to contemporary psychology. 
~t the existence of ~ ~rtori, moral laws does not fol-
low from this fact has been shown already. But it does 
follow that there is somehow a "moral nature" to be ful-
filled; rather than that oughting is fundamentally either 
a reaction-formation against incestuous impulses or an 
internalization of external authority. 
IV. Is There a Universal Drive for :nnbral Rightness? 
Considerations such as those in the foregoing 
section have led to considerable discussion concerning 
the moral nature of man. This question is important to 
the problem of moral laws in that upon. the answer one 
finds most satisfactory must hinge the further question: 
11
.Are so-called moral laws a design for fulfilment of 
potentialities without which the person could never be 
Whole, or are they simply prescribed adaptations to the 
peculiarities of a given culture?" 
MUch discussion of man's moral nature has centered 
around the question of a drive for moral rightness. 
Drive has been defined previously43 as an investment of 
energy in quest of realization of certain autonomous and 
teleological potentialities. Contemporary discussion 
does not present a clear·cut answer to the question of 
43. Cf. Chapter Eight; this dissertation. 
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whether there is such a specific investment of energy in 
.·• 
quest of moral rightness. .Answers given dependt in part, 
~ ' . . . - .. .. - . .. . . - . 
'tlPon_ ~he toital phi_lC?sophy of pe_r_sc;>nali_~Y and m_orali ty 
within Vlihich the answer is framed. Let us take up, in 
turn, several representative positions. 
1.. The Freudian Interpretation. 
It is quite clear that within the widely accepted 
Freu_<l.-i_an interpretation there_ is no ?asia for postulating 
the existence of such a drive. Here, morality is the 
assimilated feeling of compulsion to obey the commands 
of parents and other conditioning elements in the social 
environment. Without such compulsions; there would be 
- - -· 
no development of moral experience~ and no void in the 
personality because of its absence. 
2. Other Views. 
But what is the likelihood of a drive for moral 
rightness within other philosophies and psychologies? 
Here there is no single answer. 
A. Gordon w • .Allport, one of the leading person .. 
alistic psyChologists, regards as inadequate all explana-
tions of human behavior and development in terms of ulti-
. . . - . 
mate drives, motives, or instincts. He feels that suCh 
concepts fail to do justice to the individuality of per-
sonality and to the emergence of new motivational factors 
in the process of development. 44 He feels that emphasis 
44. Cf. Allport, PER., Chap. VII; Art. (1940). 
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on his principle of functional autonomy of motives is 
-·- . , 
closer to the facts than is any discussion of propensities, 
.... ·- ... , ... 
drives, or instincts. 45 
.. . . . . . . ~ . - . ' - - - . - -· . . 
3. Erich Fromm, a_n_e~~SY?h_oanalyst, cle~_r_?..;r._ recogniz-
es that morality is something far more fundamental in na-
ture than the ~rthodox ~eudi~ account suggests. Charac-
teristic of several pages of discussion from Man for Him-
self is the following: 
____. ..... 
I have written this book with the intention-of re-
affirming the validity of humanistic ethics; to 
-show that our knowledge of human nature- does not 
lead to ethical rela.tivi sm but, on the contrary, 
to the conviction that the sources of norms for 
ethical conduct are to_ be fOund in man •s nature 
itself; that m:oral norms are based upon man's in-
herent qualities, and that their violatio-n results 
in mental and emotional disintegration.46 
Fromm finds this nature of man, which is basically moral, 
fulfilled in a personality orientation which is pre-
dominantly organized around productive work and love 
for other persons. 47 Yet Fromm does not discuss the problem 
of a moral drive specifically, and one is thus left to 
conjecture as to whether his view would entail such a 
drive, or whether fulfilment of the moral nature is con--
other more specific ttorientations. 
11 
tingent upon 
c. Karen Horney, Whose views were developed from 
psychoanalytic beginnings, differs irreconcilably with 
Freud on the nature of morality. She regards the develop-
45. 
46. 
47. 
df. Cfiap. jOur, Sections I and v, this Dissertation. 
Fromm, :MFH, 7 • s t · I Cf'. Ibid., Chap. IV. Cf. also Chap. Six, ec J.on ' 
this dissertation. 
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ment of a super-ego as a neurotic condition, stemming 
from some felt need to appear perfect to others. 48 
The super-ego.is a sham mor~li'o/, leaving the real 
moral problems of man unsolved. She includes a realis.~ 
tic and adequate morality among the goals of therapy,49 
leaving the impression tbat she might agree with Fromm 
that there is a moral nature to be fulfilled. But on 
the subject of whether or not there is a drive for moral 
rightness as such, or whether moral problems arise 
secondarily in problems of social adjustment, She is 
consistent with the majority of contemporary discussion 
on the subject in saying nothing. 
D. Peter A. Bertocci subscribes to muCh in McDougall's 
instinct psyahology, and is especially critical of All-
port's principle of functional autonomy. 50 He feels 
that there is evidence for teleological unfolding in 
personality, and that such purposiveness cannot be ac-
counted for except as personality is recognized as ful-
filling definite innate capacities, with the motivation-
al power being supplied by drives for such fulfilment. 
One might, therefore, be rather surprised to find him 
cautious in asserting a drive for morality. In discus-
sing this point in his "Reinterpretation of Moral Obli-
gation, n he wri tea: 
48. Cf. Horney;-NWP, 207ff. 
49. Cf. Horney, OIC, 217-243. 
50. Bertocci, Art.(l940). 
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If ·it- were ·a relatively independent drive for··a. 
specific type' of sa tisfaotion; like. the. drives, 
hunger, sex·, curioSity, ·or sociality, it would 
have been recognized more easily. As ·it is; -it 
seems to be a demand for quality· of· ·e-?_t:preasion 
among existing abilities and drives.51 
., ... - ·'. 
This classification of moral experience as a "demand for 
quali t:y _among existing drives" rather than a ~ecifi_c 
drive in ita own r-ight is hardly what would have been 
. . 
expected after he had insisted :previously that oughting 
. . " -
is a unique form of experience just_ as "sensing, emoting, 
-. . ~ ' . 
remembering, thinking and feeling.u52 Indeed, Bertocci 
. - . - . 
neglect.s to clarify just howthese two apparently incom-
patible ideas are reconciled. The :point of reconcilia-
tion would seem to be recognition of the fact that while 
moral rightness is not an experience which can be sought 
for ita own sake as distinct from all other experience, 
still that ~uality in other specific satisfactions does 
:produce the unique experience of morality. More of this 
later. 
E. One of the moat recent atudi es of the :problem of 
moral obligation was made by Hans Reiner in his P!licht 
und Neigung (~ty and Inclinati~). His work takes the 
form of a compara ti·ve di acusaion of the views of Immanuel 
Kant and Friedrich von Schiller on the foundations of 
morality. Reiner examines the two systems, noting points 
5!. Bertocci,tlrt.)l945, 280. 
52. Ibid., 276. 
of similarity and contrast,53 and then presents his own 
conclusions on the question. He finds that moral obliga-
tion arises with the recognition of values, and is direct-
ed toward the achievement of these values.54 As values 
are "felt n in two forms, yerantwortrmgsgefiih;!;, and Eb.rgefUhl, 
mora.li ty is given two qualities. Value perceived a.s 
y~ran~wortungsgefUh,! is the basis of Kant's conception of' 
moral laws as a priori forms of thought, commanding obedi-
!:.~· Value as Ehrgefu~ elicits a. "feeling of honor,« or, 
of self-reap ect, and issues in a vol.un~_rz_ moral will, a. 
readiness to do the right entirely apart from any command. 55 
These two forms of value perception are not at all opposed, 
but supplement one another in accounting for the recogni-
tion of moral laws and for the motivation to fulfil them. 56 
Reiner thus attempts to show that both reason and inclina-
tion are present in moral experience. The inclination, 
that is the voluntary moral will, does not appear to be so 
mudh an innate drive, however, as a new form of motivation 
•• When value is perceived as ~rgeftihl. This is not far 
from Allport's concept of the autonomy of motives as ap-
plied to motivation for moral experience. 
5g:-
54. 
55. 
56. 
Cf. Reiner, 
Ibid., 243. 
Ibid., 244. 
Loa. Cit. 
PN, 15-111. 
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This selection from contemporary discussion of 
the problem of a drive for mor.al r.ightness could be ex-
panded, but with little purpose. The same diversity of 
opinion and inconclusiveness would prevail. Whatever 
psychological data are relevant to the problem fail to 
point to any conclusion which is coercive in its logic, 
except that the Freudian view is inadequate. 
Perhaps the general inconcJusiveness of discus-
sions concerning a drive for moral rightness persists 
because this is a question ~ich can be dealt with only 
within the framework· .. of a total philosophy of personali-
ty. Data which of themselves do not suggest clear-cut 
conclusions often become more meaningful within the frame-
work of a broader interpretation. How, for instance, 
does a possible drive for mor.al rightness (whether in-
nate or acquired) fare within the philosophy of person-
ality developed in the preceeding chapter of this dis-
sertation? 
\3). Ex:peri ence o:f Moral Rightness a Teleological Need. 
The philosophy of personality developed in this 
investigation does have some implications for the moral 
nature of man. These implications need to be clarified 
for the sake of future research on the problem of deriv-
ing moxal laws from psychological data. 
Much ~bout man suggests a need for moral right-
--
ness. The very persistence of the human search for ade-
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quate answers to moral problems is evidence of the reali-
ty of such ~ need. Even poorly conceived and inadequate 
attempts to deal with moral ~uestions testify to the reali-
ty of the need itself, and to the difficulty in satisfying 
it. So, too, do the incredible rationalizations of faulty 
personal and social morals; and again, the many personal 
maladjustments which result from unresolved moral prob~ems. 
Indeed, the whole structure of society and the wholeso~e 
integration of individual personalities depend upon a 
high degree of constant quality in moral choices. Nature 
seems certainly to be set against the irrationalities and 
contradictions of the immoral personality. And since all 
persons ~make choices involving foreseeable conse-
quences for values, it is impossible to be always morally 
neutral. The experience of moral rightness is a teleo-
logical need whose ramifications reach into nearly every 
other possible form of exp erienae. 
Yet, as has been brought out repeatedly, moral 
rightness is not an experience which can be productively 
sought for its own sake. There is not in the awareness 
of obligation a. d.emand for mo:ral rightness ~er se.. .An 
erroneous supposition that such is the case vms perhaps 
one factor in Kant's expectation of being able to formu-
late specific ~ priori moral laws. Rather than feeling 
obligation to an abstract duty, one always feels obligated 
to make the best spe~fic choices in s,Pecif~!_~tio~. 
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It is necessary, therefore to deny the reality of a ~eci­
fic ·arive for moral rightness as distinct from other drives. 
It remains true that the fulfilment of obligation to ~eei­
fic best choices produces a unique experience of moral 
rightness not contained in any of the direct effects of 
such choices. Thus moral rightness is a real teleological 
need, of both diversified and ~ecific nature. But there 
is no distinct drive for the teleological need, for it is 
an experience which cannot be 'firi ven" :for. One may ful-
fil the need for moral rightness only as one seeks the 
highest possible quality in satisfaction o:f drives which 
are distinct. This, it would appear, is simdlar to ~t 
Bertocci had in mind in asserting the unique irreducibili-
ty of moral exp erie nee while denying a distinc~ moral 
drive. The Uniqueness of moral experience combined with 
the undi a co vera bili ty of a di stinat moral drive may well 
account as well for much of the ambiguity of contemporary 
discussion of the subject. 
The comprehensiveness of the position here pre-
sen ted is attested by the fact tba t it preserves the 
eminent significance of morality achieved in such systems 
as those of Thomas Aquinas or of Kant, while at the 
same time it is compatible with contemporary empirical 
studies of personality. 57 
5?. For an earlier treatment in which need :for moral 
rightness was regarding as constituting a distinct 
drive, Cf. Bender, POL, 57-60. Without the distinc-
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V) How Is Regard for Consequences Related to the EX:p eri-
ence of Moral Obligation 1 
This question has been answered already in the 
analysis of the experience of moral obligation, though it 
may be well now to make that answer quite specific. An 
experience of moral obligation is a demand made on the per-
son by himself that he will the best he knows in specific 
circumstances. :But the good will cannot function in a 
vacuum, nor be directed toward a meaningless abstraction. 
The good, or the best one knows, is some one or more of 
the possible consequences of acting. As was shown in 
.. -
58 Chapter 1rQ:tl.r~;, even Kant 'a attempt at a wholly ~iori 
system did not escape consideration of consequences at 
the point where 11duty for duty's sake" had to be given 
meaningful content. 
Merely fortunate or unfortunate consequences do 
not determine the morality of the choices and the acts 
leading to those consequences. :But choice~ of conse-
quences believed to be entailed by certain acts, and acta 
in conformity with those choices, are either moral or im~ 
moral. On~e again, . then·, to experience moral obliga tian 
is to be aware of .;. expecting oneself to will consequences 
believed to be best in those circumstances. 
57. tiona developed above, moral rightness would yet 
need to be thought of in the frame of the earlier 
discussion. 
58. See Section III, 2, G, (vii). 
VI. 'What is the Relation of Values to Moral laws? 
Values are those fulfilments of potentialities 
referred to above; values, more concisely, are need-
satisfactions. 
Throughout the analysis of moral obligation as an 
experience, it was necessary to refer to ttthe good" or 1tthe 
best 11 without defining these terms and without suggesting 
how they might be determined. Yet the answers were par-
tially implicit in the recognition that one part of moral 
experience is a striving for quality in all need satisfac-
tions. "The best" in any situation is that form of need-
satisfaction which most completely fulfils the teleologi-
cal paten tiali ties and the autonomous potentialities which 
are coherent with them. ttTb,e best, 11 therefore, is what 
is most valuable among the possibilities. What has al-
ready been said about value saves that statement from be-
ing tautologous. ''The moral obligation is not to an abso-
lute best, but to the best ~s understood, however inade-
quately. Yet, as has been shown, one's best involves 
one's best effort to understand the best. Tb.us, while no 
particular theory of value is implied by the fact of moral 
obligation, some value theory is implied~ as a system of 
--
understanding the best to which one is obligated. 
In Chapter Three moral laws were defined as "con-
stant verifiable genetic relevance between choices and 
foreseeable consequences for values. n59 fb.e further 
59. See Sect ion I. 
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search for moral laws thus involves, first, an attempt 
to understand as well as possible "the best 11 to which one 
is morally obligated, that is to say, a comprehensive and 
coherent understanding of values. The search for moral 
laws involves, secondly, an effort to determine to what 
extent those values a.ctual~y may be achieved, preserved, 
or destroyed, by the choices to Which one feels morally 
obligated. 
CHAPTER TEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
I. Brief Summary. 1 
The present investigation has establiShed the philo-
sophical ~oundness of deriving moral law~ fr~m psycholog-
ical data, and has defined both possibilities and limita-
tions in the use of such data. The understanding of moral 
laws set forth in Chapter Three, is, of course, presup-
posed: constant, genetic relevance between choices and 
foreseeable effects upon values. As noted, such laws 
would be self-obligatory upon persons respecting reason, 
and might or might not imply a Moral Legislator respons-
ible for such reievance. This last is a metaphysical 
question lying outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Wholly rationalistic approaches were shown to be 
void of helpful insights before real-life moral pro-
blems, while the empirical approach was found e~ecial­
ly fruitful. Objections to empirical approaches were 
considered and found to be both fallacious and inapplic-
able. 
While psychological data are not the only applic-
able information derivable by empirical study, they are 
of spegial relevance because they deal with thought and 
behavior of persons. Whatever else moral obligation may 
1. See AbStract, following, for a more detailed summary. 
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or ma.y not be, it concerns some human thought and be-
havior. Psychological studies therefore produce the 
. . . . . ..- - ~ . - . 
most relevant data, both concerning moral experience and 
concerning moral laws as defined here. 
It is not claimed that the descriptive informa-
tion provided by psychological studies constitute moral 
-- - . -
laws. In fact, this idea is ~ecifically denied. Rather, 
it is held that a rational ought-to-be is among the ~os­
sibili ties of human thought and action, distinguishable 
- . . . 
from what merely~ by measurement against some criterion. 
Yet expanding inf~rmation about ~at i! broadens insight 
as to what may b~.' thus providing data for the formula-
tion of a rational ought-to-be. A rational standard 
thus enlightened is protected both against expecting 
the impossible and against too-easy satisfaction with 
inadequate standards. Criteria necessary to the evalua-
tion of psychological data are not contained as such in 
the data themselves. Thus derivation of specific moral 
laws must be prefaced by the development of a theory o:t 
values. 
Persons are shown to be more or less integrated 
configurations of socio-psycho-physical energies, con-
stantly thrusting for fulfilment of potentialities. 
T.his, in briefest possible form, is the net product of 
a discussion which was indispensable to any further in-
vestigation, but which seemed at times to lead us far 
from problems of ethics. 
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Among the potentialities of personality is the experi-
ence of moral obligation. This was found to be a demand 
persons make on themselves to choose the understood best 
- . 
in each situation involving choices and values. The 
content of one's understanding of the best is conditioned 
by society, and will be as individual and as socialized 
as is the person. Yet moral obligation to the best as 
understood is not merely an internalization of society's 
pressures. Rather, moral expectancy is one of the po .. 
tentialities for which persons seek satisfaction. SUch 
satisfaction, while not confined to any clearly defined 
area of experience, brings a new g,uali t;y of experience 
not otherwise achievable. As noted, psychological data, 
especially those provided by work in mental hygiene, 
psychiatric treatment, and personal counseling, can be 
very helpful in identifying genetic relevance between 
choices and consequences. 
II. Conclusions. 
The following conclusions are warranted by this 
investigation: 
1. The abstraction and inadequacy of non-empirical 
approaches to real-life moral problems strongly implies 
an urgent necessity to investigate eliLJ?irical approaches. 
2. Psychological data itay be utilized (as specified 
in 3 and 4, below) for the derivation of moral laws de-
fined as constant, verifiable, genetic relevance between 
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choices and foreseeable consequences in values. 
3. The important contributions of psychological data 
are·: (a) broader knowledge of possibilities in mental 
and physical behavior of persons, which affords rational 
grounds for the· ought-to-be; and (b) help in clarifying 
the nature of moral choices and their relations to values. 
4. Thus (following 3) 1 while actual derivation of 
moral. laws involves evaluations which~ as such~ ara not 
cont~ined in psychological data, any valid axiological 
criteria must take account of the information such data 
afford concerning the experiences of persons. Hence 
psychological data contribute even to the criteria where-
by they must be; e.valuate:d in the formulation. of moral laws. 
5. All mental phenomena must be accounted for within 
the activities of consciousness, though the so-called 
uunaonsciousn suggests new dimensions of consciousness. 
6. Persons must be regarded as more or less integrat-
e:d systems of sooio.-.psycho-physical energy 1 characterized 
by constant deve~opment, as satisfactions for teleological 
and autonomous potential! ties are sought·. 
7. wndle there is no distinct drive for moral right~ 
ness, it is a distinct teleological need:: of both diver-
sified and specific nature, achievable. only through high-
est possible quality in satisfaction of other potentiali~ 
ties .. Capacity for moral rightness can be conditioned, 
but not created.t by the impact of society,; 
a. This investigation implies further studies, both 
philosophical and scientific, as additional necessary 
steps toward derivation of specific moral laws .. 
III. Implications for Further Study. 
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This investigation has been strictly a consideration 
of prolegomena, from which clear implications for further 
study have emerged. These studiest when pursued, promise 
to lead to the formulation of specific moral laws. 
1. The Necessity of a Theory of Values. 
Moral obligation propels us to seek the best, and 
implies the obligation to understand the best, in so far 
as possible. Thus, before moral laws can be derived from 
psychological data, a theory of value. must be established. 
This 1 clearlyt is the next step implied by the present in-
vestigation. Values must be defined, classified, and veri= 
fied. Psychological data will be of great assistance at 
this point. 
Of paramount importance will be the questions 11 Is 
there evidence that some axperiences are valuable to all 
persons? 11 ; in other words 2 11Are there universal values? 11 
Upon the answer to that question the entire search for 
moral laws must hinge. If no values are universal, thera 
can be no universality of obligation, and thus no moral 
laws as here defined. 
Following closely upon the heels of the previous 
question will be the further one: "How may universality 
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and ind.i vi duality in value experience be reconcilled~:" 
Again, there must be a clear-cut method for iden-
tifying value experience among psychological data. 
2. The Logic. 
Once foregoing questions have been dealt with, at-
tention must be given to applicable logic. 
A. The heretofore implied criterion for moral 
rightness must be clearly stated. 
B. Its use in the formulation of moral laws must 
be specified. 
c. Tb.e applicability of scientific method must 
be considered in direct relation to the formulation of 
moral laws. 
D. Hypotheses for universal moral laws must be 
developed. Such hypotheses might either be deduced 
from the criterion, or might be suggested by persistent 
cause-effect pa. tterns among psychological data. 
E. These hypotheses must be checked, logically 
and empirically, with a view to verification or rejec-
tion. 
F. Universality of moral laws must be recon-
. . 
oiled< with the individuality of moral experience. 
3. Accumulation and Classification of Data. 
At long last it would now be possible to turn to 
methodological questions having to do with the accumula-
tion and classification of data. It would hardly be pos-
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sible to deal with methodology ahead of the foregoing 
questions, for only at this point can there be many 
. . .. . . - . . ~ - ~ ~ ; 
clues as to What data are relevant. Now, however, 
there must be techniques for bringing relevant data to-
gether, classifying them according to some scheme best 
. - . . 
calculated to bring out genetic relevance between ~hoices 
and effects on values, and relating them to specific hy-
. -·· - -. - . 
po~eses. This is no small problem, but, in this day 
When the accumulation and classification of data is one 
of our greatest industries, it by no means requires the 
pioneering effort of some of the preceeding questions. 
4. .A;p:plica tion. 
Finally, there will be almost limitless opportuni-
ties to apply the philosophy, the logic, and the methodo-
logy of deriving moral laws from psychological data to 
personal and social moral problems. Here our knowledge 
of the nature of the energy called personality will be 
of inestimable value. SUch fields as mental hygiene, 
personal counseling, and social planning will bear a dy-
namic reciprocal relationShip to the work of deriving 
moral laws, providing data, and gaining new perspectives 
for enriching their contributions. Morality can be 
freed from the strait jackets of blind obedience and 
outmoded tradition ori the one hand, and from the stif.J · 
ling morass of chartless relativism on the other. Yet 
moral laws so. derived will not be coercive; indeed, if 
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they were, they would not be moral. ~ose who will seek 
to understand and observe such moral laws will be only 
those persons sufficiently mature and mentally healthy to 
love the Right because it is Right; in Short, those whose 
- .. ~. -- . . - ··-- . . .. - . ~·· .. . . - . 
deep-seated demand for quality in personal experience has 
found genuine satisfactionw 
265 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
and Science of Man as a Foundation of Ethics 
University of Chicago Press, 19 o. 
Adrian, o. M.--Art. (1950) 
"What Happens When We Think.n 
Laslett(ed.), PBM, 5-ll. 
Aiken, Henry D.(ed.)--BMPP 
Hume 1 s Moral and Political Philoso 
ew Nork: Hafner Classics, 19 
Alexander, Franz.--FOP 
Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis. 
New York: w. W. Norton Co., 1948. 
------OAU 
OUr Age of Unreason. 
New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1942. 
------and Thomas M. French and Others--PT 
Psychoana~ytic Therapy. __ 
New York: The Ronald Press, 1946. 
Allport, Gordon W~--NP 
T.he Nature of Personality. 
·cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, Inc., 1950. 
------Art. (1947) . 
"Scientific Models & Human Morals." 
Psych. Rev., 54(1947), 182-192. See Allport, NP. 
---. ............ pER 
Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. 
New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1937. 
------Art.(l95l) 
nA Psychological Approach to Love and Hate." 
Sorokin, EALB. 
Aristotle.--Met. 
Metaphysics, (tr. Hugh Tredennick). 
New York: G. P. Putnam•s Sons,· (1933)1935. 
-------NE: The NicomaBb.ean Ethics, (tr. H. Raekb.am). 
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1926. 
Ayer~ Alfred J.--LTL 
Language, Truth, and Logic. ' 
New York: Oxford University Press~ 1936. 
Bakewell, Charles M.(ed.)--SAP 
Sourcebook in Ancient Philoso h • 
New York: cribnerst ons, (1907)1939. 
Beck, Lewis W.(ed. & tr.)--CPrR 
Critique of Practical Reason and Oth!:Jr Writings in 
Moral P.hilos~hy. 
Chicago: U~~ersity of Chicago Press, 1949. 
~entbam, Jeremy.--FOG 
Fragment on Government. 
Halevy~ Elie, GPR. 
------IPML 
266 
Introduction to Princi les of Morals and Le islation. 
New York: Hafner Pub. Co., 19 .• 
Bender, Richard N.--POL 
A Philosophy of Life. 
New York: Philosophical Library, Inc.~ 1949. 
ion. 
Human Knowled e • 
• 
Bertocci, Peter.--Art.(l940) 
11A Critique of G. W. Allportts Theory of Motivation.n 
.Psych. Rev., 47 (1940), 501-532. 
------Art.(l946) 
nPersonali ty. n 
He.rriman(ed.), EOP, 425-477. 
------Art.(l945) 
nA Reinte:r?pretation of Moral Obligation. n 
Phil. P.hen. Res., 6(1945), 270-283. 
Blake, R. R., and G. V. Rrunsey.--PAP 
Perce tion: An A roach to Personalit • 
New York: Ronald Press, 19 o. 
Bowne, Borden Parker.--MET 
Metaphysics. 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1882. 
------PER 
Personalism. 
Boston: Houghton Mi~~lin Go., 1908. 
267 
Bretall, Robert(ed.)--KA 
A Kierkegaard Antholo~. 
Princeton, N. J".: Prnceton University Press, 19L~7. 
Brightman, Edgar S.--ITP (rev.) 
An Introduction to Philosophy, 2nd ed. (rev.) 
New York: Henry Holt & Go.; (1929)1951 
____ :__ML 
Moral Laws • 
New York: The Abingdon Press, 1933. 
------Art.(1951) 
"Personalistic Metaphysics of the Sel~: its Distinctive 
Features." 
W. R. Inge(ed.), RGSP. 
------POR 
A Philosophy o~ Religion. 
Ne1.v York: Prentice-Hall, 1941 • 
.... -----"""RV 
Religious Values. 
New York: The Abingdon Press, 1925. 
Brill, A. A.(ed.)--BWSF 
T.he Basic writings o~ Si~d Freud. 
New York: Random Rouse~e Modern Library), 1938. 
Brosnahan, T. J.--PTE 
Prolemomena to Ethics. 
Fordhrun Universl ty Press. 
268 
Buckham~ J. w.--Art. (1940) 
"What Has Psychology Done to Us: Supplanted Ethics.n 
School and Soc.~ 57(1940), 1171-1172. 
Burtt~ Arthur E.--RT 
Right Thinking. 
New York: Harper Bros. • 1946. 
Cameron, Norman A. and Ann Margaret.--BP 
Behavior Pathology. · 
Boston: Houghton Mi.ff'1in Co., 1947 .. 
o.f Self-realization. 
Gannon, W. B.--BG 
Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage, 2nd. ed. 
New York: Appleton Go., 1929. 
Gar.michael,·Leonard.--Art.(1940) 
uThe Physiological Correlates o:f Intelligence.n 
· Whipple (ed.), INN~ 93-158. · 
G~ap, Rudol.f.--PLS 
Philosophy and Logical syntax. 
London: K~gan Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co., Ltd., 1935 ... 
------US 
The Unity o.f Science. 
· London: Kega:n Paul, Trench~ Trubner, and Go., Ltd., 1934. 
Gasser+~, J. V. L.--~!MSS 
Morals and Man in the Social Sciences. 
New York: Longmans~ Green~ and Go., 1951. 
Chubb, L. W.--WWA 
The Wor1d.Within the Atom. 
Pittsburgh: School Service~ Westinghouse Eleo. Gorp., 1946. 
Conklin, E. G.--Art.(l939) 
"Does Science Aff'ord a Baais:tw Ethics?» 
Sci. Mo., 49(1939)~ 295-303. · 
Democritus--Fragments. 
"The Fragments of Democritus.n 
Bakewell(ed.), SBAP, 59-65. 
Dennis, Wayne ( ed. )-RHP 
Readings in the History of Psychology. 
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1948. 
Deploige, Simon.--CES 
Conflict between Ethics and Sociology, (tr. Charles 
C. Miller). 
New York: Herder Publishing Co., 1938. 
Dercum, .Francis x.-POM 
The Physiology of Mind. 
Philadelphia: W.B.Saunders Co. 1 1925. 
' Descartes, Rene.-~MED Meditations. 
Haldane and Ross(trs.), PWD. 
Dewey, John.--QFC 
The Quest for Certainty. 
New York: Minton, Balch, and Co., 1929. 
DeWolf 1 L. Harold.--Art •. (l952) 
269 
~.Personalistic Re-examination of the Mind-Body Problem." 
Awaiting publication in The Personalist. 
---RRAR 
The Religious Revolt Against Reason. 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. 
Dollard, John and N.E.Miller.--PAP 
Personality and .. Psycho therapy. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, Co. 1 1950. 
Drake, Durant.~PC 
Problems of Conduct. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1 1921. 
Dunbar, Flanders.-SPDT 
Synopsis of Psychosomatic Diagnosis and Treatment. 
St. Louis: The O.V.Mosby Co., 1948. 
Einstein, Alfred, and L. Infeld.~EOP 
The Evolution of Physics. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1938. 
Eby, Louise Saxe.--QML 
The Quest for Moral Law. 
New York: Columbia Uhiversity Press, 1944. 
EVerett, Walter Goodnow.--MV 
Moral Values. 
New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1918. 
Fairbairn, W. R. D.--Art. (1949) 
"An Object-Relations T.heory of Personality." 
Brit. Jour. Med. Psych., 22(1949), 26-31. 
Falk, W. D.-~Art.(l950) 
nMorali ty and Nature. u 
The Australasian Jour. Phil., 28(1950), 69-92. 
Fodor, Nandor, and Frank Gaynor.--FDP 
Freud: Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. 
New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1950. 
270 
Freud, Sigmund.--BWSF 
The Basic Writings of' Sigmund Freud, {Tr>. and ed. A. A. 
Brill). 
New York: T.he Modern Library, 1938 • 
... -----CP 
Collected Papers, (tr. Joan Riviere). 
New York: !fhe Ih.ternational PsyOb.oanalytie Press, 1924 • 
............ _ ....... Er 
The Ego and the I4, (tr. Joan Riviere). 
London: The Hogarth Press, Ltd., (1927)1949. 
------GIP 
A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, ( tr. G. Stanley 
Hall) • · 
New York: Boni and Liveright, (1920)1935. 
------IOD 
T.he Inte~retation of Dreruns. 
Brill(e ~), BWSF, 181-549. 
------NILP 
New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, (tr. W. J. H. 
Sprott). 
New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1933. 
------OPA 
An OUtline of' Psychoanal!sis, (tr. Ja:m.es Stra.chey, 1st ed.). 
New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1949. 
Freud, Sigmund.--PEL 
Psycho1athology of Eve~yday Life. 
Brill ed.), BWSF, 35-178. 
------TAT 
Tot~ and Taboo. 
Brill(ed.),·BVISF, 807-930. 
------Art.(l938) . 
ttThe Transformation of Puberty .n 
Bril1(ed.) BWSF, 6.04-629. 
Fromm, Erich.--EFF 
Escape from Freedom. 
New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 194J.. 
_..,._ ... _ ... lVIF'H 
Man for B±mself. 
New York: Rinehart, 1947. 
Geiger, G • R.--TOE -
Toward an Objective· Ethics. 
New York: Antioch Press, 1938. 
Gesell, Arnold L.--WCHC 
Wolf Child and Human Child. 
Nevv York: Harper &: Bros., 194J.. 
Gittler, J. B.--Art.(194J.) 
nscience and Morals.n 
Sci. Mo., 53(1941), 371-373. 
Goldstein, Kurt.--ORG 
The Organism, (tr. Lashley). 
New York: Americ~~ Book Go., 1939. 
Green, T. H.--PE 
Prolegomena to Ethics. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890. 
Gurvitch, George.~ ... Art. (1943) 
"Is Moral Philosophy a Normative Theory?" 
Jour. Phil., 4o, 6(1943), 141-148. -
Hadfield, J. A.--PAM 
Psychology and Morals, 15th ed. 
London: Methuen, (1925)1949 .. 
271 
272 
Ralevy, Elie.--GPR 
The Growth o:f Philosophical Radicalism, (tr. Mary M?rris). 
London: Waber and Gwyer, Ltd., 1928. 
Halliday, James L.--PM 
Psychosocial Medicine. 
New York: W. W. Norton & Go., Inc., 1948. 
Harriman, Phillip L.(ed.)--EOP 
Encyclopedia o:f Psychology. . 
New York: Citadel Press, 1946. 
Hartmann, Nicolai.--ETH 
Ethics, (tr. S-Ooit). 
New York: The Macmdllan Go., 1932. 
Heard, Gerald.--Art. (1945) 
"Need tor Idoral Research. n 
Chris. Gent., 62(1945), 929-931. 
Hobbes, Thomas,-~LEV 
Leviathan. 
London: Dent Publishing Go., 1928. 
Hobhouse, L. T.--RG 
T.he Rational Good. 
New York: Henry Holt & Go., 1921. 
Hobhouse, Leonard.--MIE 
Morals in Evolution. 
New York: Henry Holt & Go., 1915. 
Hollingsworth, Harry Levi.--PE 
Psychology and Ethics. 
New York: Ronald Press Go., 1949. 
Rol t 1 Edwin B. and Others.--llR 
T.he New Realism. 
New York: The Macmillan Go., l912. 
Horney, Karen.--NHG 
Neurosis and HUman Growth. 
New York: W. w. Norton Go., 1950. 
Horney, Karen.--NRG 
Neurosis and Human Growth. 
New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1950. 
---... --oro 
OUr Inner ConTlicts. 
New York: w. W. Norton and Co., 1945. 
BUme, David.--EHU 
En§uiry Coneernin~ the HUman Understanding. (e • L. I. Selby-~gge) 2rid. ed. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902. 
Goncernin the Princi les of Morals, 
1902 • 
... - .... --THN' 
A Treatise of Human Nature, (eds. T. H. Green and 
T. H. Giuse). 
New York: Longmans, Green & Go., 1898. 
Inge, W. R.(6d.)--RGSP 
Radakrishnan: Com arative Studies in Philoso 
London: Allen & Unwin, 19 1. 
Jrunes, William.--POP 
.Principles o~ Psychology. 
New York: Henry Holt, 1890. 
Jolmson, Paul E.--Art. (1952) 
"Margins o~ Consciousness." 
Awaiting Publication. 
Jung, Carl.--IOP 
The Integration o~ Personality, (tr. S. Dell). 
London: Kagan and Paul, 1940: 
Kant, Lmmanuel.--CPrR 
Critirue o~ Practical Reason. 
Beckljr. and ed. ) , CPrR, 118-260. 
-------CPR 
Critique o~ Pure Reason, (tr. N. K. Smith). 
London: Macmillan and Co., ~929. 
sics o:f Morals. 
0-117. 
• 
273 
Kant, Immanuel--MOM 
Metaphysics of Morals (selections). 
Beck(tr. and ed.), CPrR, 351-357. 
-----NTM 
Natural Theology and Morals. 
Beck(Tr. and ed.), CPrR, 261-285. 
Kierkegaard, Soren Aabye.--FT 
Fear and Trembling, (tr. Walter Lowrie). 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945. 
-----KA 
A Kierkegaard Anthology, (ed. Robt. Bretall). 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947. 
Kinsey, Alfred c. and Others.--SBHM 
Sexual Behavior in the Human Male. 
Philadelphia: W.B.Saunders Co., 1948. 
Kohler 1 w.-DP 
Dynamics in Psychology. 
New York: Liveright Publishing Co., 1940. 
Kretschmer, E.-PAC 
Physique and Character. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace,. and Co., 1925. 
Kuhn,: Helmut .--EWN 
Encounter with Nothingness. 
Hinsdale, Ill: H. Regnery Co. 1 1949. 
Kunkel 1. Fritz ·--ISM In Search of Maturity. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. 
Lamont, Corliss.--IOI 
·The Illusion of Immortality. 
New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1935. 
Lamontt w. D.---PMJ 
Principles of Moral Judgment. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946. 
Laslett, Peter(ed.)--PBM 
Th~ PhySical Basis of Mind. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1 .1950. 
274 
Lasswell, Harold H.--Art.(l941) 
"Psychology Looks at Morals and Politics." 
Ethics, 3(1941), 325-336. -
Lecky, William Edward Hartpole .--HEM 
History of European Morals. 
London: Watts and Co., 1946 •. 
Leibniz, Gottfried, Wi:hhelm von.--LM 
L~~onadologie, (tr. J. E. Erdmann). 
English translation by W. T. Harris, Jour. Spec. 
~·, i (1867), 129-137. (See Rand, IvlCP.) 
Lepley, Ray.--vov 
The Verifiability of Value. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. 
275 
Lewin, Kurt~--FTSS 
Field Theory in Social Science, (ed. Darwin Cartwright). 
New York: Harper and Bros., 195J.. 
------RSC 
h.Resolving Social Con:f'licts. 
New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. 
Lippitt, Ronald.--TCR 
Training in Community Relations. 
New York: Harper and Bros., 1950. 
Lotze, Her.man.--1fic 
Miorocosm.us, ( trB:" Elizabeth Hamil ton and E. E. Constance), 
4th ed. 
New York: Chas. Scribnerfs Sons, 1894· 
Lucretius.-- EXtracts. 
"Extracts of Lucretius .. n 
Bakewell(ed.), 305-316. 
Lurie, L. A.--Art.(l938) 
nEndocrino1ogy and the Understanding and Treatment 
of the Ebtoeptional Child.n 
Jour. Amer. Med. Asso., 110(1938), 1531-1536. 
Masser.man, Jules.--PDP 
Principles of ;Dyp.am.ic Psychiat~. 
Philadelphia: W. E. Saunders ~., 1946. 
McConnell, R. A.--Art.(l947) 
"A Physicist· Looks a.t Morality." 
Sci. Mo., 64(1947), 61-62. 
McDaniels, Laurence H.--Art.(19~) 
"some Social Implications of the Scientific Method.fl 
Science, 84(1941), 243-248. 
McDougall, Willi~.--CCL 
Character and the Conduct of Life. 
New York: G. P. PUtn~l s Sons, 1927. 
_ ......... - .. QP 
Outline of Psychology. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924. 
Meikeljobn, Alexa.nder.--IAO 
Inclinations and Obligations. 
University of California Press, 1948. 
Melden, A. I.--Art.(l948) 
nOn the Method of Ethics.n 
Jour. Phil., 45, 7(1948), 169-181. 
Menninger, Karl.--LAH 
Love Against Hate 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1942. 
--~---MAH Man Against Himself. 
New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1938. 
276 
Government • 
Miller, J. G.{ed.)--ESP 
Ex eriments in Social Process. 
~lew York: McGraw-Hill, 19 o. 
Moreno, J. L.--PSY 
Psychodrama. 
New York: The Ronald Press, 1950. 
• 
amics. 
Muelder, Walter G.--Art.(l951) 
nNorms and Valuation in Social Science." 
Wilder ( ed. ) , LLR. 
Mukerjee, Radhaprunal.--Art.(l950) 
nA BioSocial Approach to Morals." 
Eth., 3(1950), 178-187. 
Muller, Ma.x.--BW 
Bio~aph2es of Words. 
pa=fisher not kriow.n to this writer, (1888). 
277 
MUllahy, Patrick.--Art.(l947) 
ttpsychiatric and Psrchological Contributions to Ethics.n 
Jour. Phil., 44(1947), 380-391. 
J1£Urphy, Gardner.--PBA 
Persona1it : A Biosocial A roach. 
New York: Harper and Bros., 
MYers, Philip Van Ness.--HPE 
History as Past Ethics. 
New York: Ginn and Co., 1913. 
Newcomb, T. M., and E. L. Hartley(eds.)--RSP 
Readings in Social Psychologr. 
New York: Henry Holt and. Co., 1947 ~ 
Northridge, Williron L.--MTU 
Modern Theories of the Unconscious. 
New York: D. P. Dutton, 19~. 
Overholt, Willi&m Alvin.--RAN 
Reason and the Nonrational in Lovejoy, Montague, and 
Tsano:f':f'. 
P.h. D. Dissertation, Boston u., 1951. 
Pegis, Anton C.(ed.)-~BWTA 
Basic Writings of Saint 'Thomas Aquinas. 
New York: Random House, 19[i..:S. 
Pen:f'ield, Wilder.--Art.(l950) 
uThe Cerebral Cortex and the Mind o:r Man. n 
Laslett(ed.), PBM~ 56-64 
Perry, Ralph Barton.--GTV 
General Theory o:r Value. 
New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926. 
278 
Plsmenatz, John.~-EU 
The English Utilitarians. 
OXford! Basil .BlackWell, 1949. 
Plato.-... REP 
The Republic, (tr. and ed. Paul Shorey, in Loeb Classical 
Library). 
Crunbridge: Harvard University Press, 1930. 
Pratt, James B.--RAL 
Reason in the Art o~ Living. 
New York: Macmillan Co., 1949. 
Prichard, H. A.--MO 
MOral Obligation. 
New York: OXford Press, 1949. 
Prior, A. N.--LBE . 
Logic and the Basis of Ethics. 
Oxford: Oxford Press, 1949. 
Quillian, Wm. F.·, Jr.--Art. {1949) 
"The Problem of Moral Obligation. n 
Eth., 6o, 1(1949), 40-48. 
Rand, Benjgmin(ed.)--CM 
The Classical Moralists. 
Boston: Houghton ~tlfflin, (1909)1937. 
---~--(ed.)--MCP 
Modern Classical Philosophers. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1908. 
Rank, Otto.--WTTR 
Will Therapy and ·Truth and Reality, (tr. Jessie Taft). 
New York: A1~ed Knopf, 1945. 
Raphel, D. D.--MS 
Moral Sense. 
London: Oxford Press, 1947. 
Reiner, Hans.--PN 
Pf1icht un Neigung. 
Meisenheim/Glan: WestkUl turverlog Anton Hain, 1951. 
Rhine, Jrunes B.--NFM 
New Frontiers of the Mind. 
New York: Farrar & Rhinehart, Inc., 1937. 
Rhine~ Joseph B.--ROM 
'lhe Reach of" the Mind.. 
New''York: William Sloane Associates, 1947. 
Rogers~ A. K.--MIR 
Morals in Review. 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927. 
Rogers, Carl and Others.~-CCT 
Client Centered T.herapl. 
Boston: Houghton Mit:r in_ Co., 195lo 
Ruch, Floyd L.--PAL 
Psycholo~ and Life. 
New Yor i Scott, Foresman and Co., 1948. 
Ruggiero, Guido de.--EX1 
EXistentialism. 
New York: Social Science PubliShers, 1948. 
Runes, Dagobert D.(ed.)--DP 
Dictionary of" Philosophy. 
New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 
Russell, Bertrand.--BWP 
A History of" Western Philosop~y. 
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945 • 
.... _ .............. Rs 
Reli~ion and Science. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1935. 
Sartre, Jean Paul.--EXI 
Existentialism, (tr. Bernard F.rechtman). 
New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1947. 
Schilpp, Paul A.--Art.(l936) 
"On the Nature of" the Ethical Problem. n 
Eth., 47, 2(1936), 57-69. 
Sharp, F. C.--GWIW 
Good Will and Ill Will. 
Chicago: University of" Chicago Press, 1950. 
Sheldon, W. H., and S. S. Stevens.--VOT 
The Varieties of" Te~rament. 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. 
Sherman, Mandel, and Irene case Sherman.--PHB 
The Process o:f Hmnan Behavior. 
New York: W. W. Norton & Go., Inc., 1929. 
Sherrington, G. s.--IANS 
The Integrative Action o:f the Nervous System. 
New Haven: Yale Uhiversity Press, 1906: 
280 
Shock, Nathan W.--Art. (1940) 
nT.he Effect of Benzedrine and o:f Thyroid and Pituitary 
Substances on Mental Life." 
Whipple(ed.)--INN., 139-141. 
Smith, Norman Kamp(tr. )--CPR 
Immanuel Kant 1 s Critique of Pure Reason. 
London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1929. 
Somerville, J"obn.--SE 
Soviet Ethics. 
New York: Philosophical Library~ Inc., 1946. 
Sorokin, P. A.(ed.)--EALB 
lorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior. 
Boston: Beac on Press, 19 1. 
Sperry, w. L.-·-Art. (1942) 
110Ur Moral Chaos·. n 
Fortune, 25(1942), 102-104. 
Spinoza, Benedictus de.--ETH 
Spinoza's Eth. and De intellectus emendotinne, 
( tr. A. Boyle ) • 
New York: E. P. Dutton and Go., 1910. 
Stace, W. T.--COM 
The Concept of Morals. 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937. 
Stern, William.--GPPS 
General Ps cholo :from the Personalistic Stand oint, 
r. H. D. poerl • 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938. 
Stevenson, Gharles·L.--EL 
Ethics and Language. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944. 
Sullivan, H. S.--CMP 
Conce tions of Modern Ps chiatr • 
Reprinted from Psychiatry, 3 19 0) and 8(1945). 
Washington, D. C.: William Alanson White Foundation. 
Thiesen, John w.--Art.(19~3) 
"Effects of Certain Forms of Emotion on the Normal 
Electroencephafr.ogram~n 
Arch. Psych., 255(1943), 5-85. 
Thilly, Frank.--HOP 
History of Philosophy. 
New York: Henry Holt & Co., (191~)1940. 
281 
Thomas Aquinas.--BWTA 
Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, (ed. Anton C. Pegis). 
New York: Random House, 1945 .. 
Thorpe, Louis Peter.--CPD 
Child Psychology and Development. 
Na\'11 York: The Ronald Press Co •. , 1946. 
Titchener, Edward B.--Art.(l898) 
nThe Postulates of a Structural 
Phil. Rev., 7 (1898), 449-~65. 
Reprinted in Dennis(ed.), RHP, 
Titus, Harold H.--WAM 
What Is A Mature ~/Iora1it:y:?­
New York: The Macmillan Co. 
Psychology." 
366-3?6. 
Tompkins, Silvan S.(ed.)--CP 
Cont~porary Psychopathology. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. 
Toulmin, Stephen Edelston--PRE 
The Place of Reason in Ethics. 
Cambridge: university Press, 1950. 
Ulich, Robert.--CCL 
Conditions of Civilized Living. 
New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1946. 
Waddington, Conrad Hall and Others.--SAE 
Science and Ethics. 
New York: G. Allen, 1942• 
Watson, John B.--BEH 
Behaviorism. 
New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 19~. 
Werkmeister, W. H.--BSK 
The Basis and Structure of Know1ed e. 
Nev1 York: Harper and Bros., 19 
Wester.marck, Edward.--ER 
Ethical Relativity. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1932. 
------ODMI 
Origin and Development of Moral Ideas. 
New York: T.he Macmillan Co., 1906-oB. 
Whipple, Guy Montrose(ed.)--INN 
282 • 
Intelligence: Itts Nature and Nurture, Part I. 
(Thirty-ninth Yearbook of the National Society for 
the Study of Education) 
Bloomington, Ill.: Public School Publishing Co., 1940. 
Whitehead, Alfred North • .;.,.;.rMOT 
Modes-of Thought. 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938. 
------PR 
Process and Reali~. 
New York: T.he So~al Science Book Store, (1929)1950. 
------SMW 
Science and the Modern World. 
New York: The American Library, (1925)1948. 
(Pelican Mentor Books, M28). 
Whitrow, G • J.--sou 
The Structure of the Universe. 
London: Hutchinsonts University Library, 1949. 
Wilder, A. N.(ed.)--LLR 
Liberal Learning and Religion. 
New York: Harper and Bros., 1951. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig.--TLP 
Tractotus Logico-Philosophicus. 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1922. 
Witty, P. A., and H. S. Schacter.--Art.(l936) 
"Hypothyroidism as a Factor in Maladjustment." 
Jour. Psych., 2(1936), 377-392. 
Woodworth, R. s., and Donald G. Marquis .. --PSY 
Psycholof:• 
New Yor~ Henry Holt & Co., 1947. 
283 
Wundt, Wilhelm.--ETH 
Ethics, (trs. E~ B. Titchener, J'ulia Henrietta Gulliver, 
Margaret F. Washburn) • 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1897-1901. 
Young, K~ball.--SP 
Social Psychology. 
New York: F. s. Cro.f'ts and Co., 1944. 
Zeigler, Harley Herschel.--CUPP 
Some Aspects of the Concept of' Unconscious Purpose in 
Modern Philosophy. 
Boston University, P.h. D. Dissertation, 1940. 
284 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose o~ this dissertation is to examine 
several important philosophical problems connected with 
deriving moral laws from psychological data. 
The concept of moral laws, arising perhaps even 
prior to recorded history, and developing throughout the 
entire history of human thought, has evolved steadily 
• -· ·:! 
under diversified and penetrating criticism, but persists 
,-
as a living philosophical issue. 
Edgar s .. Brightman's Moral Laws was the first at-
tempt to base specific moral laws chiefly on empirical 
data, though his use of data produced by studies in psy-
chology was limited. ~e present investigation owes much 
to Brightman's earlier work. 
For purposes of this dissertation, moral laws are 
defined as verifiable principles of constant, genetic 
relevance between choices and foreseeable consequences 
for values. 
Bationalistic approaches to moral laws are found 
to be abstract and inadequate before real-life moral pro-
blems. Empirical approaches demonstrate a capacity to 
·deal with the unpredictabilities of real-life problems 
and to assist in achieving same rational control of self 
and circumstances. Bationalistic coherence is secondary 
to empirical coherence. 
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Principal objections to, or misinterpretations of, 
' ~ ,_ - -
an empirical approach Which are considered and rejected 
are: 
1. The claim of the primacy of metaphysics. The right-
ful function of metaphysics is to render a comprehensive 
and coherent account of experience, not to prejudge it. 
Universals for an adequate metaphysics can be found only 
in experience. 
2. The Kantian exclusion of empirical data. Kant as-
sumes! priority where there is none; his examples of the 
"supreme practical principle 11 applied are all over-simpli-
fications, while real moral problems are usually complex, 
devoid of the clear-cut choices he assumes; 11du ty for 
duty's sake" is incoherent with "treat all persons as 
ends"; he does not actually succeed in eliminating concern 
for consequences even in his own system; his objections 
are inapplicable to the present investigation. Rant does 
succeed in showing that moral obligation is an underived 
category of mind. 
3. Relativistic and positivistic misinterpretations. 
a. Relativists (typified by Weatermarck) characteris-
tically fail to recognize possibilities of empirically 
verifiable moral laws, directing their attacks principal-
ly against absolutism. MOst relativists classify moral 
experience as exclusively emotio~al, thus failing to re-
cognize the unity of personalit.Y in assuming an atomistic 
philosophy of personality. 
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b. Positivists (typified by Ayer) repeat the faulty 
atomistic concept of personality; arbitrarily seek to lindt 
experience to thought about the sensible world, thus elimin-
ating themselves from consideration of ethical problems 
- . - . . .. 
(without eliminating the ethical problems); and fail to 
raise any valid objection to the approaCh of this disserta-
tion. 
The _£Ught-to-be must be formulated from what!! or 
m~-be. Prescribed choices must be possible but not neces-
sary, else there is no choice. ~e more we know of the ±s, 
the more we understand the may-be, and the better equipped 
we become to formulate a rational criterion for the ought-
to-be. The Chief contribution of psyChological studies is 
to clarify the ~y-be through investigations of personality, 
value experience, and genetic relevance between choices and 
foreseeable consequences for values. PsyChological contri-
butions are largely informative, providing no axiological 
nor moral norms for evaluating the data. Norms are hypo-
theses, tested philosophically, utilizing all relevant data. 
It is necessary to understand persons, their dynam-
ice, their possibilities, and their limitations, in order 
to discuss moral problems of persons intelligently. The 
term 1'personali ty 11 , as used by psychologists, is enmeshed 
in ambigui~. No adequate psyChology of personality is pos-
sible apart from a philosophy of personality. Personality 
is the most complex of all objects of study, and the vari-
28? 
ous ttelemen ts n studied by psychological specialists can 
be meaningful only within a synoptic view • 
. The philosophy ~f personality developed in this 
dissertation is a possible answer to the above need. 
1. Persons are found to be, in part, minds. Mind is 
the total content of rational, nonrational, and irration-
al consciousness, including the patterns developed by con-
sciousness. It is characterized by a continual effort to 
adapt the total personality with its needs and potentiali-
ties to the believed possibilities of fulfilment. It en-
deavors to understand relationships of ~ings and ideas, 
conceives values, and pursues goals purposively. It under-
takes to 1:>ind together past experience, present awareness, 
and anticipated experience into a coherent, evolving, unity 
of consciousness. All mental phenomena, ~ot excepting the 
so-called "unconscious", are included in the activities of 
consciousness. 
2. Certain behavior of the human organism is best 
understood as both functionally and ontologically conti~u­
ous with mental activi;ty. Idealistic and materialistic 
reductionisms, dualism, parallelism, and interactionism 
are all both functionally and philosophically inadequate 
to account for this continuity. Personality must be under-
stood as a continuous psychophysical energy (Hi .agreement 
with Stern, Allport, Johnson, DeWolf, etc.), knowable 
noumenally (i. e., through self-consciousness) as mind, 
phenomenally as part of the organism's behavior. This 
view is coherent with a personalistic metaphysics (in 
agreement with _DeWolf). 
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3. To a large measure, society participates in the 
life-space (~o~lowing _Lewin) of a person<.. Those psycho-
physical modifications called forth by relation with so-
ciety and absorbed by the persona.li ty are onto logically 
identical with the total person. 
4. Persons develop progressively as potentialities 
are actualized. Potentialities _may be teleological an~or 
autonomous. The dynamics of personality are literally 
thrusts, or drives, as investments of energy in quest of 
actualization of potentialities. Such thrusts may rise 
to or originate in consciousness as motives. .Among tele-
ological ne~ds are: 11Wett experience, creative experience, 
aesthetic experience, and moral rightness. 
5. A person is a system of diversified socio-psycho-
physical energies, more or less integrated by voluntary 
behavior, Chief among which are certain mental activities. 
F.reud analyzes conscience as the internalization 
of the parental-social taboo against incestuous desires, 
and/or the development of an ideal-ego in compensation for 
weaknesses of the real ego. Bertocci successfully refutes 
this view by showing that the experience of moral obliga-
tion cannot be equated witl:l, nor derived from, guilt, 
shame, or fear, and that it is characterized by a unique 
voluntariness that could never emerge from strategic 
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ordering of rewards and punisruments. Moral rightness ful-
fils an important teleological potentiality, and while 
' ' -
~ntent is learned, the £apacity for oughting can in no 
wise be "conditioned" into existence. Morality is a dis-
tinct and unique function of the self; not a distinct 
drive among other dri vee; but a demand for quality in all 
experience -- a self-imposed obligation to choose the best 
possible as understood. This position implies the obliga-
tion to reason about the best; calls attention to the dif-
ference between assessing individual moral responsibility 
and determining the best moral standard; points to the 
necessity of criteria not contained in psychological data; 
and reasserts the validity of Kant's claim that the capaci-
ty for moral obligation is an ~ priori category of mind 
(but not that moral laws can be formulated apart from em-
pirical considerations). 
'nl.e following a.re implied areas for further study: 
1. Development of a theory of value; 
2. Clarification of applicable logic; 
3. Accumulation and classification of data; 
4. Application to personal and social moral problems. 
Conclusions: 
1. The abstraction and inadequacy of non-empirical 
approaches to real-life moral problems strongly ~plies 
an urgent necessity to investigate empirical approaches. 
290 
2. Psychological data may be utilized (as specified 
in 5 and 4 1 below) for the derivation of moral laws de ..... 
fined as principles of consta.nttr verifiable, genetic rele-
vance between choices and foreseeable consequences in 
values. 
3. The important contributions of psychological data 
are: (a) broader lmowledga of possibilities in mental 
and physical behavior of persons" which affords rational 
grounds for the ought-to~be; and (b) help in clarifying 
the nature of moral choices and their relations to values .• 
4.. Thus (following 3), while actual derivation of 
moral laws involves evaluations which1 as such1 are not 
contained in psychological data, any valid axiological 
oriteria must take account of the information such data 
afford concerning the experiences of persons. Hence psy~ 
ehologica.l data contribute even to the criteria whereby 
they must be evaluated. in the formulation of moral laws. 
5. All mental phenomena must be accounted for within the 
activities of aonsciousness 1 though the so-called 11unao~ 
saious 11 suggests new dimensions of consciousness. 
e. Persons must be regarded as more or less integra~ 
ed systems of socio-psycho ... physica.l energy, characterized 
by constant development! as satisfactions for teleological 
and autonomous potentialities are sought. 
7. While there is no distinct drive for moral right-
ness, it is a distinct. teleological need, of both diversi-
fied and specific nature:, achievable only through highest 
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possible quality in satisfaction of other potentialities. 
Capacity for moral rightness can be conditioned, but not 
created, by the impact of society. 
8. This investigation points to further studies, both 
philosophical and scientific in nature, as additional 
:· 
necessary steps toward derivation of specific laws. 
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~d :pastor at Aeu.s~et, M.a.~ s., in _:;Je:ptember, _19_~0. He was 
ordained a deacon in 1941; an elder in 1943; and became a 
member of the New England &>uthern Conference of the 
Methodist Church. 
Bender received the A.B. degree from Boston Univer-
sity in 1943; and the A.M. degree in :philosophy in 1944. 
During the academic year, 1943-44 and the first half of 
1944•45, h.e was student assistant to Dr. L. Harold DeWolf 
. . . . 
of Boston university; lectured in philosophy in the Bos-
- . 
ton University School of Education; and served as Protes-
tant Chaplain tor three hospitals in and around New Bed-
ford, Mas a. 
Bender was appointed Assistant Professor of Phil-
osophy and Psychology at Ba.ker University, :Ba.ldwin, Kan-
sas, effective February 1, 1945. In 1948 he was appoint-
ed Director of Religious Life and Assistant Professor of 
Philosophy at :Baker. Doctoral atudi es were pursued 
summers a.t Boston Ub.iversi ty and Harvard Uhiversi ty. 
A textbook entitled ~Philosophy of Life, develo:ped 
by Bender in connection ~th a course by the same name he 
taught at Baker, was published by Philosophical Library, 
Inc., in 1949. 
For the .Academic Year, 1951-52, Bender was made a 
Faculty Fellow of the Foundation for the Advancement of 
Education and granted a leave-of-absence from Baker Uni-
versity to complete studies for the doctorate. 
